Opinion
18-P-411
03-05-2019
JAMES P. KARTELL v. MICHAEL J. TRAFT.
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 (2009), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court, confirming an arbitration award in favor of the plaintiff, James Kartell, and against the defendant, Michael Traft, with respect to a dispute over attorney services and attorney fees. We affirm.
Background. The plaintiff, the defendant, and the defendant's then law firm entered into an agreement for legal services in 2003. The defendant was to pursue habeas corpus proceedings with respect to the plaintiff's criminal convictions in Essex Superior Court. The plaintiff paid a retainer of $25,000.
Thereafter, a dispute arose regarding the services performed, and the appropriate fee. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant had failed to perform, and among other things, had failed to timely make a critical filing. The defendant claimed that he had performed considerable legal work for the plaintiff, and was entitled to substantial compensation. Ultimately, the plaintiff and the defendant agreed to resolve their dispute by arbitrating the amount of attorney's fees that should be paid, before the Legal Fee Arbitration Board of the Massachusetts Bar Association. The arbitration went forward on June 11, 2014. The arbitrators' award found the reasonable fee to be $5,000, and concluded that $20,000 of the retainer was accordingly "due to be repaid." At the plaintiff's instance a Superior Court judge entered judgment confirming the award. An amended judgment subsequently entered, including an award for prejudgment interest and costs.
Discussion. As an initial matter there is no basis for disturbing the judgment because it runs against the defendant Traft, individually. It is true that the arbitration award at issue was rendered against Traft's former law firm, whereas the Superior Court judgment confirming the award runs against Traft individually. At oral argument, however, Traft confirmed that he is not challenging the judgment on a theory that he was improperly named as the defendant in the judgment. Traft accordingly has waived any argument in that regard. We note as well that in addition to being a party to the original fee agreement, Traft was the only signatory to the subsequent agreement to arbitrate, and was the only participant as a defendant in the arbitration.
That brings us to the merits of Traft's challenge to the arbitration award. The gist of his argument is that the arbitration panel failed to consider material evidence of legal work he performed, in raising new arguments and seeking postjudgment relief in State court. Traft argues that the fee agreement only mentioned seeking relief in Federal court, and suggests that the arbitrators therefore believed that the State court work that Traft performed was for some reason beyond the scope of the arbitration. He urges that the arbitrators "could not possibly have considered that work since it encompassed exponentially more time" than would justify an award of $5,000.
Review by the courts of an arbitration award is very limited. With only very limited exceptions we are bound by the arbitrator's factual findings and legal conclusions, "even if they appear erroneous, inconsistent, or unsupported by the record at the arbitration hearing." Lynn v. Thompson, 435 Mass. 54, 61 (2001). Speculation about what the arbitrators may or may not have considered on the evidence before them is generally beyond the scope of our review. See United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987) ("[A]s long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision").
Here the evidence of Traft's work in State court was in fact presented to the arbitrators. Traft provides no basis to believe that the arbitrators excluded the evidence he presented, or his arguments. Traft posits that his time was worth considerably more than $5,000, but he did not accomplish any positive result for his client, and more importantly, he is accused of failing to make a filing on a timely basis, which pretermitted any positive result. The arbitrators of course were free to consider such an error in setting the reasonable value of the defendant's services. See School Comm. of Norton v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 839, 853 (2005), citing Salem v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 627, 648 n.29 (1998) ("[T]he results obtained by a claimant may affect the determination of attorney's fees"). Indeed, the arbitrators cited "[t]he amount involved and the results obtained" (emphasis added) as one of the "principal factors" in their award.
There is no basis to disturb the award.
The defendant filed a counterclaim in the Superior Court, also seeking fees, purportedly for the work on the State court proceeding. The counterclaim sought to offset such fees against the arbitrators' award. The Superior Court judge dismissed the counterclaim, noting that it raised the same issues that the defendant had agreed to arbitrate, and as such was subsumed in the arbitrators' award. We agree with the dismissal.
Amended judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Meade, Agnes & Englander, JJ.),
The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
/s/
Clerk Entered: March 5, 2019.