Opinion
Case No. 01-CV-760
September 3, 2002
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court for consideration of pro se Plaintiff, George G. Karnes', Motion for Relief from Judgment pursuant to Rule60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Doc. # 3) and Plaintiff's Motion for Joinder of Claims, Remedies and Persons pursuant to Rules 18, 19 and 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Doc. # 11). Plaintiff claims violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 1986, the Ohio Constitution and several Ohio statutes.
This matter is also before the Court for consideration three motions from the defendants: Defendant Michael Ward's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Doc. # 5) and Ward's Motion to Postpone Case Management Meeting (Doc. # 6), and a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Doc. # 13) of Defendants Martin Kikis, Thomas Taggart, David Winkleman, Rhonda Greenwood and Karen Harvey.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear this case. Thus, the case is hereby REMANDED.
I. FACTS
Plaintiff, George Karnes, was married in 1968. Complaint, Ex. 1 at 1. One child was born to the marriage on June 3, 1979. Id. In 1981 Plaintiff's wife, Nancy Karnes, filed for a divorce in the Athens County Court of Common Pleas. Id. Mr. Karnes filed and answer and counterclaim. A Referee heard the matter in December of 1981, and issued a report and recommendation that Ms. Karnes receive custody of the child and that Mr. Karnes be required to pay child support. The trial court adopted the Referee's report and granted the divorce in a Final Judgment and Decree entered on January 8 or 18, 1982 ("Divorce case"). Id.
Plaintiff appealed the Divorce Case, arguing that the court had violated Ohio Civil Procedure Rules 53 and 75(c) by referring the case to a Referee. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the trial court's judgment in Karnes v. Karnes, No. 1131, 1983 Ohio App. Lexis 13495, (Athens App. Feb. 1, 1983) (" Karnes I"). Defendants "Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Ex. A. Karnes I specifically ruled that the trial court's reference to the Referee's recommendation was acceptable under the Ohio Rules and that Mr. Karnes had failed to show any prejudice resulting from the method of referring the case to the Referee. Karnes I, at *2. Plaintiff requested clarification of Karnes I which was overruled on March 8, 1983. Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Ex. A.
Mr. Karnes has subsequently been a defendant in five contempt proceedings in the Athens County Court of Common Pleas for failure to pay child support. Complaint, Ex. 1 p. 6. Further, in November of 2000, Athens County Child Support Enforcement Agency ("Child Support Enforcement") initiated a felony nonsupport action against Karnes through the Athens County Prosecutor's Office. Id. at 20. A brief outline of the conviction proceedings and outcomes follows.
In Karnes v. Karnes, No. 95CA1666, 1996 Ohio App. Lexis 3371, (Athens App. Aug. 8, 1996) ("Karnes II"), Mr. Karnes appealed a judgment from the Athens County Court of Common Pleas finding him in contempt for failure to pay child support. Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Ex. B. Although this action was brought under the auspices of an appeal from a conviction of contempt, Mr. Karnes attacked the jurisdiction of Child Support Enforcement to enforce the child support obligations, claiming that the original decision granting his divorce was void. Again, Karnes claimed that because the Divorce case court adopted the Referee's recommendations concerning issues of child custody and support the court's judgment was null and void. The court held that Karnes was barred from litigating the claim by the doctrine of res judicata based on the court's decision in Karnes I.
Karnes appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio which declined jurisdiction of the case, stating that the appeal did not involve any substantial constitutional question. Karnes v. Karnes, 77 Ohio St.3d 1514 (1997). Karnes then motioned the Ohio Supreme Court for reconsideration of its Opinion and Order declining jurisdiction, which the Court denied. Karnes v. Karnes, 78 Ohio St.3d 1415 (1997).
On September 2, 1998, the Athens County Grand Jury returned an indictment charging appellant with four counts of criminal nonsupport. A jury found Karnes guilty on all charges. The trial court sentenced Karnes to a partially suspended term of imprisonment as well as community control sanctions. The court also ordered Karnes to pay restitution in the amount of $39, 971.22. Karnes appealed this conviction. State v. Karnes, No. 99CA042, 2001 Ohio App. Lexis 3678 (Athens App. March 29, 2001) (" Karnes III"). Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Ex. C. In the appeal, Karnes again raised the issue of the validity of original judgment granting his divorce. In a lengthy, well written opinion affirming the judgment of the Athens County Court of Common Pleas, the court of appeals again specifically stated that the doctrine of res judicata barred Karnes from challenging the validity of the 1982 divorce decree.
Most recently, in Karnes v. Karnes, No. 00CA53, 2001 Ohio App. Lexis 3678 (Athens App. Aug. 17, 2001) (" Karnes IV"), Child Support Enforcement filed a motion for contempt for child support arrearages. The trial court granted the motion and Karnes appealed. Karnes once again sought to have the original judgment declared void because it incorporated the Referee's recommendations concerning child custody and support, which he maintains deprived the court of jurisdiction. The court, for a fourth time, rejected Karnes' argument, stating:
We also agree with [Child Support Enforcement] that this issue has long since been rendered res judicata. Appellant raised this very argument in Karnes II III and we held in both cases that the issue was res judicata. He presents nothing new in this case which would lead us to change our opinion.Id. at 5.
Karnes then brought this suit in the Athens County Court of Common Pleas. Karnes claims violation of his state and federal constitutional rights and demands six million dollars in damages. Defendants removed the case to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446.
II. STANDARD
Initially, the Court notes that Plaintiff brings this action pro se. The pleadings of a pro se litigant are held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Williams v. Browman, 981 F.2d 901, 903 (6th Cir. 1992). The Court has, therefore, viewed Plaintiff's pleadings pursuant to this less stringent standard.
Defendant Ward requests dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to on Rule 12(b)(6). The other defendants request judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c). The Court, however, will first address whether it has subject matter jurisdiction to hear this case. Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised sua sponte, prior to, during or after trial, even at the appellate level. Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939); Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1).
III. ANALYSIS
Although Plaintiff attempts to couch his claims in terms of Constitutional violations, this case is clearly one in which Plaintiff seeks appellate review of his divorce and custody proceedings and the subsequent proceedings brought against him in contempt for failure to abide by the divorce and custody decree. Thus, the Court concludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
In District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), the Supreme Court held that federal court review of state court proceedings is jurisdictionally limited to the Supreme Court of the United States by 28 U.S.C. § 1257. See also Patmon v. Michigan Sup. Ct., 224 F.3d 504, 506 (6th Cir. 2000). This doctrine is referred to as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See also Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). The Feldman Court stated that "United States District Courts. . . do not have jurisdiction. . . over challenges to state court decisions in particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if those challenges allege that the state court's action was unconstitutional. Review of those decisions may only be had in this Court." Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486; see also Anderson v. Charter Township of Ypsilanti, 266 F.3d 487, 492 (6th Cir. 2001).
Section 1257 provides:
Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in question or where the validity of a statute of any State is drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, or where any title, right, privilege, or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution or the treaties or statutes of, or any commission held or authority exercised under, the United States.28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).
The Supreme Court recently restated the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as follows: "under [the doctrine] a party losing in state court is barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing party's claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser's federal rights." Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994). The Sixth Circuit has held that there are two elements to a Rooker-Feldman analysis:
"First., in order for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to apply to a claim presented in federal district court, the issue before the Court must be [inextricably intertwined] with the claim asserted in the state court proceeding." Catz v. Chalker, 142 F.3d 279, 293 (6th Cir. 1998) (quotation omitted). "Where federal relief can only be predicated upon a conviction that the state court was wrong, it is difficult to conceive the federal proceeding as, in substance, anything other than a prohibited appeal of the state-court judgment." Id. (quotation omitted).
Second, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes federal court jurisdiction where the claim is "a specific grievance that the law was invalidly — even unconstitutionally — applied in the plaintiff's particular case." Id. In contrast, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar federal court jurisdiction where the claim is "a general challenge to the constitutionality of the state law applied in the state action." Id. See also Patmon, 224 F.3d at 509-10.
Tropf v. Fidelity National Title Ins. Co., 289 F.3d 929, 937 (6th Cir. 2002).
In the case at bar, neither required element to the Rooker-Feldman analysis is met. First, the issue before the Court is inextricably intertwined with the claim asserted in the state court proceedings. That is, relief in this Court can only be predicated on the conclusion that the state court's judgments were wrong. Plaintiff claims that the first proceeding, the Divorce case, required the presiding judge to determine custody of the minor child and that instead, the judge adopted the report and recommendation of the Referee. Thus, Plaintiff claims that the presiding judge was wrong in ordering the divorce and custody in the manner in which he ordered it. Plaintiff now asks this Court to sit as an appellate court, review this state proceeding and find that the court lacked jurisdiction to enter judgment.
In every appeal thereafter, as adeptly pointed out repeatedly by the Ohio appellate court, Plaintiff asserted procedural and jurisdictional arguments all based on the assertion that his "1982 divorce decree was not a "lawfully issued judgment' and thus did not impose upon him a binding support agreement."' Karnes IV, 2001 Ohio App. Lexis 3678, * 5 Again, Plaintiff attempts to appeal state court judgments, which this Court cannot do.
Next, the second requirement of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is not met because Plaintiff claims that several Ohio laws are invalidly and unconstitutionally applied to his particular case. He makes no claim as to the constitutionality of the state laws themselves. Plaintiff contends that Ohio Revised Code (O.R.C.) §§ 3105.01, 3105.03, 3105.21 and 3109.04(A) (all regarding jurisdiction) were unconstitutionally applied to him. Complaint, at 4. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that the judge in his divorce case, in adopting the report and recommendation of the Referee, unconstitutionally applied these jurisdictional statutes to Plaintiff in his Divorce case. Id.
Further, Plaintiff claims that O.R.C. §§ 2705.02, 2705.10 and 2705.31 (all regarding standing) prevented Child Support Enforcement from bringing contempt proceedings against him. Thus, Plaintiff argues that these statutes were unconstitutionally applied to him. Id. at 6. Finally, in an exceedingly convoluted argument regarding his criminal trial, Plaintiff asserts that O.R.C. §§ 3103.03(c) and 3103.06 were unconstitutionally applied to him. Id. at 20. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that because these laws were changed after his wife had contracted with him, via their marriage, to provide support for their child and herself the statutes are ex post facto as applied to him and are in violation of his constitutional right to contract. In addition, Plaintiff claims that O.R.C. §§ 2901.11, 2901.12, 2901.21 and 2301.35 (all regarding criminal jurisdiction) were unconstitutionally applied to him in violation of double jeopardy.
The Court concludes that neither element of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is met. Thus, this Court is precluded from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over this case. Based on this conclusion, the Court is required to remand this removed case back to state court. Coyne v. The American Tobacco Company, 183 F.3d 488, 496 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) . The Court notes that based on its review of the record in this case it would seem prudent to dismiss it as opposed to remanding. In Karnes VI, the defendants requested attorneys fees based upon the fact that Karnes had, again, brought a frivolous appeal. Although the Karnes VI disagreed it cautioned:
Section 1447. Procedure after removal generally
(c) A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal under section 1446(a). If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded. An order remanding the case may require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal. A certified copy of the order of remand shall be mailed by the clerk to the clerk of the State court. The State court may thereupon proceed with such case.28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
We disagree, albeit reluctantly.
Appellant represented himself in this case pro se and we have a long history of affording considerable leniency to pro se litigants. It does not appear that appellant is familiar with the doctrine of res judicata. Accordingly, in this instance we believe it appropriate to provide appellant some leeway. Our patience is not unlimited, however, and we are not without sympathy to the plight of [Child Support Enforcement] who must defend against these meritless appeals. Thus, appellant is put on notice that this matter is res judicata and, if he appeals this issue again, he will subject himself to possible sanctions under App. R. 23 including the payment of attorney fees and costs to appellee.Karnes VI, 2001 Ohio App. Lexis 3678, at * 7-8 (internal citations and footnote omitted).
Based on the Ohio appellate court's statements, it seems that it would not only be futile to remand this case, it would also most likely be financially detrimental to Plaintiff. Plaintiff clearly makes the exact same claims and arguments the case sub judice that he has made repeatedly in the Ohio courts. The Sixth Circuit, however, has held that "the futility of a remand to state court does not provide an exception to the plain and unambiguous language of 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)." Coyne, 183 F.3d at 496. The "literal words of § 1447(c). . . on their face, give. . . no discretion to dismiss rather than remand an action." Id. (citations omitted). Thus, "in a removed action, upon determination that a federal court lacks jurisdiction, remand to state court is mandatory even if it appears that remand would be futile. Id. at 496-97. While this Court would prefer to dismiss rather than remand this case, it is without jurisdiction to do so.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, this case is hereby REMANDED. Because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear this case it cannot rule on any of the pending motions. The Clerk is DIRECTED to remove the following motions from this Court's pending motion list: Defendant Ward's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 5), Defendant Ward's Motion for Postponement (Doc. # 6), Defendant Kikis, Taggart, Winkleman, Greenwood and Harvey's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. # 13).