“To obtain relief under the Hague Convention, a petitioner has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the children have been wrongfully removed or retained.” Kanth v. Kanth, 79 F.Supp.2d 1317, 1321 (D. Utah 1999); see 22 U.S.C. § 9003(e)(1). The Court's role is not to determine the merits of child custody claims but rather to prevent parents from abducting children to avoid the jurisdiction of courts they view as unfavorable.

Upon finding out that she was pregnant, Respondent started her prenatal care in New York with a New York doctor. It is undisputed that the primary motivation to have the baby in Belgium was to obtain free medical care and avoid the high cost of carrying a baby to term in the United States. No evidence was presented to indicate that the parties thought that the departure from New York would be permanent. For example, there was no "going-away" party; no sale of the New York apartment; no removal of furniture from the New York apartment; and no removal of Respondent's non-maternity clothing from the New York apartment. See Kanth v. Kanth, 79 F. Supp.2d 1317 (D.Utah 1999) (where parties did not sell property in the United States and took no other steps consistent with a permanent move, habitual residence did not change in a move lasting less than one year). The parties applied for only a three-month tourist visa for Respondent and never applied for any visa extension or a permanent visa. Respondent brought nothing more than one or two suitcases filled with maternity clothing to Belgium.

First, the cases are clear that there need not be a decision to remain somewhere indefinitely for it to be considered the child's habitual residence. See Feder, 63 F.3d at 223-24 (citing In re Bates); Kanth v. Kanth, 79 F. Supp.2d 1317, 1321 (D. Utah 1999); In re Ponath, 829 F. Supp. 363, 367 (D. Utah 1993); Levesque v. Levesque, 816 F. Supp. 662, 666 (D. Kan. 1993). Second, the "degree of settled purpose" is to be analyzed not from the parent's perspective but from the child's perspective. Feder, 63 F.3d at 224.

First, the cases are clear that there need not be a decision to remain somewhere indefinitely for it to be considered the child's habitual residence. See Feder, 63 F.3d at 223-24 (citing In re Bates); Kanth v. Kanth, 79 F. Supp.2d 1317, 1321 (D. Utah 1999); In re Ponath, 829 F. Supp. 363, 367 (D. Utah 1993); Levesque v. Levesque, 816 F. Supp. 662, 666 (D. Kan. 1993). Second, the "degree of settled purpose" is to be analyzed not from the parent's perspective but from the child's perspective. Feder, 63 F.3d at 224.