Kane v. City of Flint

10 Citing cases

  1. Mich. Coal. of State Emp. Unions v. State

    302 Mich. App. 187 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013)   Cited 3 times

    When the 1963 Constitution was considered, SERA had been in place for twenty years. In Kane v. City of Flint, 342 Mich. 74, 83, 69 N.W.2d 156 (1955), our Supreme Court upheld the city's authority to take into account the additional retirement pension benefits granted firefighters and police officers when the city created for its employees a โ€œlike compensationโ€ pay system that differentiated the compensation of firefighters and police officers from other city employees. The Court noted that the applicable ordinance mandated that, โ€œ[l]ike classifications of work are to receive like compensation,โ€ and the plaintiff-firefighters argued that the pay differential violated this requirement.

  2. Assoc. Builders & Contractors v. City of Lansing

    305 Mich. App. 395 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014)   Cited 3 times

    The conclusion that our courts now recognize an expanded view of a city's police power different from the view espoused in Lennane is buttressed by cases that have upheld a city's authority to enact ordinances pertaining to wages. See, e.g., Brimmer v. Village of Elk Rapids, 365 Mich. 6, 12โ€“13, 112 N.W.2d 222 (1961) (declaring that salaries paid by municipalities are a matter of local concern); Gildersleeve v. Lamont, 331 Mich. 8, 12, 49 N.W.2d 36 (1951); Kane v. City of Flint, 342 Mich. 74, 77โ€“78, 69 N.W.2d 156 (1955); Olson v. Highland Park, 312 Mich. 688, 695, 20 N.W.2d 773 (1945). In Olson, 312 Mich. at 695, 20 N.W.2d 773, our Supreme Court upheld a city's regulation of overtime compensation for certain city employees.

  3. Attorney Gen. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n

    No. 306685 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2013)

    Although our Supreme Court has never decided whether health insurance qualifies as compensation, it has held in a different context that some fringe benefits (including pensions, clothing allowances, and life insurance premiums) are "compensation" because they were "not a gratuity, but a part of the stipulated compensation" pursuant to their contracts. Kane v City of Flint, 342 Mich 74, 80-83; 69 NW2d 156 (1955). This Court previously held in an older case that "hospitalization, medical, and dental insurance should not be included" as compensation.

  4. Mich. Coal. of State Emp. Unions v. State

    No. 147758 (Mich. Jul. 29, 2015)

    Other cases addressing "compensation" in other contexts, as well as the Court of Appeals below, recognize this. See, e.g., Kane v City of Flint, 342 Mich 74; 69 NW2d 156 (1955) (addressing municipalities' authority to define pensions as compensation). However, we are here concerned with the entire phrase, "rates of compensation," as that phrase is used in its constitutional context and as specifically understood by the ratifiers of our Constitution.

  5. Gantz v. Detroit

    392 Mich. 348 (Mich. 1974)   Cited 8 times
    In Gantz v Detroit, 392 Mich. 348; 220 N.W.2d 433 (1974), the Supreme Court construed the same Detroit residency ordinance with which we are involved in the instant case.

    See also, Philbrick v Dust, 178 Mich. 605, 607; 146 N.W. 175 (1914). Cf. Kane v Flint, 342 Mich. 74, 79; 69 N.W.2d 156 (1955). IV

  6. Gentile v. City of Detroit

    362 N.W.2d 848 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 5 times
    Holding that longevity pay was part of salary because it was not a true fringe benefit but, rather, a normal payment made regularly in the course of the plaintiffs' work for regular work done

    The discontinuance was permitted on other grounds but the court did find that it normally was part of his compensation protected by the constitution. In Kane v City of Flint, 342 Mich. 74; 69 N.W.2d 156 (1955), policemen and firemen sought equal pay for their classifications. They claimed they were being underpaid.

  7. Mich. Coal. of State Emp. Unions v. State

    498 Mich. 312 (Mich. 2015)   Cited 16 times
    Noting the absence of references of "pensions" or "retirement" during the constitutional convention debates as further support for its conclusion that the phrase "rates of compensation" in Const. 1963, art. 11, ยง 5 was not commonly understood to include them

    Other cases addressing โ€œcompensationโ€ in other contexts, as well as the Court of Appeals below, recognize this. See, e.g., Kane v. City of Flint, 342 Mich. 74, 69 N.W.2d 156 (1955) (addressing municipalities' authority to define pensions as compensation). However, we are here concerned with the entire phrase, โ€œrates of compensation,โ€ as that phrase is used in its constitutional context and as specifically understood by the ratifiers of our Constitution.

  8. Satterley v. City of Flint

    128 N.W.2d 508 (Mich. 1964)   Cited 8 times

    This Court has construed the word "compensation" as used presently in section 236 of the Flint charter. The Court was required to interpret the phrase "Like classifications of work are to receive like compensation" in Kane v. City of Flint (1955), 342 Mich. 74. Holding that strict dollar equality was not necessary, the Court said at p 78: "The city commission, in fixing the `compensation' to be paid to firemen and policemen took into consideration certain benefits afforded them by the city which were not shared in by other city employees."

  9. Daggett v. St. Francis Levee District

    226 Ark. 545 (Ark. 1956)   Cited 10 times
    In Daggett v. St. Francis Levee Dist., 226 Ark. 545, 291 S.W.2d 254 (1956) it was held that a retirement allowance financed over a period of years by the joint contributions of the employer and employee represents compensation rather than a mere gratuity.

    It cannot be doubted that a retirement allowance, financed over a period of years by the joint contributions of the employer and the employees, represents compensation rather than a mere gratuity. Kane v. City of Flint, 342 Mich. 74, 69 N.W.2d 156; Salz v. State House Com'n, 18 N.J. 106, 112 A.2d 716; Retirement Bd. of Allegheny County v. McGovern, 316 Pa. 161, 174 A. 400. Cases might also be cited to show that compensation embraces the furnishing of group insurance, medical benefits, work uniforms, meals, housing, and anything else of value that the employer provides in return for the work done by his employees. The question, however, is not whether retirement pay comes within the definition of compensation; it is whether the legislature may fairly be said to have had such pay in mind when it enacted the statute relied on by the district.

  10. Williams v. Det. Civ. Serv. Comm

    15 Mich. App. 55 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968)   Cited 6 times

    See, also, Philbrick v. Dust (1914), 178 Mich. 605, 607. Cf. Kane v. City of Flint (1955), 342 Mich. 74, 79. While ยง 7 (see footnote 2) confers upon the commission powers and duties " necessary to carry out the provisions hereof," and it may adopt rules "adapted to carry out the purposes of this chapter and not inconsistent with its provisions for the examination and selection of persons to fill the offices and positions in the classified service, which are required to be filled by appointment and for the selection of persons to be employed in the service of the city" the commission does not under the quoted words have powers or duties not necessary to carry out "the provisions hereof" or to promulgate rules unrelated to examination and selection of employees.