Summary
In Kaseburg, seventy-eight plaintiffs, all members of this class action, filed suit requesting an order quieting title in the property at issue in this case against a number of defendants, including King County, Washington ("King County").
Summary of this case from Haggart v. United StatesOpinion
CASE NO. C14-0784 JCC
08-23-2016
SCOTT KASEBURG, et al., Plaintiffs, v. PORT OF SEATTLE, et al., Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ALL REMAINING ISSUES
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant King County's motion for summary judgment on all remaining issues (Dkt. No. 165). Having thoroughly considered the parties' briefing, oral argument on August 23, 2016, and the relevant record, the Court hereby GRANTS the motion for the reasons explained herein.
I. BACKGROUND
The facts in this case are already well established. Its central concern is the ownership of a railway corridor (the "Corridor") that stretches along the eastern shore of Lake Washington. In the late 1800s and early 1900s, the Northern Pacific Railway Company assembled the Corridor by purchasing private property and condemning shoreland. (Dkt. Nos. 168-2-168-4 and Dkt. No. 167-3.) In 2008, Northern Pacific's successor in interest, the Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Company, transferred its property interest in the Corridor to King County. (Dkt. No. 83 at 37-38, 40-41, 45.)
At issue in the instant motion are three of the deeds originally acquired by Northern Pacific: the Kittinger Deed, the Lake Washington Land Company Deed ("LWLC Deed"), and the Lake Washington Belt Line Company Deed ("Belt Line Deed"). Also at issue is the State of Washington Shoreland Condemnation. (Dkt. No. 167-3.) The Court has already held that the Belt Line Deed and the Condemnation granted easements entitling the easement holder to "own and exercise the rights inherent in the railroad easement," (Dkt. No. 107 at 6), that these rights include the "exclusive use, possession, and control of the corridor," (Dkt. No. 138 at 5), and that they also include "incidental uses that are consistent with trail use and the operation of a railroad." (Id. at 18.)
In their Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs, who own property near the Corridor, stated two causes for relief. First, they asked for an order quieting title in the Corridor against a number of parties, including King County. (Dkt. No. 83 at 48.) Second, they asked for a declaratory judgment that, among other things, "they are the fee owners of the railroad right-of-way at issue." (Id. at 50.) King County then counterclaimed to quiet title against Plaintiffs and for a declaratory judgment. (Dkt. No. 18 at 10-14.)
To that end, King County now moves the Court to grant summary judgment against Plaintiffs and find as follows:
1. That King County has a fee simple interest in the property conveyed via the Kittinger Deed and the LWLC Deed.
2. That the State of Washington has a reversionary interest in the Condemnation easement.
3. That King County has an easement in the property conveyed via the Belt Line Deed and the Shoreland Condemnation.
4. That Plaintiffs lack standing to bring a quiet title and declaratory judgment action.
As the Court explains below, it finds for King County on each of these issues, which it will address in turn.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Summary Judgment Standard
"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In making such a determination, the Court must view the facts and justifiable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Once a motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported, the opposing party "must come forward with 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the case, and a dispute about a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49. Ultimately, summary judgment is appropriate against a party who "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
B. The Kittinger Deed
The Court has already held that the Kittinger Deed was a "bargain and sale" deed, (Dkt. No. 91 at 5-6), which Plaintiffs do not dispute. Bargain and sale deeds "automatically convey[] a fee simple estate," unless there is "additional language in the deed[] [that] clearly and expressly limits or qualifies the interest conveyed." (Id.)
Plaintiffs argue that the Kittinger Deed expressly limits the interest conveyed. They point to Kershaw Sunnyside Ranches, Inc. v. Yakima Interurban Lines Ass'n, in which the Washington Supreme Court held that the use of "the words 'right of way' in both the granting clause and the habendum clause" of a bargain and sale deed "presumptively evinces the parties' intent to convey only an easement." 156 Wash. 2d 253, 266 (2006). Plaintiffs argue that, as in Kershaw, "[t]he granting clause in Kittinger is for the railroad's 'right-of-way' and it specifically says that it is for 'such purposes.'" (Dkt. No. 170 at 8.)
"A dictionary definition of the habendum of a deed is that it is the clause usually following the granting part of the premises of a deed, which defines the extent of the ownership in the thing granted to be held and enjoyed by the grantee." 26A C.J.S. Deeds § 33.
The Court agrees with King County that this is a misrepresentation—and a blatant one, at that. In fact, the Court has already explained that while the Kittinger Deed does state that the railroad "wishes to secure for such purposes the right-of-way over and across said lands," it does so "external to the granting clause." (Dkt. No. 91 at 6.) As the Court elaborated, "the use of the term 'right of way' outside the granting or habendum clauses does not overcome the presumption of fee conveyance when a bargain and sale deed form was employed, and... the term 'right of way' in a description of the property being conveyed does not qualify as a 'clear and express limitation' on the interest." (Id. at 7) (citing Roeder Co. v. K & E Moving & Storage Co., Inc., 102 Wash. App. 49, 51, 55). Because "right of way" is used outside of the granting and habendum clauses in the Kittinger Deed, it "automatically convey[ed] a fee simple estate."
All of this is essentially a refresher on the Court's order denying Plaintiffs' motion for a declaratory judgment (Dkt. No. 91). That motion requested, among other things, that the Court declare that "the Railroad Originally Acquired an Easement for the Railroad Corridor." (Dkt. No. 91 at 4.) In its order, the Court held that entering a declaratory judgment would have been inappropriate at that time. As the Court explained, one of the bases for its holding was that Defendants had "establish[ed] a genuine dispute" as to what sort of property interest the Kittinger Deed conveyed. (Id. at 5.)
Plaintiffs argue that the existence of that earlier dispute means that summary judgment is still inappropriate. But it was Defendants, not Plaintiffs, who raised that dispute—arguing that in fact the Kittinger Deed conveyed a fee, not an easement. (Id.) Now that it is King County moving for summary judgment, Plaintiffs need to "come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." They have failed to do so. Instead, in the face of King County's persuasive argument that the Kittinger Deed is a bargain and sale deed that does not expressly limit the property interest conveyed—and therefore conveys a fee simple—Plaintiffs offer only rehashed legal arguments that the Court has already rejected.
Because Plaintiffs have not raised a single genuine dispute of material fact, the Court holds that the Kittinger Deed conveyed a fee simple to Northern Pacific. In their Complaint, Plaintiffs admit that King County acquired all of BNSF's property interests (which had been Northern Pacific's) in the Corridor. (Dkt. No. 83 at 111, 121.) The Court therefore finds that King County possesses a fee simple interest in the land conveyed by the Kittinger Deed and quiets title on its behalf.
In the Declaration of Robert Nunnenkamp, Property Agent with the King County Division of Parks and Recreation, he groups Plaintiffs into twelve different categories based on a number of factors, including the location of their property, the language of their conveyances, and their behavior during this lawsuit. (Dkt. No. 168-1.) Plaintiffs do not dispute the bases of the Nunnenkamp Declaration, its findings, or its admissibility. In Category 1, Nunnenkamp groups all those Plaintiffs whose property sits alongside land conveyed to King County by the Kittinger Deed. (Id. at 7.) Again, Plaintiffs do not dispute the accuracy of this grouping. Because King County holds a fee in the Corridor land adjacent to these Plaintiffs' properties, they have failed to demonstrate any interest in this portion of the Corridor. The Court therefore dismisses the claims of all Plaintiffs in Category 1.
Nearly all Plaintiffs fall in more than one category.
C. The Lake Washington Land Company Deed
King County next argues that it has a fee interest in those portions of the Corridor acquired via the LWLC Deed. The Plaintiffs in Haggart v. United States, 108 Fed. Cl. 70 (2012), which involved the vast majority of the Plaintiffs in this case, (Dkt. No. 113 at 8 n.8), stipulated that the LWLC Deed did convey a fee interest. (Dkt. No. 167-4 at 3.) Plaintiffs do not dispute that the LWLC Deed conveyed a fee interest, but they do argue that it is "irrelevant" to this case. (Dkt. No. 170 at 10.)
The Court finds that the LWLC Deed conveyed a fee interest. It is a warranty deed, both because it is captioned as such and because its granting clause states that: "The Grantor the Lake Washington Land Company, a Corporation of the State of Washington, in consideration of the sum of Two Thousand ($2000.00) Dollars, in hand paid, conveys and warrants unto the Northern Pacific Railway Company, a Wisconsin Corporation, the following described real estate...." (Dkt. No. 168-4 at 10) (emphasis added). As with bargain and sale deeds, warranty deeds "convey fee simple title unless additional language in the deeds clearly and expressly limits or qualifies the interest conveyed." Brown v. State, 130 Wash. 2d 430, 437 (1996). There is no such limiting language here.
As for the LWLC Deed's relevance, Plaintiffs argue that King County "has made absolutely no attempt to establish" which individual Plaintiffs own properties adjacent to land conveyed by the LWLC Deed. (Dkt. No. 170 at 10.) That is incorrect. Instead, as King County points out in its reply, the Nunnenkamp Declaration explicitly identifies all of the Plaintiffs whose properties are adjacent to the LWLC Deed, and groups them together as Category 2. (Dkt. No. 168-1 at 7.)
In fact, the LWLC Deed is relevant for an additional reason that King County could not have foreseen when bringing its motion due to Plaintiffs' egregiously improper behavior. As the Court explains below, despite its previous order requiring Plaintiffs to disclose their chains of title, (Dkt. No. 138 at 22), they never did so. (Dkt. No. 171 at 9-10.) Nonetheless, in Plaintiffs' response to King County's motion, they present, for the first time, chains of title for four sets of Plaintiffs, arguing that this evidence demonstrates that these Plaintiffs have a property interest in the Corridor. (Id.) But what three of the chains actually demonstrate is that these Plaintiffs' properties (and the properties of many of the Plaintiffs in this suit) actually derive from a deed sold by the Lake Washington Land Company after it had sold the LWLC Deed to Northern Pacific; in other words, after it no longer had any reversionary interest in the Corridor that it could convey. (Compare Dkt. No. 168-4 with Dkt. No. 170-3 at 3, 27.) Therefore, the LWLC deed is highly relevant to this suit, a fact that Plaintiffs, given their endless obfuscations, may well have realized.
Plaintiffs do not specifically dispute any of Nunnenkamp's findings. Rather, they state, without any citations or elaboration, that the Nunnenkamp Declaration "conflicts with the prior title work performed on behalf of the Port and King County," and that the "only evidence before the Court on this subject is the title work and mapping performed on behalf of the Port and King County as set forth in Cindy Straup's Declaration." (Dkt. No. 170 at 10-11 & n.21.) But "[a] summary judgment motion cannot be defeated by relying solely on conclusory allegations unsupported by factual data." Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Moreover, the Straup Declaration, which was submitted over a year ago, did not address the LWLC Deed. (Dkt. No. 113-1.) Straup never even reviewed it. (Id. at 3.)
The Court therefore finds that the LWLC Deed conveyed a fee simple interest in the Corridor to Northern Pacific, which has since been transferred to King County. As a result, the Court dismisses the claims of all Plaintiffs whose property is adjacent to the LWLC Deed—i.e., all Plaintiffs in Category 2 of the Nunnenkamp Declaration.
D. The State of Washington Shoreland Condemnation
On October 6, 1903, Northern Pacific initiated a condemnation proceeding in King County Superior Court against a number of defendants. (Dkt. No. 167-1.) The goal—which it achieved—was to extend the Corridor over submerged shorelands along Lake Washington. (Id.) In December of that year, a jury resolved the defendants' competing claims to the shorelands, finding that "the State of Washington is the owner of all the shore lands of the second class described in the petition." (Dkt. No. 167-2 at 2.) The State was therefore entitled to compensation for Northern Pacific's condemnation. (Id.) The Superior Court entered final judgment and a decree of appropriation on February 8, 1904. (Dkt. No. 167-3.)
A number of Plaintiffs, identified in the Nunnenkamp Declaration as those in Category 3, live alongside land that Northern Pacific obtained via the Condemnation and are attempting to quiet title to the underlying fee. (Dkt. No. 168-1.) King County admits that it only obtained a railroad easement through the Condemnation land, (Dkt. No. 138 at 7-8), but it argues that the Category 3 Plaintiffs cannot quiet title because the reversionary interest in the fee belongs to the State of Washington.
Plaintiffs do not deny that the State owned the shorelands at the time of the condemnation proceedings. (Dkt. No. 170 at 11.) But they argue, again without authority or evidence, that it no longer owns the reversionary interest today. (Id.) This is plainly incorrect: the fee owner of property underlying an easement retains a reversionary interest in that property. See Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Trust v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1257, 1265 (2014) ("In other words, if the beneficiary of the easement abandons it, the easement disappears, and the landowner resumes his full and unencumbered interest in the land."). Plaintiffs provide no basis for their implicit argument that because they own property alongside the Condemnation easement, they, not the State, possess the reversionary interest in the underlying fee.
Plaintiffs also argue that because the State of Washington is not a party to this suit, it is irrelevant whether it owns the fee in the condemnation land. But the Category 3 Plaintiffs are attempting to quiet title to land that King County has shown actually belongs to the State. These Plaintiffs are therefore required to raise some material dispute to this argument in order to preserve their quiet title claims; they must, in other words, provide sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that they are the true owners of the underlying fee. They have not done so—in fact, they haven't provided any evidence at all. Plaintiffs may not quiet title to land that they do not actually own, regardless of whether the true owner is a party to the suit. See King Cty. v. Squire Inv. Co., 59 Wash. App. 888, 899 (1990) ("[O]wnership should be determined according to the title [one] holds rather than according to whether other parties fortuitously learned of the litigation and appeared to press their claim.").
The Court therefore dismisses the Category 3 Plaintiffs' claims. In addition, the Court holds that because Northern Pacific acquired railroad easements in the Corridor via the Condemnation and the Belt Line Deed, these interests were ultimately transferred to King County. (Dkt. No. 83 at 37, 45.)
E. Plaintiffs' Standing to Quiet Title
King County also argues that each individual Plaintiff—including those in Categories 1 through 3—lacks standing to quiet title in the Corridor and that their claims should be dismissed for this reason as well.
"[S]tanding is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). To satisfy Article III's standing requirements, "a plaintiff must show (1) it has suffered an 'injury in fact' that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 2011). It is Plaintiffs' burden to satisfy this standard. U.S. v. City and County of San Francisco, 979 F.2d 169, 171 (9th Cir. 1992).
In Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint, they seek to quiet title in the Corridor under RCW 7.28, the quiet title statute, and via declaratory judgment (RCW 7.24). (Dkt. No. 83 at 46-50.) "RCW 7.28.010 requires that a person seeking to quiet title establish a valid subsisting interest in property and a right to possession thereof." Horse Heaven Heights, 132 Wash. App. at 195 (emphasis added). A party that cannot make this demonstration lacks standing as a real party in interest. Id.; see also Sammamish Homeowners v. Cty. of King, No. C15-284 MJP, 2015 WL 3561533, at *4 (W.D. Wash. June 5, 2015) ("The Washington statutes concerning quiet title and declaratory judgments (deeds) (RCW 7.28.010, 7.24.020) require a property interest and an injury in fact before suit may be brought under them.").
A "valid subsisting interest" means "legal title to the real estate." White v. McSorley, 47 Wash. 18, 20 (1907).
King County argues that all Plaintiffs lack standing because they have failed to establish a property interest in the Corridor or a right to possession thereof.
Standing is judged separately for counterclaimants in a quiet title action. See Washington Sec. & Inv. Corp. v. Horse Heaven Heights, Inc., 132 Wash. App. 188, 195 (2006) ("[B]ecause this case comes to this court upon cross motions for summary judgment quieting title, both WSIC and the Rankins had the burden of proving ownership of the land in question and standing as a real party in interest."). As the Court explained above, King County has demonstrated an interest in the Corridor and a right to possession thereof. Thus, regardless of whether Plaintiffs have standing for their claims, the Court retains jurisdiction over King County's counterclaims for declaratory judgment and quiet title. Id. at 195-96.
1. Valid Subsisting Interest
As the party moving to quiet title, the burden is on Plaintiffs to demonstrate that they have a "valid subsisting interest" in the Corridor. Horse Heaven Heights, 132 Wash. App. at 195. Relying on the Nunnenkamp Declaration, King County argues that none of Plaintiffs' deeds explicitly conveys a property interest in the Corridor. (Dkt. No. 168 at 21.) Plaintiffs do not dispute this point. Therefore, because their deeds do not grant them a fee interest in the Corridor, Plaintiffs must rely on the centerline presumption. The Court has previously explained that under the centerline presumption:
[T]he conveyance of land which is bounded by a railroad right of way will give the grantee title to the center line of the right of way if the grantor owns so far, unless the grantor has expressly reserved the fee to the right of way, or the grantor's intention to not convey the fee is clear.(Dkt. No. 138 at 22 n.8) (internal quotation marks removed). To be entitled to the centerline presumption, Plaintiffs must first establish that their property adjoins the right of way and that they acquired it "from the fee owner of the right of way property." Roeder Co. v. Burlington N., Inc., 105 Wash. 2d 567, 578 (1986). If they are able to do so, the presumption applies unless it is rebutted through presentation of "persuasive evidence of the grantor's intent to retain the right of way." Id.
The Court previously held that "the centerline presumption requires that all Plaintiffs prove their chain of title back to the original grantor." (Dkt. No. 138 at 22.) Nonetheless, Plaintiffs make several arguments as to why they should not be required to produce their chains of title. Yet they also provide, for the very first time, chains of title for four sets of Plaintiffs (out of the eighty-five total Plaintiffs). The Court will first address Plaintiffs' arguments against the need to produce chains of title; then it will address the chains of title that Plaintiffs actually produced.
a. Plaintiffs' Interpretation of the Centerline Presumption
Plaintiffs first argue that, in applying the centerline presumption, the Court should also apply the so-called "strip and gore doctrine," because "it Definitely Exists in Washington." (Dkt. No. 170 at 13.) Plaintiffs barely explain this doctrine, although the Court imagines that it does not require the production of chains of title. Plaintiffs do not provide a single Washington case adopting or applying the doctrine. Plaintiffs' counsel already tried this tactic before Judge Pechman, who similarly found that "Plaintiffs do not cite a single Washington case which has adopted the doctrine." Sammamish Homeowners, 2015 WL 3561533, at *3. The Court therefore declines to apply the strip and gore doctrine.
Plaintiffs then argue that King County has misconstrued the centerline presumption and misinterpreted Roeder. But at every turn it is Plaintiffs who misinterpret—willfully, it would seem—crystal clear precedent. Plaintiffs argue that Roeder excludes from the centerline presumption only those deeds that "contain BOTH a metes and bounds description and...also refer to the railroad right-of-way as a boundary" in that description. (Dkt. No. 170 at 16.) But Roeder actually—and quite limpidly—holds as follows:
First: When a party presents evidence that a grantor owned a right of way and that the party acquired property from the grantor adjoining the right of way, then under the centerline presumption the party's title extends to the center of the right of way. Roeder, 105 Wash. 2d at 578.
Second: The presumption applies "[w]hen [a] deed refers to the grantor's right of way as a boundary without clearly indicating that the side of the right of way is the boundary." Id. 576-77.
Third: The presumption is rebutted when "a deed refers to the right of way as a boundary but also gives a metes and bounds description of the abutting property." Id. at 577.
Fourth: The presumption may also be rebutted via evidence of the grantor's intent to retain the right of way. Id. at 578.
In other words, regardless of whether a party's deeds contain a meets and bounds description, the centerline presumption will not apply unless the party also demonstrates that it received its property from a grantor that owned the right of way. The Roeder court was explicit on this point:
The presumption that the grantor intended to convey title to the center of the right of way is inapplicable where the adjoining landowner presents no evidence of having received his or her property from the owner of the right of way. A property owner receives no interest in a railroad right of way simply through ownership of abutting land.Id. at 578 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs next argue that Roeder should be limited to its facts. However, they point to no limiting language in the opinion in support of their argument. As the block quote above makes clear, the Roeder court's holding was not narrow at all—at least in regards to the necessity of providing chain of title evidence to support the centerline presumption.
Finally, Plaintiffs assert that "King County's position is apparently that language in ownership deeds that 'exclude' or 'except' the right-of-way means that the centerline presumption does not apply." (Dkt. No. 170 at 170.) According to Plaintiffs, this position is contrary to the Washington Supreme Court's holding in Kershaw. But King County's "position" is actually that Plaintiffs have failed to establish that they obtained their deeds from a grantor that owned the right-of-way—i.e. have failed to provide chains of title—so the centerline presumption does not apply. King County's position is the right one. Without such evidence, Plaintiffs' arguments about the differences between "exclude" and "except" are irrelevant.
Here, Plaintiffs appear to conflate King County's argument that the centerline presumption does not apply to all Plaintiffs who failed to provide chains of title with its more specific argument that the centerline presumption does not apply to all Plaintiffs whose properties are described in metes and bounds. The Court briefly addresses King County's metes and bounds argument below.
Plaintiffs assert that "King County's argument lacks candor to the Court regarding the Kershaw Sunnyside Ranches opinion." (Dkt. No. 17 at 25.) But Plaintiffs already made this exact argument about Kershaw—coupled with an identical "lack of candor" attack—to Judge Pechman, who informed them that Kershaw
is not helpful to Plaintiffs. First and foremost, it is not a 'centerline presumption' case, so the theory that Plaintiffs are relying on is not at issue in Kershaw. Nor did the Washington Supreme Court overrule any of the previous holdings of Roeder (in fact, Kershaw calls Roeder 'nearly indistinguishable.')
b. Plaintiffs' Four Chains of Title
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that even if they really must provide chains of title to assert the centerline presumption and maintain standing, the claims of four sets of Plaintiffs—the McCrays (Dkt. No. 170-3), the Piantanidas (Dkt. No. 170-4), Kevin Iden (Dkt. No. 170-5), and the Kaseburgs (Dkt. No. 170-6)—may nonetheless go forward. According to Plaintiffs, they have "obtained chains of title for 4 of the Plaintiffs," and these documents allegedly demonstrate that "nobody in the chain of title specifically reserved the right-of-way to themselves and each grantor granted all the interest they owned, including their interest in the underlying fee in the railroad right-of-way." (Dkt. No. 170 at 23.)
To quote Plaintiffs, this argument "is indeed curious," (Dkt. No. 170 at 11), as King County pointed out in its motion that "not a single Plaintiff has produced a chain of title." (Dkt. No. 165 at 15.) So then where did these four chains of title come from? It would seem that Plaintiffs have had them this entire time. Apparently, despite the Court's explicit order to Plaintiffs that they produce all chains of title, (Dkt. No. 138 at 22), and despite the fact that Plaintiffs acquired these documents on January 13, 2016, they simply chose not to disclose them until now, in a response brief in which they rely on them. (See Dkt. No. 170 at 23) (arguing that "even if this Court somehow accepts King County's arguments, these 4 Plaintiffs have standing even under Judge Pechman's interpretation of the centerline presumption").
(Dkt. No. 170-3 at 2; Dkt. No. 170-4 at 2; Dkt. No. 170-5 at 2; Dkt. No. 170-6 at 2.)
This is the second time Plaintiffs have relied on evidence that they failed to disclose to King County upon its request. (Dkt. No. 138 at 22, 23-24.) The difference now—and it is a significant one—is that the Court has already ordered Plaintiffs to disclose these exact documents. (Id.) Plaintiffs' blatant disregard of the Court's order is both inexplicable and deserving of sanction. Nor do they offer any excuse for their actions. However, the fact that Plaintiffs have rather meekly inserted their chain of title argument—upon which their claims necessarily turn—in the second-to-last paragraph of a 23-page brief is perhaps an admission of guilt in itself.
The Court notes that Plaintiff Scott Kaseburg updated the Court as to Plaintiffs' progress on responding to King County's discovery requests after the Court granted its motion to compel. (Dkt. No. 149-2.) It is therefore particularly concerning that he was also among the Plaintiffs who did not release their chains of title.
The Court is empowered to dismiss these four sets of Plaintiffs for their discovery abuse, or to strike these documents from the record. See Sanai v. Sanai, No. C02-2165Z, 2005 WL 1593488, at *8 (W.D. Wash. July 1, 2005), aff'd, 141 F. App'x 677 (9th Cir. 2005) (dismissing complaint where "[p]laintiffs' pattern of discovery abuse and disobedience of Court orders has been extraordinarily prejudicial"); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii) (providing that when a party disobeys an order to compel, the court may "strik[e] pleadings in whole or in part" or prohibit the party from "introducing designated matters into evidence"). Moreover, since Plaintiffs "agree that those [individuals] who did not respond to King County's discovery can be dismissed," (Dkt. No. 170 at 22 n.34), they have essentially admitted that these Plaintiffs should be dismissed as well. Because Plaintiffs inarguably disobeyed the Court's order that they disclose their chains of title, and then prejudiced King County by relying on undisclosed title chains, the Court strikes this evidence from the record. Thus, without any evidence of their chains of title, these four sets of Plaintiffs cannot assert the centerline presumption and do not have standing.
But the Court wouldn't want Plaintiffs to feel (or later complain) that they didn't receive a full hearing on the merits. Thus, it will address their four title chains below. As the Court explains, these Plaintiffs would lack standing even if the Court didn't strike this evidence, as their chains of title are patently insufficient to satisfy the prerequisites of the centerline presumption.
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c. The Declaration of John Rall
Along with their four chains of title, Plaintiffs present the Declaration of John Rall, in which he interprets the deeds in Plaintiffs' title chains (Dkt. No. 170-2). Rall's alleged expertise is in "identifying source deeds that Railroads used in acquiring specific property and determining what rights were conveyed to the Railroad." (Dkt. No. 170-2 at 1.) King County argues that the Court should strike Rall's Declaration because "the interpretation of a deed, like any other contract, is not a proper subject for expert testimony." (Dkt. No. 171 at 10.)
Judge Pechman was presented with a similar declaration from this same witness, and held that "Plaintiffs offer no authority supporting their right to offer expert testimony on the legal interpretation of a deed." Hornish v. King Cty., No. C15-284-MJP, 2016 WL 1588346, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 20, 2016). The same is true here. Perhaps that is because, as Judge Pechman found and the Ninth Circuit has held, "[r]esolving doubtful questions of law is the distinct and exclusive province of the trial judge." Nationwide Transp. Fin. v. Cass Info. Sys., Inc., 523 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2008). Moreover, Rall's legal conclusions "not only invade[] the province of the trial judge, but constitute[] erroneous statements of law." Id. at 1059. His testimony—consisting of no more than rank legal argument, (Dkt. No. 170-2 at 2-3)—is therefore "not only superfluous but mischievous." Id.
For example, Rall states that "[n]o deed in the chains of title expressly reserved the fee portion underlying the Railroad Right-of-way unto any predecessor grantor." (Dkt. No. 170-2 at 3.) This is an impermissible legal conclusion, and, as the Court explains below, it is incorrect. Because the entirety of the Rall Declaration—besides the description of his qualifications—consists of such legal conclusions, the Court strikes it from the record.
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d. Plaintiffs' Chains of Title and the Centerline Presumption
The chains of title for each of the four sets of Plaintiffs—the McCrays, the Piantanidas, Iden, and the Kaseburgs—derive from a plat that unambiguously excludes the Corridor from the platted lots. When interpreting plats, "the intention of the dedicator controls." Rainier Ave. Corp. v. City of Seattle, 80 Wash. 2d 362, 366 (1972). Where, as here, a plat is unambiguous, the intent of the grantor "must be determined from a consideration of the plat itself and of the descriptions and dedicatory language contained therein." Frye v. King Cty., 151 Wash. 179, 183 (1929). The language of the plat need not be repeated in Plaintiffs' deeds, because "where a deed describes land as a lot laid out on and designated on a certain plat or survey, the plat becomes as much a part of the deed as if it were copied into it." Cook v. Hensler, 57 Wash. 392, 398 (1910).
The Kaseburg property falls within the Pleasure Point Park No. 2 plat. (Dkt. No. 168 at 13.) As the Court has explained, when a deed, or, in this case, a plat, "refers to the right of way as a boundary but also gives a metes and bounds description of the abutting property, the presumption of abutting landowners taking to the center of the right of way is rebutted." Roeder, 105 Wash. 2d at 577. That is exactly the case here. The Pleasure Point plat gives a metes and bounds description of the property using the Corridor as a boundary. (Dkt. No. 168-10 at 2.) The Kaseburgs are therefore unable to shelter under the centerline presumption, and thus have no property interest in the Corrider and no standing.
The Iden, McCray, and Piantanida Plaintiffs' property falls within the Garden of Eden No. 3 plat. (Dkt. No. 168 at 11 (Iden), 15 (McCrays), 18 (Piantanidas).) The "Description" of this plat states that it "comprises the following described tract of land," which it then describes, "[e]xcept that portion occupied by the N.P.R.R. right of way and county roads as shown on said plat." (Dkt. No. 168-8 at 2.) "The term 'except' is generally meant to exclude the described property." Ray v. King Cty., 120 Wash. App. 564, 588 (2004). "[A]n exception operates to withdraw some part of the thing granted which otherwise would pass to the grantee under the general description." Duus v. Town of Ephrata, 14 Wash. 2d 426, 430 (1942). As the court held in Roeder, the centerline presumption will apply to a conveyance of land bounded by a railroad right of way "unless the grantor has expressly reserved the fee to the right of way, or the grantor's intention to not convey the fee is clear." 105 Wash. 2d at 576. Here, by excepting the NPRR right of way—which is now part of the Corridor—the plat expressly reserved the Corridor from purchasers of the platted lots. Plaintiffs argue that King County has misinterpreted the word "exception," citing to Kershaw and Zobrist v. Culp, 18 Wash. App. 622 (1977). But neither of those cases involved the centerline presumption. They are therefore irrelevant.
In addition, they are inapplicable because each involved a dispute over whether a deed excepted an easement previously conveyed to a third party. Zobrist, 18 Wash. App. at 629; Kershaw Sunnyside Ranches, 156 Wash. 2d at 271. As the Court explains below, the exception here involves a fee interest previously conveyed to a third party.
Moreover, the chains of title for the McCray, Piantanida, and Iden Plaintiffs demonstrate that they never acquired property from an owner of the Corridor—nor could they have. Again, Roeder requires that a party demonstrate that it received its adjoining property "from the fee owner of the right of way property." 105 Wash. 2d at 578. Here, these Plaintiffs' chains of title show that their predecessor, the Hillman Investment Company, acquired its property on May 26, 1904, through a deed from the Lake Washington Land Company. (Dkt. No. 170-3 at 4 (McCrays); Dkt. No. 170-4 at 4 (Piantanidas); Dkt. No. 170-5 at 3 (Iden)). As Plaintiffs essentially conceded (although they argued that it was "irrelevant") and as the Court has explained, the Lake Washington Land Company had already conveyed to Northern Pacific a fee interest in the Corridor via the LWLC Deed. The May 26, 1904 Deed therefore could not have conveyed to the Hillman Investment Company any interest in the Corridor, which the Deed itself makes clear, stating: "from the lands above desc[ribed] is to be deducted the rights of way of various r[ail] companies and co[unty] roads as sh[ow]n by the deeds heretofore filed in the office of the Aud[itor] of s[ai]d K[ing] Co[unty]." (Dkt. No. 170-3 at 27.) Thus, these Plaintiffs never received "adjoining property from the fee owner of the right of way property"—since the Hillman Investment Company did not own the fee at the time of the conveyance.
As King County points out, this deed was never disclosed to them even though they specifically requested—and the Court ordered Plaintiffs to disclose—this very sort of evidence. (Dkt. No. 138 at 21-22.) There is no question that it was highly prejudicial for Plaintiffs to withhold the May 26, 1904 deed from discovery and then rely on it in their response brief.
Therefore, these four chains of title, which Plaintiffs have apparently concealed, do no more than conclusively demonstrate that the centerline presumption does not apply to them and that they have no interest in the Corridor. Thus, they have no standing to sustain their quiet title action.
King County argues persuasively that Plaintiffs also have no right to possess the Corridor, which is the second RCW 7.28.010 requirement to quiet title. (Dkt. No. 165 at 16-17.) Plaintiffs make no attempt to rebut this argument. Regardless, because Plaintiffs fail to establish that they have an interest in the Corridor, the Court need not reach the question of whether they have a right to possession. See RCW 7.28.010 (requiring "a valid subsisting interest in real property, and a right to the possession thereof") (emphasis added).
F. Additional Reasons for Dismissal
King County raises a host of additional arguments why the claims of various groups of Plaintiffs fail for individualized reasons. Because Plaintiffs have not established that they have an interest in the Corridor, the Court need not reach these arguments. Nonetheless, the Court will briefly address them here.
First of all, there are a number of Plaintiffs who both parties essentially agree should be dismissed. As the Court mentioned above, "Plaintiffs agree that those Plaintiffs who did not respond to King County's discovery can be dismissed," (Dkt. No. 170 at 22 n.34), although, again, perhaps they fail to realize that this would also logically exclude the Kaseburg, Iden, McCray, and Piantanida Plaintiffs who obtained their chains of title but did not disclose them. Plaintiffs "generally agree" that those "plaintiffs who sold their property cannot quiet title," although they argue without elaboration that the purchasers of that property would later be entitled to join the suit. (Id.) Plaintiffs also "generally agree" that "Plaintiffs who transferred their properties to other legal entities cannot quiet title," although they similarly argue that this "depend[s] on a number of factual questions" that they do not elucidate. (Id.) Plaintiffs also appear to agree that "only living plaintiffs have standing," although they argue, without evidence or citation to any authority, that the spouse or other heirs of the deceased plaintiff, Barbara Bergstrom, (Dkt. No. 167-6), "would continue to have standing." (Dkt. No. 170 at 22 n.34.) In addition, several Plaintiffs have requested that they be dismissed. (Dkt. No. 167-9 at 5-6.) Were it necessary to the Court's decision, it would find that all of these individual Plaintiffs—which King County has grouped as Categories 7 through 9, 11, and 12—should indeed be dismissed. (Dkt. No. 168-1 at 7.)
Plaintiffs do contest King County's argument that collateral estoppel bars the claims of those Plaintiffs who have previously filed suit. But their response, in its entirety, is that King County is "incorrect as a matter of procedure, fact, and law." (Dkt. No. 170 at 22 n.34.) Given that seven Plaintiffs—grouped as Category 10—have previously filed suit on the same operative facts at issue here, the Court would almost surely find their claims barred by collateral estoppel were such a finding necessary.
King County asserts, and Plaintiffs do not dispute, that five of the current Plaintiffs were parties to Ioppolo v. Port of Seattle, (Dkt. No. 165 at 25), in which the plaintiffs argued that "BNSF's interest [in the Corridor] was limited to a surface easement for a hiking and biking trail." Case No. C15-0358 JCC, 2015 WL 5315936, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 11, 2015). Two other plaintiffs previously filed suit in Ao. V. Port of Seattle, No. 09-2-44773-0 KNT (King Co. Sup. Ct. 2011), arguing that they had acquired title to property within the Corridor through adverse possession. (Dkt. No. 167-7 at 8-9.) Both cases were dismissed. Ioppolo, 2015 WL 5315936, at *5; (Dkt. No. 167-8 at 2-3.)
Finally, King County argues that Plaintiffs in Categories 4 through 6 should be dismissed because they cannot assert the centerline presumption due to: limitations in the language of their deeds (Category 4); their properties having derived from plats that exclude the Corridor (Category 5); and/or their predecessor having purchased shorelands excepting the Corridor (Category 6). (Dkt. No. 168-1 at 7.) As the Court has explained, since all but four sets of Plaintiffs failed to present chains of title (and these were insufficient), none can assert the centerline presumption. Nonetheless, because Plaintiffs have failed to persuasively rebut King County's arguments as to the Plaintiffs in Categories 4 through 6, the Court would likely have dismissed them on these grounds as well.
Addressing the Category 4 grouping, Plaintiffs argue that the centerline presumption is unavailable only to those Plaintiffs whose deeds describe their property in metes and bounds and use the Corridor as a boundary. But dozens of Plaintiffs' deeds do, in fact, describe their property in this manner. (Dkt. No. 172-1 at 8.) Moreover, the rest of the Category 4 Plaintiffs, much like the Category 5 and 6 Plaintiffs, obtained their property through conveyances excepting or excluding the Corridor, (id.), which, as the Court explained above, also disentitles them to the centerline presumption. Plaintiffs' arguments to the contrary invoke Kershaw, Zobrist, the strip and gore doctrine, and a ruling from the Central District of California on a motion to dismiss, none of which relate to the application of the centerline presumption under Washington law. (Dkt. No. 170 at 20-22.) --------
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, King County's motion for summary judgment on all remaining issues (Dkt. No. 165) is GRANTED.
In addition, as the Court explained above, it hereby STRIKES from the record the chains of title for the McCray, Piantanida, Iden, and Kaseburg Plaintiffs (Dkt. Nos. 170-3 to 170-6), as well as the Declaration of John Rall (Dkt. No. 170-2).
It is therefore ORDERED that:
(1) The process of railbanking the Corridor under the Trails Act preserved all property rights formerly held by the Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railroad ("BNSF") and authorized trail use;
(2) King County currently holds all of BNSF's property rights in the Corridor, as well as the trail rights created by the Trails Act;
(3) The June 24, 1903 deed from J.R. Lewis to the Northern Pacific Railway Company, recording No. 269500 (also called the Kittinger Deed), conveyed a fee simple interest.
(4) The February 3, 1904 deed from the Lake Washington Land Company to the Northern Pacific Railway Company, recording No. 287093 (also called the LWLC Deed), conveyed a fee simple interest.
(5) The State of Washington holds the reversionary interest to property acquired through the February 8, 1904 Condemnation.
(6) Plaintiffs lack standing under Washington's centerline presumption doctrine to challenge King County's ownership interests in the Corridor.
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FURTHERMORE, it is hereby ORDERED:
(1) King County is granted a decree quieting title free and clear from all claims by the Plaintiffs and/or their successors in interest to any portions of the land conveyed by the February 11, 2013 quit claim deed from the Port of Seattle to King County, recording No. 20130213001645, attached as Exhibit A to this Order. The Plaintiffs, King County, and their successors in interest shall recognize in perpetuity the boundary lines described in Exhibit A.
(2) Title is quieted confirming that King County owns a fee interest in the portions of the property described in Exhibit A that are derived from the June 24, 1903 deed from J.R. Lewis to the Northern Pacific Railway Company, which is attached as Exhibit B to this Order.
(3) Title is quieted confirming that King County owns a fee interest in the portions of the property described in Exhibit A that are derived from the February 3, 1904 deed from the Lake Washington Land Company to the Northern Pacific Railway Company, which is attached as Exhibit C to this Order.
(4) Title is quieted confirming that King County may exercise its easement rights in any easement portions of the Corridor consistent with the prior rulings of this Court.
DATED this 23rd day of August 2016.
/s/_________
John C. Coughenour
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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Sammamish Homeowners, 2015 WL 3561533 at *3.