Opinion
C085448
06-23-2020
Estate of LEON A. KIRKLAND, Deceased. DOUGLAS KAPLAN, as Administrator, etc., Petitioner and Respondent, v. DWAIN L. KIRKLAND, Objector and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. PR7731)
Appellant Dwain L. Kirkland challenges the probate court's order confirming the sale of an almond orchard owned by the estate of his deceased father. He contends substantial evidence does not support the court's finding that the sale advantaged the estate and benefitted interested persons. We affirm the order.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
In 2016, respondent Douglas Kaplan, the estate's administrator, petitioned the probate court for an order confirming sale of the orchard to Michael K. Geyer, Joan M. Geyer, Thomas C. Geyer, and Pamela A. Geyer (the Geyers) for $2 million. At the hearing on the petition, the Geyers lost out to an overbidder, who bid $2,200,500. The court confirmed sale to the overbidder, but later vacated its order. Appellant, an estate beneficiary, challenged the court's vacation order on appeal. We affirmed the court's action. (Estate of Kirkland (Oct. 9, 2019, C084066) [nonpub. opn.].)
After vacating the prior sale, the probate court granted the administrator authority to market the property. On May 22, 2017, the administrator petitioned the court for an order confirming sale of the property to the Geyers for $1,801,000.
Appellant objected to the sale. He contended the sale was neither to the advantage of the estate nor to the benefit of interested persons. The Geyers were taking advantage of a downturn in the market. The property had twice been appraised at $2 million in 2016, but after the court vacated its earlier order, the Geyers initially submitted an offer of $1,346,740. After that bid was rejected, the Geyers submitted their current bid, which was only $1,000 more than the minimum bid allowed. The property was generating income which more than covered expenses. Appellant argued there was no harm in waiting for the market to turn before selling the property and in the meantime allowing the property to continue generating income.
The administrator disagreed with appellant. In his reply to appellant's objections, the administrator argued that appellant should be precluded from challenging the sale at this late date. When appellant appealed the court's vacation order after the thwarted first sale, he expressly stated in his notice of appeal his agreement that the administrator could proceed with selling the property and the court had authority to confirm a sale notwithstanding his appeal. After the court had authorized the administrator twice to sell the property, it was now too late for appellant to raise his objection.
The administrator also contended the sale to the Geyers benefitted the estate and the interested parties. In addition to paying the purchase price, the Geyers would reimburse the sellers their crop expenses for 2017, an amount estimated at $100,000. Furthermore, the property lacked a recorded access easement. The Geyers were offering to buy the property without requiring the estate to provide a recorded easement, saving the estate the costs of that endeavor. The lack of an easement had "detracted" other prospective purchasers. The administrator also stated it was unknown whether other prospective purchasers would be forthcoming in offering an increased price, and, in the meantime, the estate's administration would remain uncompleted.
On June 27, 2017, the court overruled appellant's objections and confirmed the sale to the Geyers.
DISCUSSION
An estate's representative may sell estate real property when selling is either (a) "necessary to pay debts, devises, family allowance, expenses of administration, or taxes," or (b) "to the advantage of the estate and in the best interest of the interested persons." (Prob. Code, § 10000, subds. (a), (b).) At a hearing on a petition to confirm a sale, the probate court must determine the sale meets at least one of these standards. (Prob. Code, § 10310, subd. (a).) The court here determined the sale was to the estate's advantage and in the best interest of the heirs.
We must affirm the court's order if the court acted within its discretion in concluding the sale was to the advantage of the estate and if the evidence is sufficient to support the court's factual findings under the substantial evidence standard. (Estate of Barthelmess (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 728, 735; Estate of Da Roza (1947) 82 Cal.App.2d 550, 553-555.)
" 'To be entitled to relief on appeal from the result of an alleged abuse of discretion it must clearly appear that the injury resulting from such a wrong is sufficiently grave to amount to a manifest miscarriage of justice . . . .' " (Estate of Gilkison (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1449.) Under the substantial evidence standard, we resolve all conflicts and inferences in favor of the judgment and do not redetermine credibility or reweigh the evidence. (Estate of Odian (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 152, 168.)
Appellant contends the probate court abused its discretion by confirming the sale based on a lack of substantial evidence. He argues the administrator's evidence consisted only of the administrator's conclusory statements in the verified petition and his verified reply to appellant's objections, statements that were offered without evidentiary support. While a verified petition and affidavit may be received as evidence when offered in an uncontested proceeding (Prob. Code, § 1022), they are insufficient evidence in a contested proceeding. As a result, appellant asserts that no evidence supports the court's finding.
Appellant has forfeited his claim. He did not file a reporter's transcript of the court's hearing. He did file a reporter's transcript of the hearing where the court vacated its earlier order, but that hearing is no longer at issue. Hence, we have before us a judgment roll appeal. (Prob. Code, § 1050.) An appellant in a judgment roll appeal may not attack the sufficiency of the evidence, and we presume there was sufficient evidence to support the probate court's findings of fact. (Estate of Koplin (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 686, 693; Ducray v. Ducray (1967) 257 Cal.App.2d 480, 483.) "[A] record is inadequate, and appellant defaults, if the appellant predicates error only on the part of the record he provides the trial court, but ignores or does not present to the appellate court portions of the proceedings below which may provide grounds upon which the decision of the trial court could be affirmed." (Uniroyal Chemical Co. v. American Vanguard Corp. (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 285, 302.)
Were we to review the merits of appellant's claim based on the record before us, we still would affirm. "[A]ffidavits and verified petitions may not be considered as evidence at a contested probate hearing. [Citations.] [¶] 'However, where the parties do not object to the use of affidavits in evidence, and where both parties adopt that means of supporting their positions, the parties cannot question the propriety of the procedure on appeal. . . . Absent an objection, these documents were properly considered as evidence. [Citations.]' [Citations.]" (Evangelho v. Presoto (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 615, 620.)
Although appellant disputed the truth of the facts that the administrator set forth in the petition and the reply, there is no record appellant objected to the use of the petition or the reply to prove the truth of the disputed facts. The court's minute order from the hearing is silent on this issue. Consequently, the trial court could consider the verified petition and the reply as evidence and base its order on that evidence.
Appellant in effect argues that his evidence was stronger than the administrator's. As stated already, we resolve all evidentiary conflicts and inferences in favor of the judgment and do not redetermine credibility or reweigh the evidence.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in confirming the sale.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Parties to bear their own costs. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(4).)
/s/_________
HULL, J. We concur: /s/_________
RAYE, P. J. /s/_________
HOCH, J.