Where a party “had no control over the previous litigation and nothing in the record indicates that [the party's] interests were legally represented in the previous trial, there can be no privity." Kaminsky v. Sebile, 140 N.C.App. 71, 81, 535 S.E.2d 109, 116 (2000) (citing Countyof Rutherford ex rel. Hedrick v. Whitener, 100 N.C.App. 70, 76, 394 S.E.2d 263, 266 (1990) ). An accident may cause damage or injury to more than one person.
ation was one of the factors that North Carolina appellate courts have considered in determining that other payment sources were collateral for purposes of the collateral source rule. See Cates , 321 N.C. at 6, 361 S.E.2d at 738 (justifying its holding that Medicaid and other public benefit payments were a collateral source based, in part, upon the fact that N.C.G.S. § 108A-57 "entitles the state to full reimbursement for any Medicaid payments made on a plaintiff's behalf in the event the plaintiff recovers an award for damages" and prevents "any ‘windfall profit’ for the plaintiff"); see also Lunsford , 367 N.C. at 628, 766 S.E.2d at 304 (stating that, "given the General Assembly's provision of subrogation and reimbursement rights for the financial protection of insurers, we cannot agree with Farm Bureau's argument that the trial court's order resulted in a ‘windfall’ for Lunsford" in that "Farm Bureau could have preserved its subrogation rights by advancing its UIM policy limits"); Kaminsky v. Sebile , 140 N.C. App. 71, 80, 535 S.E.2d 109, 115 (2000) (noting that, "[u]nder Cates , if a plaintiff recovers for the past Medicaid payments he or she received and the state fails to seek reimbursement, the plaintiff would not then be required to return the money to the defendant-tortfeasor" and that, "[s]imilarly, defendant here should not receive a windfall because the government abandoned its right under the [Federal Medical Care Recovery Act]"). Had Erie refrained from waiving its subrogation rights and attempted to assert those rights against defendant, the same protection against a windfall recovery would exist in this case.
and the strict letter thereof shall be disregarded.’ " Id. (quoting State v. Barksdale , 181 N.C. 621, 625, 107 S.E. 505, 507 (1921) ); see alsoKaminsky v. Sebile , 140 N.C. App. 71, 76, 535 S.E.2d 109, 112–13 (2000). Griffith v. North Carolina Dept. of Correction , 210 N.C. App. 544, 559, 709 S.E.2d 412, 423 (2011)
However, if a literal reading of the statutory language "yields absurd results . . . or contravenes clearly expressed legislative intent, `the reason and purpose of the law shall control and the strict letter thereof shall be disregarded.'" Id. (quoting State v. Barksdale, 181 N.C. 621, 625, 107 S.E. 505, 507 (1921)); see also Kaminsky v. Sebile, 140 N.C. App. 71, 76, 535 S.E.2d 109, 112-13 (2000). Further,
Kayler v. Gallimore, 269 N.C. 405, 408, 152 S.E.2d 518, 521 (1967). Indeed, in Kaminsky v. Sebile, 140 N.C. App. 71, 81, 535 S.E.2d 109, 115-16 (2000), this Court held that no privity existed for res judicata purposes between a member of the military and the United States Army. Moreover, our Supreme Court has held:
Kayler v. Gallimore, 269 N.C. 405, 408, 152 S.E.2d 518, 521 (1967). Indeed, in Kaminsky v. Sebile, 140 N.C. App. 71, 81, 535 S.E.2d 109, 115-16 (2000), this Court held that no privity existed for res judicata purposes between a member of the military and the United States Army. Moreover, our Supreme Court has held:
The purpose of the collateral source rule is to " 'exclude[] evidence of payments made to the plaintiff by sources other than the defendant when this evidence is offered for the purpose of diminishing the defendant tortfeasor's liability to the injured plaintiff.' " Kaminsky v. Sebile, 140 N.C.App. 71, 77, 535 S.E.2d 109, 113 (2000) (quoting Badgett v. Davis, 104 N.C.App. 760, 764, 411 S.E.2d 200, 203 (1991)). "The policy behind the rule is to prevent a tortfeasor from 'reduc[ing] his own liability for damages by the amount of compensation the injured party receives from an independent source.'
Claim preclusion only arises in actions between the same parties or those "so identified in interest as to represent the same legal right. Privity is not established by the mere presence of a similar interest in a claim, nor by the fact that the previous adjudication may affect the subsequent party's liability." Kaminsky v. Sebile, 140 N.C. App. 71, 81, 535 S.E.2d 109, 115-116 (2000). In the case at bar, defendants have different interests than those of FEMA. Plaintiffs' claim in the federal action was dependent on the lower floor being classified as other than a "basement.