Opinion
2:22-cv-04521-RMG-MGB
08-03-2023
Peggy S. Kandies, PLAINTIFF, v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company and David Long, DEFENDANTS.
ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil action alleging breach of contract under South Carolina law. (Dkt. No. 1.) Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), pretrial proceedings in this action have been referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge. Currently before the court are three motions: a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant David Long (“Long”) (Dkt. No. 42); a Motion to Strike filed by Defendant Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (“Liberty Mutual”) (Dkt. No. 48); and a Motion for Miscellaneous Relief filed by Plaintiff (Dkt. Nos. 53). For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the court GRANT Defendant Long's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 42), and ORDERS that Defendant Liberty Mutual's Motion to Strike (Dkt. No. 48) and Plaintiff's Motion for Miscellaneous Relief (Dkt. Nos. 53) be DENIED.
FACTUAL SUMMARY
This case centers around Defendants' purported failure to “cover [Plaintiff's] house when it was damaged” pursuant to her homeowners' insurance policy. (Dkt. Nos. 1, 35.) Plaintiff's Amended Complaint alleges that she has a “Deluxe Policy” with Defendant Liberty Mutual, and that Liberty Mutual did not honor that policy when she submitted a claim for water damage in her home. (See generally Dkt. No. 35.)
Plaintiff claims that she fell in late 2019 and hurt her hand. (Id. at 2.) Her injury required a cast. (Id.) On December 19, 2019, her friend brought her to Georgia to care for her. (Id.) When Plaintiff returned to her home on January 3, 2020, she found “water coming out of the attic where the hot water heater was installed.” (Id.)
Plaintiff claims that she called Defendant Liberty Mutual to file a claim and was assigned the claim number 045268834, with a loss date of December 19, 2019. (Id.) According to Plaintiff, Defendant Liberty Mutual told her “not to do anything until the adjuster was assigned.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Richard Bohlar was assigned as the adjuster for her claim, but that he could not visit her home to inspect the water damage due to the COVID-19 pandemic. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff claims that Mr. Bohlar delayed addressing her claim and that during the delay “[t]here were no actions to help Plaintiff in getting her and her pets in a safe place, per her policy ....” (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that she called Defendant Liberty Mutual to request a new adjuster on April 7, 2021. (Id. at 6.) She states that she spoke to a woman named Stephanie and that she did not file a new claim. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Liberty Mutual nonetheless “changed the date of loss to April 7, 2021.” (Id.)
According to Plaintiff, Defendant Liberty Mutual “used the delay, deny, defend strategy to not take care of Plaintiff's damages per her policy.” (Id. at 7.) She further claims that David Long, as President and Chief Executive Officer of Defendant Liberty Mutual, “signed a contract with Plaintiff.” (Id.) Plaintiff therefore brings breach of contract claims against Defendants, alleging “breach of duty” and “bad faith.” (Id. at 9-13.) Plaintiff claims she suffered damages directly and proximately caused by Defendants' breach of contract and the “complete failure of Liberty Mutual Insurance Company to perform.” (Id. at 7.)
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed the instant litigation on December 15, 2022. (Dkt. No. 1.) On March 15, 2023, Defendants filed an Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint. (Dkt. No. 17.) On that same day, Defendant David Long filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's claims against him. (Dkt. No. 22.) On April 17, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend her Complaint, which included a proposed Amended Complaint and various exhibits. (Dkt. Nos. 25, 25-1, 25-2, 25-3, 25-4, 25-5, 25-6, 25-7, 25-8, 25-9, 25-10, 25-11, 25-12, 25-13.) By Order dated April 28, 2023, the undersigned granted Plaintiff's Motion to Amend. (Dkt. No. 34.) The Amended Complaint was filed that same day. (Dkt. No. 35.) In light of the Amended Complaint, the undersigned deemed Defendant Long's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 22) moot. (Dkt. No. 37.)
Defendant Liberty Mutual answered the Amended Complaint on May 10, 2023. (Dkt. No. 41.) On that same day, Defendant Long filed a renewed Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). (Dkt. No. 42.) The next day, the court issued an Order, pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff of the dismissal procedure and the possible consequences if she failed to adequately respond to Defendant Long's Motion. (Dkt. No. 43.) Plaintiff responded on May 22, 2023. (Dkt. No. 45.) On May 26, 2023, Defendant Long replied to Plaintiff's response. (Dkt. No. 46.)
On June 7, 2023, Plaintiff filed a response to Defendant Liberty Mutual's Answer to her Amended Complaint. (Dkt. No. 47.) Two days later, Defendant Liberty Mutual filed a Motion to Strike Plaintiff's response. (Dkt. No. 48.) On July 7, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Miscellaneous Relief, claiming that Defense counsel “misrepresent[ed] the dates of mailings to Plaintiff” and asking the court to address this issue. (Dkt. No. 53.) Defendants responded to Plaintiff's Motion on July 10, 2023. (Dkt. No. 55.) Plaintiff replied to Defendants' response on July 17, 2023. (Dkt. No. 56.) As such, the Motions before the court have been fully briefed and are ripe for disposition.
DISCUSSION
I. Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 42)
A. Rule 12(b)(2) Standard
When a court's personal jurisdiction is challenged pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), the burden is on the plaintiff to establish that a ground for jurisdiction exists. See Gourdine v. Karl Storz Endoscopy-Am., Inc., 223 F.Supp.3d 475, 481-82 (D.S.C. 2016) (referencing Combs v. Bakker, 886 F.2d 673, 676 (4th Cir. 1989)). “When, as here, the court resolves the motion on written submissions (as opposed to an evidentiary hearing), the plaintiff need only make a ‘prima facie showing of sufficient jurisdictional basis.'” Red Hill Ranch, LLC v. Old S. Carriage Co., Inc., 225 F.Supp.3d 422, 424 (D.S.C. 2015) (referencing Combs, 886 F.2d at 676). To determine whether Plaintiff has satisfied this burden, the court may consider both Defendants' and Plaintiff's “pleadings, affidavits, and other supporting documents presented to the court” and must construe them “in the light most favorable to plaintiff, drawing all inferences and resolving all factual disputes in [her] favor,” and “assuming [Plaintiff's] credibility.” Gault v. Thacher, 367 F.Supp.3d 469, 474 (D.S.C. 2018) (referencing Masselli & Lane, PC v. Miller & Schuh, PA, 215 F.3d 1320, ___, 2000 WL 691100, at *1 (4th Cir. 2000) (table opinion); Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Akzo, N.V., 2 F.3d 56, 62 (4th Cir. 1993); Combs, 886 F.2d at 676).
Because Plaintiff is representing herself, these standards must be applied while liberally construing her filings in this case. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (referencing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
B. Personal Jurisdiction
1. Legal Standard
“[T]o validly assert personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, two conditions must be satisfied.” Christian Sci. Bd. of Dirs. of the First Church of Christ v. Nolan, 259 F.3d 209, 215 (4th Cir. 2001). First, the exercise of jurisdiction must be authorized by the long-arm statute of the forum state, and second, the exercise of personal jurisdiction must not “overstep the bounds” of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Anita's N.M. Style Mexican Food, Inc. v. Anita's Mexican Foods Corp., 201 F.3d 314, 317 (4th Cir. 2000). South Carolina's long-arm statute has been construed to extend to the outer limits allowed by the Due Process Clause. Foster v. Arletty 3 Sarl, 278 F.3d 409, 414 (4th Cir. 2002). “Because South Carolina treats its long-arm statute as coextensive with the due process clause, the sole question becomes whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would violate due process.” Cockrell v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 611 S.E.2d 505, 508 (S.C. 2005).
Due process requires that a defendant have sufficient “minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'” Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). This standard can be met in two ways: “by finding specific jurisdiction based on conduct connected to the suit or by finding general jurisdiction.” See ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 711-12 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984)).
Under the Fourth Circuit's three-prong test for specific jurisdiction, a court must consider “(1) the extent to which the defendant purposefully availed [himself] of the privilege of conducting activities in the State; (2) whether the plaintiff's claims arise out of those activities directed at the State; and (3) whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would be constitutionally reasonable.” Consulting Eng'rs Corp. v. Geometric Ltd., 561 F.3d 273, 278 (4th Cir. 2009). To determine whether a defendant purposefully availed himself of the forum state, courts look at a variety of factors, including:
(1) whether the defendant maintained offices or agents in the State; (2) whether the defendant maintained property in the State; (3) whether the defendant reached into the State to solicit or initiate business; (4) whether the defendant deliberately engaged in significant or long-term business activities in the State; (5) whether a choice of law clause selects the law of the State; (6) whether the defendant made in-person contact with a resident of the State regarding the business relationship; (7) whether the relevant contracts required performance of duties in the State; and (8) the nature, quality, and extent of the parties' communications about the business being transacted.Sneha Media & Ent., LLC v. Associated Broad. Co. P Ltd., 911 F.3d 192, 198-99 (4th Cir. 2018) (citing Consulting Eng'rs Corp., 561 F.3d at 278).
When the defendant's contacts with the forum state do not form the basis for the suit, personal jurisdiction over the defendant must arise from the defendant's “general, more persistent, but unrelated contacts with the state-known as general jurisdiction.” Callum v. CVS Health Corp., 137 F.Supp.3d 817, 834 (D.S.C. 2015) (referencing ALS Scan, 293 F.3d at 712). In order for general jurisdiction to exist, the defendant's activities in the state must have been “continuous and systematic.” Id. at 834-35. “[T]he defendant must be engaged in longstanding business in the forum state, such as marketing or shipping products, or performing services or maintaining one or more offices there; activities that are less extensive than that will not qualify for general in personam jurisdiction.” See id. at 835 (citing 4 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1067.5 (3d ed. 2002)).
Relevant here, “the acts of a corporate officer or employee taken in his corporate capacity within the jurisdiction generally do not form the predicate for jurisdiction over him in his individual capacity.” Columbia Briargate Co. v. First Nat. Bank in Dallas, 713 F.2d 1052, 105556 (4th Cir. 1983) (internal quotations and citation omitted). However, this idea-known as the “fiduciary shield doctrine”-does not prevent a court from exercising personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporate officer if that officer otherwise has sufficient minimum contacts within the forum state. See id. (“[W]hen a non-resident corporate agent is sued for a tort committed by him in his corporate capacity in the forum state . . . he is properly subject to the jurisdiction of the forum court, provided the long-arm statute of the forum state is co-extensive with the full reach of due process.”); Magic Toyota v. Southeast Toyota Distrib., 784 F.Supp. 306, 310 (D.S.C. 1992) (explaining that a court “may have personal jurisdiction over an individual non-resident employee based on acts he performed on behalf of his employer under certain circumstances”). In other words, a defendant's role as a corporate officer does not alone justify the court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over him, but the court may exercise jurisdiction if it finds that the corporate officer has otherwise engaged in sufficient directed activity in the forum state. Gault v. Thacher, 367 F.Supp.3d 469, 476-77 (D.S.C. 2018).
2. Analysis
In his Motion, Defendant Long argues that “[t]o hale [him] into a South Carolina court offends ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'” (Dkt No. 42 at 4-5.) Defendant Long contends that Plaintiff cannot establish specific jurisdiction because her Amended Complaint contains “no allegation of why personal jurisdiction is present, no allegation that she interacted with Long in the adjustment of her claim, or that a contract exists between she and Long. Indeed, the contract at issue reflects that it is between an insurance company and Plaintiff-not Long and Plaintiff.” (Id.) Defendant Long therefore asserts that he has not purposefully availed himself of the jurisdiction of South Carolina and that minimum contacts are not satisfied. (Id. at 5.)
Based on the allegations set forth in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, the undersigned agrees. As Defendant Long correctly notes, Plaintiff does not allege that he actively participated in any part of her insurance claim. (See generally Dkt. No. 35.) Plaintiff names two employees who helped her with her claim; Defendant Long is not one of them. (Id.) Plaintiff also does not allege that she interacted with, spoke to, or heard from Defendant Long at any point during the negotiation of her insurance contract. (Id.) In sum, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Long was personally involved with any aspect of her insurance policy or claim. (Id.)
The only reason Plaintiff sets forth in support of the court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over Defendant Long is his signature on the insurance contract between Plaintiff and Liberty Mutual. (Id.) However, Defendant Long is not a party to that contract; he signed the contract in his capacity as President and Chief Executive Officer of Defendant Liberty Mutual.(Dkt. No. 42 at 2; Dkt. No. 42-1 at 5.) This does not indicate personal involvement in the decisions or actions underlying Plaintiff's purported injuries. See Columbia Briargate Co., 713 F.2d at 1063 (“What is required is some showing of direct, personal involvement by the corporate officer in some decision or action which is causally related to the plaintiff's injury.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Thus, even construing Plaintiff's allegations in the light most favorable to her, they do not support a finding that this court's exercise of specific jurisdiction over Defendant Long is proper.
It is worth noting that Defendant Long has since retired. (Dkt. No. 42 at 2.)
Similarly, Defendant Long argues that Plaintiff cannot show that his contact with the state of South Carolina is sufficient to warrant the court's exercise of general jurisdiction over him. (Dkt. No. 42 at 6.) Specifically, Defendant Long contends that Plaintiff makes “no specific allegations of Long's conduct at all,” let alone conduct that could be considered “continuous and systematic contact with the state.” (Id.) The undersigned agrees with Defendant Long on this point, as well. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint does not allege that he visited, conducted business, held meetings, sold or marketed goods, or owned or rented property within the state of South Carolina. (See generally Dkt. No. 35.) In fact, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Long had contact with or conducted activity within South Carolina at all. (Id.) Accordingly, the undersigned simply cannot conclude that Defendant Long had systematic or continuous contacts with the state of South Carolina, nor that he did anything to “purposefully avail [himself] of the privilege of conducting activities within [South Carolina].” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475-76, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985). For this reason, the court's exercise of general jurisdiction over Defendant Long is also inappropriate. As such, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the court GRANT Defendant Long's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 42) and dismiss him as a party to this litigation.
Even if the Court could properly exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendant Long, Plaintiff's claims against him would still fail because the contract underlying Plaintiff's claims is between Plaintiff and Defendant Liberty Mutual, not Plaintiff and Defendant Long. (See Dkt. No. 42-1.)
II. Motion to Strike (Dkt. No. 48)
As for Defendant Liberty Mutual's Motion to Strike Plaintiff's reply to its Answer to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, the Motion is denied. While the court recognizes that Plaintiff's reply was unauthorized, Defendant Liberty Mutual has failed to set forth any prejudice resulting from the filing. (See generally Dkt. No. 48.) Thus, striking Plaintiff's reply is unnecessary at this juncture.
III. Motion for Miscellaneous Relief (Dkt. No. 53)
Plaintiff's Motion for Miscellaneous Relief is also denied. As with Defendant Liberty Mutual's Motion to Strike, Plaintiff has articulated no prejudice resulting from Defendants' purported delay in mailing the relevant filings to her. (See generally Dkt. No. 53.) Indeed, Plaintiff admits to having access to those filings via Pacer. (Id.) Further, Plaintiff does not provide the court with any evidence to indicate that Defense counsel altered the dates of any mailings or intentionally delayed sending them to her. (Id.) As such, Plaintiff's Motion is denied.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the court GRANT Defendant Long's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 42), and ORDERS that Defendant Liberty Mutual's Motion to Strike (Dkt. No. 48) and Plaintiff's Motion for Miscellaneous Relief (Dkt. Nos. 53) be DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).