We have construed this same provision in a similar' treaty to mean that a prisoner's accrual of good time credits is governed by the law of the state to which he is transferred, effective on the date of the transfer. Kass v. Reno, 83 F.3d 1186, 1192 (10th Cir. 1996). Thus, from 2003 onward the administration of Mr. Jolivet's good time credits is a matter that he must take up with the Canadian authorities.

Once a sentence has been imposed by a foreign sentencing court and translated by the Parole Commission into a sentence under our penal law, it is the BOP's determination of service credits that has been challenged in habeas corpus proceedings under "manner of execution."See Kass v. Reno, 83 F.3d 1186, 1191 (10th Cir. 1996) ("Congress made it clear that despite the provision barring United States courts from reviewing the validity of a foreign conviction or sentence, `a transferred offender may challenge in the [United States] . . . the manner of the execution of his confinement' and `[a]ny challenge in the courts of the [United States], other than to the foreign conviction or sentence is not precluded by [the implementing statutes], or any treaty.'" (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 95-720, at 43 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3146, 3165) (alterations in original) (emphasis added)). The district judge adopted the magistrate judge's conclusion that Bishop's habeas petition "involve[d] questions concerning both the nature of the sentence and the execution of the sentence."

(providing that there can be no parole consideration until the expiration of the ineligibility period). Thus, Kass v. Reno, 83 F.3d 1186 (10th Cir. 1996), governs. In Kass, we considered a sentence which expressly provided that early release was conditioned upon Kass' "submit[ting] himself during his internment to a material work regimen and intellectual activities directed to achieve his readaptation to social life."

County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979). When that happens, the case must be dismissed because there is simply no work for the Court to do. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 8 (1998) ("[M]ootness, however it may have come about, simply deprives us of our power to act; there is nothing for us to remedy, even if we were disposed to do so."). Where, as here, the BOP restores the previously-forfeited good time at issue, a habeas corpus petition challenging the underlying conviction is rendered moot and must be dismissed. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, No. 2: 17-CV1951-AKK-JEO, 2018 WL 992057, at *2-3 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 11, 2018) (collecting cases and holding that inmate's claims were rendered moot where BOP expunged inmate's disciplinary conviction and rescinded sanctions); Kass v. Reno, 83 F. 3d 1186, 1196 (10th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows:

This is unquestionably correct. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, No. 2: 17-CV1951-AKK-JEO, 2018 WL 992057, at *2-3 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 11, 2018) (collecting cases and holding that inmate's claims were rendered moot where BOP expunged inmate's disciplinary conviction and rescinded sanctions); Kass v. Reno, 83 F. 3d 1186, 1196 (10th Cir. 1996). In his reply, Pearson contends that during the same October 2017 hearing, the DHO considered and found him guilty of other Incident Reports and that as a result "a total of 163 days was sanctioned..." For the first time Pearson asks this Court to find these convictions invalid on constitutional grounds.

Because Frascarelli had not completed the requisite period of incarceration required to become eligible for early release or sentence reduction in Mexico, the labor credits he seeks had not "been given" by Mexico to him at the time of his transfer, within the meaning of section 4105. Though the Second Circuit has not addressed this question, the Tenth Circuit addressed a similar set of facts in Kass v. Reno, 83 F.3d 1186 (10th Cir. 1996). The Kass court concluded that the transferred prisoner, Kass, was not entitled to habeas corpus relief. Kass, much like Frascarelli, argued that he was eligible for early release or sentence modification, based on credits he earned during incarceration in Mexico.

Plaintiff cites a string of cases in support of this argument. Doc. 115 at 34 (citing Singer v. City of Topeka, 227 Kan. 356, 607 P.2d 467 (1980); United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963); Pfeifer v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 615 F.2d 873 (9th Cir.1980); Kass v. Reno, 83 F.3d 1186 (10th Cir.1996)). Plaintiff provides no analysis of their holdings and never tries to apply them to the facts of her case.

The Treaty precludes United States courts from reviewing the validity of the underlying foreign conviction or sentence. Kass v. Reno, 83 F.3d 1186, 1191 (10th Cir. 1996). See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 4601A(b)(1)(A), (2)(A); Cafi v. United States Parole Commission, 268 F.3d 467, 474 (7th Cir. 2001) (a defendant is not actually "sentenced" under Section 4106A). According to Buitron, the Commission was "dilatory" in imposing the term of supervised release, and the Commission did not inform the appellate court or "the parties" of the 60-month term (Doc. 1, p. 4; Doc. 1-2, p. 4).

30 U.S.T. 6263, Article IV, Section 1. (Emphasis added). In Kass v. Reno, 83 F.3d 1186 (10th Cir. 1996), the Tenth Circuit addressed a similar issue to the one encountered in this case. In Kass, the petitioner was convicted in Mexico, and requested that he serve his sentence in the United States, which was granted.

Respondent responds that petitioner has not completed his 20-year Mexican sentence because petitioner agreed, when he accepted the USPC's proposed expedited parole revocation proposal, that he would receive no credit for the time he was in absconder status from July 3, 1991, through October 15, 2001.See Respondent's Exhibits BB and CC. Under the United States-Mexico Treaty, any collateral challenge to a transferee's Mexican conviction can be brought only in Mexico, not in the courts of the United States. See Kass v. Reno, 83 F.3d 1186, 1189 (10th Cir. 1996). Although petitioner may challenge the execution of his sentence under Section 2241, he may not challenge the fact of his conviction or the length of his sentence in the United States courts.