Summary
In Kast v. Antonsson (A117115, Apr. 4, 2008 [nonpub. opn.]) (Kast I), we affirmed the trial court’s decision to award appellant’s former husband, respondent John W. Kast, presumed father status with respect to appellant’s daughter under Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d).
Summary of this case from Kast v. AntonssonOpinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
San Francisco Super. Ct. No. FPT-06-375647
Ruvolo, P. J.
I. Introduction
In her handwritten two-page opening brief, appellant Anna Karin Antonsson, acting in propria persona, challenges the lower court’s “decision to reward presumed fatherhood status to John Winspeare Kast.” We are compelled by law to affirm the trial court’s decision because of appellant’s failure to designate a record, identify any errors made by the trial court, and cite any law or authority supporting her allegations.
II.
Facts and Procedural History
Our review of this case is severely impeded by the multiple deficiencies in appellant’s briefs. We summarize the facts as best we can. On July 6, 2006, respondent filed an ex parte application seeking, among other things, to be declared the presumed father of S.A. S.A. had just turned 13 at the time of the hearing. Respondent sought a determination of his “legal rights and obligations to [S.A.] at this point in her life” because of appellant’s “fragile mental condition.”
This statement of facts is taken principally from the superior court’s statement of decision dated January 18, 2007, which is appended to respondent’s brief.
The court ruled that respondent, while not S.A.’s biological father, had attained presumed father status under Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d). The court found that the evidence unequivocally demonstrated that respondent “has in fact been the only father [S.A.] has known in her life. [Respondent] has held [S.A.] out as his own, received [S.A.] into his home, financially provided for her, and along with his biological son, Martin, has created a family home where [S.A.] is welcomed and indeed has spent much of her young life.”
While appellant and respondent were not husband and wife at the time of S.A.’s conception, Martin was conceived during the parties’ short marriage. In 1987, respondent was granted sole physical custody of Martin based on appellant’s deteriorating mental state.
The court indicated that as a result of appellant’s mental illness, S.A. has “suffered physically, emotionally and academically.” S.A. herself, as well as her lawyer and her psychologist, supported respondent’s petition requesting that he be awarded presumed father status. The court found giving S.A.’s relationship with respondent “legal standing” would be in S.A.’s best interest, because she would now be residing in “a safe and stable environment.” This appeal followed.
III. Discussion
Appellant’s briefs consist of a first-person narrative, including rambling accusations against respondent and assertions of error in the trial court’s statement of decision. After a passionate recitation of her version of the events in question, she urges this court to order “an independent highly qualified child adolescent psychiatrist/psychologist to independently determine what is in my daughter’s best interest.”
Appellant is representing herself on appeal. One may act as his or her own attorney, but when a litigant appears in propria persona, he or she is held to the same restrictive rules of procedure and evidence as an attorney. (Nelson v. Gaunt (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 623, 638-639.)
We first conclude appellant has waived her right to argue on appeal that the court’s factual findings were not supported because she has failed to set forth all of the evidence which was presented to the trial court. “ ‘It is well established that a reviewing court starts with the presumption that the record contains evidence to sustain every finding of fact.’ [Citations.]” (Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881 (Foreman).) Appellant’s assertion that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s order granting presumed father status to respondent required her to demonstrate that there is no substantial evidence to support the challenged ruling. (See ibid.; Campbell v. Southern Pacific Co. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 51, 60; Howard v. Owens Corning (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 621, 630-631.) All material evidence on that question must be set forth in appellant’s briefs and not merely appellant’s own evidence and argument. (Foreman, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 881; Jordan v. City of Santa Barbara (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1245, 1255 (Jordan).) Unless this is done, the appellate court may presume the record contains evidence to sustain every finding of fact. (Toigo v. Town of Ross (1998) 70 Cal.App.4th 309, 317; Foreman, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 881; Jordan, supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at p. 1255.)
Moreover, we have not been furnished with a record of any of the relevant proceedings in the trial court. Nor has appellant provided us with a settled statement of those proceedings. It is the appellant’s burden to provide an adequate record on appeal. (Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 574 [“a party challenging a judgment has the burden of showing reversible error by an adequate record”]; In re Kathy P. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 91, 102 [“appellant . . . has not met her burden of showing error by an adequate record”].) An appellant’s failure to provide an adequate record on appeal “precludes an adequate review and results in affirmance of the trial court’s determination. [Citation.]” (Estrada v. Ramirez (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 618, 620, fn. 1.)
“ ‘ “Instead of a fair and sincere effort to show that the trial court was wrong, appellant’s brief is a mere challenge to respondent[] to prove that the court was right.” ’ ” (People v. Dougherty (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 278, 283.) The fact that the trial court could have issued other orders more favorable to appellant does not demonstrate error on appeal. (See Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870, 874.)
IV. Disposition
The judgment is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to respondent.
We concur: Sepulveda, J., Rivera, J.