Opinion
Civil Action No. 00-540; SECTION "R" (3)
February 14, 2001
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is defendants' motion to dismiss and plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, the Court grants defendants' motion to dismiss and denies plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
This case grows out of earlier litigation in which plaintiffs, John and Aura Karagiannopoulos, claimed that Judge Charles Cusimano II, of Division "L" of the 24th Judicial District Court for the Parish of Jefferson, wrongfully exercised jurisdiction over their state court civil case, and, in so doing, conspired to "fix" the action against plaintiffs and in favor of State Farm Insurance Co. In this case, plaintiffs claim that defendants, Jon A. Gegenheimer, Jefferson Parish Clerk of Court, and Marcella Ziifle, Deputy Clerk and legal counsel to Gegenheimer, conspired with Chief Judge Clarence McManus and Judge Cusimano of the 24th Judicial District Court and others to frustrate their civil rights.
This story began in 1998, when plaintiffs brought a slip-and-fall personal injury suit against State Farm Fire and Casualty and the Sutton Corporation in the 24th Judicial District. The case was originally allotted to Division K of the 24th Judicial District Court before the Honorable Rudy Eason. Judge Eason died, and Chief Judge McManus reallotted all Division K cases to Division L, over which Judge Cusimano presides. Plaintiffs tried their case to a jury in Division L, which found in favor of the defendants on July 12, 1994, and Judge Cusimano entered judgment dismissing all of plaintiffs' injury claims. The plaintiffs appealed the judgment in state court and filed discrimination claims in federal court against numerous parties, including State Farm, Sutton, counsel for defendants in the state court proceedings, counsel for plaintiffs in the state court proceeding, Redler, Brown, Williams Orthopedic Medical Clinic, and the State of Louisiana on behalf of the 24th Judicial District Court. Plaintiffs challenged the transfer of their case to Judge Cusimano as unlawfully discriminatory. The claims in federal court were dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiffs then filed several more cases in state court, including an action against Judge Cusimano, his law clerk, his court reporter, and his deputy clerk. Ultimately, on July 2, 1999, the state court granted these defendants' exceptions of prescription and no cause of action, thereby dismissing plaintiffs' claims against Judge Cusimano and his staff.
Plaintiffs filed this action on February 22, 2000, alleging that defendants Gegenheimer and Ziifle were involved in an alleged conspiracy with Judges McManus and Cusimano to have plaintiffs' personal injury case transferred to Judge Cusimano. Plaintiffs sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 1985, claiming that the conspiracy includes transfer of the case from Division K to L for racially discriminatory purposes, expungement of records by Gegenheimer, refusal to accept plaintiffs' petition for a default judgment in their case against Judge Cusimano, conspiring to cause the attorney general to represent private parties, and ultimately manipulating the outcome of the personal injury case.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
Defendants move to dismiss this action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs move for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court converts defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) into a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 because matters outside of the pleadings have been presented to and not excluded by the Court. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The Court will consolidate the record of the two motions and consider the evidence submitted in connection with either motion in support of both motions.
Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues as to any material facts, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). A court must be satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party or, in other words, "that the evidence favoring the nonmoving party is insufficient to enable a reasonable jury to return a verdict in her favor." Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 178 (5th Cir. 1990) ( citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511 (1986)), abrogated on other grounds by Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 n. 14 (5th Cir. 1994). The moving party bears the burden of establishing that there are no genuine issues of material fact.
If the dispositive issue is one for which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by merely pointing out that the evidence in the record contains insufficient proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2554; see also Lavespere, 910 F.2d at 178. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who must, by submitting or referring to evidence, set out specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. Additionally, the nonmovant may not rest upon the pleadings, but must identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue exists for trial. See id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2553-54; Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. The nonmovant may not rest upon conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or merely a scintilla of evidence. See Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.
B. "Conspiracy" Regarding Transferring Personal Injury Case to Judge Cusimano
Plaintiffs claim that defendants were involved in a conspiracy to "fix" their state court personal injury case. This conspiracy allegedly involved defendants' improper transfer of the case to Judge Cusimano in order to discriminate in some way against plaintiffs, fabricating testimony at the trial, expunging records from the 24th Judicial District's computer and paper records, causing plaintiffs to lose their appeal of the personal injury case, and back dating filings from the Assistant Attorney General in plaintiffs' case against Judge Cusimano and his staff. Although these allegations are serious, plaintiffs offer no evidence to support for any of these charges.
Read liberally, plaintiffs sue for a denial of their constitutional rights to equal protection and due process under the authority of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985. In order to successfully plead a § 1985 claim, a plaintiff must allege four distinct elements: (1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purposes of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; and (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is either injured in his person or property or deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States. United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 828-29, 103 S.Ct. 3352 (1983). The Fifth Circuit has also held in order "[t]o establish a cause of action based on conspiracy a plaintiff must show that defendants agreed to commit an illegal act." See Dayse v. Schuldt, 894 F.2d 170, 173 (5th Cir. 1990) ( citing Arsenaux v. Roberts, 726 F.2d 1022, 1024 (5th Cir. 1982). The Arsenaux court also held that "[m]ere conclusory allegations of conspiracy cannot, absent reference to material facts," constitute grounds for Section 1983 relief. See id. ( citing Arsenaux, 726 F.2d at 1024). Plaintiffs' allegations are conclusory, and the Court finds no reference to material facts regarding an agreement to conspire by defendants anywhere in plaintiffs' complaint or evidence submitted on summary judgment.
Furthermore, defendants have offered evidence that they acted properly under the rules of the 24th Judicial District and the direction of the judges in transferring plaintiffs' personal injury case. Defendants offer a letter from Chief Judge McManus directing Gegenheimer to transfer Division K cases to Division L. ( See Defs.' Mem. Supp. Motion to Dismiss, Ex. 2.) Defendants also offer the affidavit of Chief Judge McManus to authenticate this letter. ( See id. at Ex. 8.) This letter included the transfer of plaintiffs' personal injury suit.
Gegenheimer transferred plaintiffs' case at the direction of Chief Judge McManus. ( See Defs.' Mem. Supp. Motion to Dismiss, Ex. 13.) Plaintiffs' have offered no evidence to show Gegenheimer acted for any other motive or to discriminate against plaintiffs in any way. In addition, defendants presented evidence that Gegenheimer denies conspiring or discriminating against plaintiffs and that Gegenheimer believes he acted in good faith in complying with the duties of his office. ( See Defs.' Mem. Opp. Summ. J., Gegenheimer Aff.). Therefore, plaintiffs fail to set out specific facts demonstrating genuine issues of material fact regarding any conspiracy or impropriety in the transfer.
Defendants also submit evidence to refute plaintiffs' charge that they conspired to alter testimony in the personal injury case. The supervisor of records, Clem Degler, signed an affidavit stating that the audio tapes of plaintiffs' personal injury case were sealed and stored in a safe. ( See id. Ex. 12.) Plaintiffs chose a person to reproduce such tapes and observed the tapes being reproduced. ( See id.) Plaintiffs have offered no evidence to refute this affidavit or to demonstrate that the tapes have been altered by defendants or anyone else in any manner. Defendants have submitted evidence that they were merely performing duties under court orders and the direction of judges. Again, plaintiffs have failed to set out specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact regarding any impropriety or conspiracy regarding the transcript tapes.
In addition, plaintiffs claim that defendants conspired against plaintiffs to allow the Louisiana Attorney General's office to represent "private parties" in the lawsuit against Judge Cusimano and his staff. Again, plaintiffs fail to provide evidence of any agreement for the purposes of depriving plaintiffs of equal protection of the laws. The Attorney General represented Judge Cusimano and his staff in their capacity as state officials as provided by Louisiana law under Louisiana Revised Statute 13:1508.1. See Molinario v. Dept. of Public Safety and Corrections, 700 So.2d 992, 994 n. 2 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1997).
La. R.S. 13:5108.1 declares, in relevant part:
§ 5108.1. Indemnification of officers and employees of the state; civil rights; representation by attorney general
A. Indemnification.
(1) The state shall defend and indemnify a covered individual against any claim, demand, suit, complaint or petition seeking damages filed in any court over alleged negligence or other act by the individual, including any demand under any federal statute when the act that forms the basis of the cause of action took place while the individual was engaged in the performance of the duties of the individual's office or employment with the state.
Section 13:5108.1(B) states:
B. Coverage process.
(1) Within ten days of the time the covered individual is served with any summons, complaint, process, notice, demand, or pleading, he shall deliver the original or a copy thereof to the attorney general. Delivery of such a summons, complaint, process, notice, demand, or pleading constitutes a request for representation under this Section and constitutes a prerequisite to indemnification by the state. Upon delivery to the attorney general, the attorney general shall, within five days, furnish a copy of the summons, complaint, process, notice, demand, or pleading to the office of risk management.
(2) Upon such delivery the attorney general shall investigate, by examining the face of the complaint, process, notice, demand, or pleading, and any other information available to the attorney general, whether the covered individual was engaged in the performance of the duties of his office or employment with the state at the time the events that form the basis of the cause of action happened.
(3) If the attorney general concludes that the covered individual was engaged in the performance of the duties of his office or employment with the state at the time the events that form the basis of the cause of action happened and that the covered individual was free of criminal conduct, then the attorney general shall provide a defense to the covered individual.
Further, plaintiffs have offered no support for their allegation that defendants conspired to discriminate against plaintiff for racial motives or otherwise. To state a claim of racial discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause and § 1983, a plaintiff must "demonstrate that the government official was motivated by intentional discrimination on the basis of race." Coleman v. Houston Indep. School District, 113 F.3d 528, 533 (5th Cir. 1997) ( citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-42, 96 S.Ct. 2040 (1976)). Similarly, in order to recover damages under Section 1985 for a conspiracy to deny individuals the equal protection of the law, plaintiffs must demonstrate that defendants were motivated by an invidiously discriminatory animus. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1798 (1971); Almon v. Sandin, 603 F.2d 503, 505 (5th Cir. 1979). Plaintiff's personal belief that he was subjected to racial discrimination, however genuine that belief may be, cannot form the basis for judicial relief. See Elliott v. Group Medical Surgical Service, 714 F.2d 556, 567 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1215, 104 S.Ct. 2658 (1984); see also Krim v. BancTexas Group, Inc., 989 F.2d 1435, 1449 (5th Cir. 1993)). "Conclusory statements . . . do not provide facts that will counter summary judgment evidence, and testimony based on conjecture alone is insufficient to raise an issue to defeat summary judgment."
Lechuga v. Southern Pacific Transportation Company, 949 F.2d 790, 798 (5th Cir. 1992). Plaintiffs have submitted no evidence of a racial motive for defendants' actions. In fact, Gegenheimer submits evidence denying that his actions were based on race. ( See Defs.' Mem. Opp. Summ. J., Gegenheimer Aff.) Therefore, plaintiffs have failed to offer any evidence showing a genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendants acted in a manner actionable under Sections 1981, 1983, or 1985.
C. Failure to Pile the Motion for Default Judgment
Plaintiffs also allege that Gegenheimer prevented plaintiffs from filing a motion for default judgment in plaintiffs' case against Judge Cusimano and his staff. Construed liberally, the Court treats this claim as a Section 1983 claim for denying plaintiffs' access to the courts. Defendants admit that Gegenheimer refused to file plaintiffs' motion for preliminary default against Judge Cusimano in March 1999 because plaintiffs did not pay filing fees. Defendants argue that Gegenheimer believed in good faith that the order granting plaintiffs' pauper status was invalid because that order was signed by Judge Green, who had already recused himself from the case. Defendants have offered the recusal order signed by Judge Green and dated October 1998 as evidence. ( See Defs.' Mem. Opp. Summ J., Ex. 3.) Gegenheimer believed that because of the recusal, Judge Green failed to retain jurisdiction over the case and could not sign a valid order granting pauper status.
Even if Gegenheimer improperly relied on the recusal order to reject plaintiffs' motion for preliminary default judgment, Gegenheimer's actions are protected under qualified immunity. Public officials performing discretionary tasks are afforded a defense of qualified immunity. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727 (1982). When a government official or employee asserts qualified immunity and establishes that his acts were taken within the scope of his discretionary authority, the burden shifts to the party seeking damages to show qualified immunity should not bar recovery. See Foster v. City of Lake Jackson, 28 F.3d 425, 428 (5th Cir. 1994).
The examination of a qualified immunity claim is a two-step inquiry. First, a court must determine whether the plaintiff alleges a violation of a clearly established right. See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231-33, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 1793 (1991). The right of access to the courts is a fundamental constitutional right grounded in the First Amendment right to petition and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process clauses. See Johnson v. Atkins, 999 F.2d 99, 100 (5th Cir. 1993). "Any deliberate impediment to access, even delay of access, may constitute a constitutional deprivation." Jackson v. Procunier, 789 F.2d 307, 311 (5th Cir. 1986). However, in order to prevail on a denial of access to the courts claim, a plaintiff suing under Section 1983 must establish that he has been prejudiced in connection with some identifiable past, pending, or proposed legal proceeding. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349-53, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 2179-81 (1996).
Plaintiffs claim that they were prejudiced by Gegenheimer's refusal to accept their motion for preliminary default judgment against Judge Cusimano, but they offer no evidence to support this claim. In fact, defendants offer evidence demonstrating that even if Gegenheimer had filed the motion for default judgment, the motion would have failed because two exceptions for prescription and an exception of no cause of action had already been filed in the case. A default judgment cannot be taken if exceptions are in the record. Therefore, plaintiffs did not and cannot show prejudice from the failure to accept their default motion. Plaintiffs' Section 1983 claim is thus defective.
Even if Gegenheimer did violate plaintiffs' constitutional rights, he can be protected from liability under qualified immunity. If a court establishes that an official has violated a clearly established right, the court must then determine whether the official's conduct was objectively reasonable in light of the legal rules applicable at the time of the alleged violation. A defendant is entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds if no reasonable trier of fact could conclude from the record, taken as a whole, that it was objectively unreasonable for the defendant to believe that his actions did not violate a clearly established federal right. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639-41, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3038-40 (1987). In Lampkin, the Fifth Circuit held that a district court, in evaluating a claim of qualified immunity, must determine the objective reasonableness of the official's act as a matter of law. Lampkin v. City off Nacogdoches, 7 F.3d 430, 434-35 (5th Cir. 1993) (following the holding and reasoning of Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 226-28, 112 S.Ct. 534, 536-37 (1991)). Therefore, the district court should evaluate the reasonableness of the official's conduct under the circumstances confronting him at the time the conduct occurred in order to determine at summary judgment whether the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. See Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. at 226-28, 112 S.Ct. at 536-37.
Even if Gegenheimer's refusal to accept plaintiffs' filing was in error, he acted objectively reasonably. Defendants have submitted evidence that Gegenheimer relied on the fact that the judge who signed the order for pauper status had recused himself to support Gegenheimer's belief that plaintiffs did not have valid pauper status. (See Defs.' Mem. Opp. Summ. J., Ex. 3, 4.) Plaintiffs have offered no evidence to support their claim that Gegenheimer deliberately impeded their access to the court for any reason other than following what he believed to be court procedure. Court procedure required that plaintiffs pay a filing fee unless the were determined eligible for pauper status. Plaintiffs have offered no evidence to demonstrate that Gegenheimer deliberately impeded plaintiffs' filing for any reason other than trying to comply with court procedures. Therefore defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reason stated, the Court grants defendants' motion to dismiss and denies plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, Accordingly, the Court dismisses plaintiffs' claims.