The competency of an individual to act as an interpreter is a question for the trial court, and the trial court's determination of the individual's competency is reviewed on appeal under an abuse of discretion standard. Martins v. State, 52 S.W.3d 459, 470 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.); Kan v. State, 4 S.W.3d 38, 41 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, pet. ref'd). The accuracy of an interpreter's translation is a question of fact for the factfinder and not reviewable by an appellate court.Martins, 52 S.W.3d at 470; Kan, 4 S.W.3d at 43.

SeeTex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.30(a); Tex.R. Evid. 1009. Individuals called upon to act as interpreters during criminal proceedings are not required to have specific qualifications or training; instead, what is required is “sufficient skill in translating and familiarity with the use of slang.” Kan v. State, 4 S.W.3d 38, 41 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. ref'd); see also Leal, 782 S.W.2d at 849 (holding that, pursuant to article 38.30, interpreter must “possess adequate interpreting skills for the particular situation” and must be “familiar with the use of slang”); Mendiola v. State, 924 S.W.2d 157, 161 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1995, pet. ref'd) (holding that article 38.30 does not require interpreter to be “official” or “certified” interpreter). The competency of an individual to act as an interpreter is a question for the trial court, and, absent an abuse of discretion, this determination will not be disturbed on appeal. See Kan, 4 S.W.3d at 41;see also Linton, 275 S.W.3d at 500 (holding that trial court has “wide discretion in determining the adequacy of interpretive services”); Montoya v. State, 811 S.W.2d 671, 673 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1991, no pet.) (“[C]ompetency is a question for the court, and a ruling on this subject will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion.”).

An individual called to act as an interpreter in a criminal proceeding is not required to have specific qualifications or training. Kan v. State, 4 S.W.3d 38, 41 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, pet. ref'd). What is required is adequate interpreting skills for the particular situation and familiarity with the use of slang.

The right to have the trial proceedings interpreted to the accused in a language the accused understands is part of the constitutional right to confrontation. Kan v. State, 4 S.W.3d 38, 41 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. ref'd) (citing Baltierra v. State, 586 S.W.2d 553, 557 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979)). The accused's right to have the trial proceedings accurately interpreted in a language she understands is also a matter of due process.

The right to an interpreter is part of an accused's constitutional right to confrontation and a matter of due process. Kan v. State, 4 S.W.3d 38, 41 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. ref'd); see U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV; TEX.

The right to an interpreter is part of an accused's constitutional right to confrontation and a matter of due process. Kan v. State, 4 S.W.3d 38, 41 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. ref'd); see U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; Tex. Const. art. I, § 10. "The question on appeal is not whether the 'best' means of interpretive services were employed, but whether the services that were actually employed were constitutionally adequate such that the defendant could understand and participate in the proceedings." Linton, 275 S.W.3d at 501; see Castrejon v. State, 428 S.W.3d 179, 184 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.); Peralta v. State, 338 S.W.3d 598, 604 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2010, no pet.). While the translation need not be perfect, it must be "true or accurate."

When considered from the jury's perspective, the use of the words "not me" in this case can be reasonably construed as "a rhetorical device to explain to the jury the elements of the law" of sexual assault. See Cruz, 225 S.W.3d at 549 (viewing prosecutor's statement that, "in order to have self-defense, what has to happen is someone says, 'Yeah, I committed this crime'" as proper jury argument because the comment referred to appellant's written statements and argument at trial); Kan v. State, 4 S.W.3d 38, 45 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, pet ref'd) (holding that rhetorical questions "What contradicted that sexual conduct occurred? What did Defendant put on there to show that sexual contact did not happen?

Issues concerning the accuracy of an interpreter's translation raise fact questions that are properly addressed in the trial court. Garcia v. State, 887 S.W.2d 846, 875 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994) overruled on other grounds by Hammock v. State, 46 S.W.3d 889 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001); Kan v. State, 4 S.W.3d 38, 43 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. ref'd). Such issues are not reviewable on appeal.

As other courts have noted, '"virtually all evidence offered by the prosecution will be prejudicial to the defendant. . . ."' Kan v. State, 4 S.W.3d 38, 46 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. ref'd) (quoting Caballero v. State, 919 S.W.2d 919, 922 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, pet. ref'd). Therefore, only unfairly prejudicial evidence should be excluded.

What is required is sufficient skill in translating and familiarity with slang." See Kan v. State, 4 S.W.3d 38, 41 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999). Thus a guard could have interpreted for Petitioner.