In Kauffman v. Pennsylvania Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, the Honorable Stuart Dalzell, a judge of this Court, set forth the applicable legal standard to determine whether a private defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. 766 F. Supp. 2d 555 (E.D. Pa. 2011). In Kauffman, the private defendants were employees of Pennsylvania Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals ("PSPCA"), a private non-profit corporation.

In Kauffman v. Pennsylvania Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, the Honorable Stuart Dalzell, a judge of this Court, set forth the applicable legal standard to determine whether a private defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. 766 F. Supp. 2d 555 (E.D. Pa. 2011). In Kauffman, the private defendants were employees of Pennsylvania Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals ("PSPCA"), a private non-profit corporation.

At the outset, the affidavit provides that Galvin: had been a humane society officer for approximately a year and a half; had been trained on the applicable animal cruelty statute by the Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture; was employed by Animal Friends; and had been sworn into the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas by Judge Borkowski. (Docket No. 15-1 at 3); see Kauffman v. Pennsylvania Soc. for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 766 F.Supp.2d 555, 559 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (upholding a warrant issued by a magistrate judge based on a humane society officer's affidavit of probable cause, which reviewed, inter alia, the officer's training, qualifications, and employment).

In her responsive brief, Plaintiff submits that Defendants satisfy the state actor requirement because they are entities statutorily authorized to enforce Pennsylvania laws pertaining to criminal cruelty to animals violations under 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5511, citing Allen v. Pennsylvania Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 488 F. Supp. 2d 450, 454 (M.D. Pa. 2007). See alsoKauffman v. Pa. Soc. for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 766 F. Supp. 2d 555, 566 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (PSPCA agent's undercover search of alleged abuser's property was conducted pursuant to 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5511(i), and thus, agent was a state actor for § 1983 purposes because he "exercised 'powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the State.'") Based on the district court's decisions in Allen and Kauffman, it appears that Defendants satisfy the state actor requirement. Therefore, the Court turns to the question of whether Plaintiff has stated plausible claims against Defendants for violations of her constitutional rights.

18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5511(i).Kauffman v. Pennsylvania Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 766 F.Supp.2d 555, 568 (E.D.Pa.2011).

“This is not surprising in view of the reality that the [defendant Pennsylvania Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals] only came into being in 1868 and that it is not unlikely that other such societies were not established until after 1871.” Kauffman v. Pa. Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 766 F.Supp.2d 555, 564–65 (E.D.Pa.2011) (footnote omitted). Thus, there is no tradition of immunity for animal-welfare officers, nor is there a clear tradition of denying immunity to employees of animal-welfare organizations.

“This is not surprising in view of the reality that the [defendant Pennsylvania Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals] only came into being in 1868 and that it is not unlikely that other such societies were not established until after 1871.” Kauffman v. Pa. Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 766 F.Supp.2d 555, 564–65 (E.D.Pa.2011) (footnote omitted). Thus, there is no tradition of immunity for animal-welfare officers, nor is there a clear tradition of denying immunity to employees of animal-welfare organizations.

Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 588 provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy when police seize property pursuant to an investigation.Potts v. City of Phila., 224 F. Supp. 2d 919, 938 (E.D. Pa. 2002); see also Kauffman v. Pa. Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 766 F. Supp. 2d 555, 571 n.7 (E.D. Pa. 2011). Plaintiffs took advantage of this process when they filed a motion in state court to quash the search warrant, for the suppression of evidence, and for the return of the property.

See Benhur v. Madavaram, No. 15-6826, 2015 WL 6739109, at *6 (D.N.J. Nov. 2, 2015) (noting distinction between a “claim” and a “prayer for relief”); see also Kauffman v. PSPCA, 766 F.Supp.2d 555, 560 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (“The relief a plaintiff seeks, and the claims he asserts, are [ ] conceptually distinct components of a complaint, and there is no need for a plaintiff to devote a separate count of a complaint to a request for a certain type of relief.”).

See McKenna v. Portman, 538 Fed.Appx. 221, 224-25 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding that no cognizable due process claim could exist because Rule 588(A) “provides a process to challenge the seizure of property and a protocol to request its return” (citing Potts v. City of Philadelphia, 224 F.Supp.2d 919, 938 (E.D. Pa. 2002) and Kauffman v. Pa. Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 766 F.Supp.2d 555, 571 n.7 (E.D. Pa. 2011)); Johnson v. Koehler, Civ. A. No. 4:18-CV-807, 2020 WL 5488939, at *6 (M.D. Pa. June 11, 2020) (same), R. & R. adopted, Civ. A. No. 18-807, 2020 WL 5439899 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2020); see also Houston v. City of Philadelphia, Civ. A. No. 13-4442, 2015 WL 4404853, at *6 (E.D. Pa. July 20, 2015) (granting summary judgment on plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment due process claim based on defendants' failure to return plaintiff's gun after charges were dismissed because plaintiff failed to meet burden of showing that Rule 588 relief was unavailable or patently inadequate), aff'd 669 Fed.Appx. 89 (3d Cir. 2016) (per curiam).