Opinion
No. 3:02-CV-1618-M.
August 3, 2004.
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and an Order of the Court in implementation thereof, subject cause has previously been referred to the United States Magistrate Judge. The findings, conclusions, and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge are as follows:
I. BACKGROUND
A. Parties : Petitioner, a state inmate currently incarcerated in the Wynne Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice — Correctional Institutions Division (TDCJ-CID), filed this action as a petition for habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Douglas Dretke, Director of TDCJ-CID, is the respondent.
B. Procedural History : In 1991, petitioner was convicted of murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment. (Pet. Writ of Habeas Corpus (Pet.) at 2.) While incarcerated in the Wynne Unit of the TDCJ-CID, on January 28, 2002, petitioner was found guilty of a disciplinary violation, and received cell and commissary restrictions for thirty days; reduction in line classification status; and loss of previously earned good-time credits. ( Id. at 5.) Petitioner appealed the discipline through the prison grievance procedure. ( Id. ¶ 19.)
In July 2002, petitioner filed the instant action. (Pet. at 1, 9.) He challenges the disciplinary proceeding (Case No. 20020129462) and the imposed punishment on four grounds: (1) his rights to due process were violated; (2) insufficient evidence supports the finding of guilt; (3) the imposed penalty was too severe; and (4) the punishment was not progressive or within the guidelines. (Pet. at 2, 5, 7-8.) The Court has not directed respondent to file an answer to the petition.
C. Exhaustion : It appears that petitioner has sufficiently exhausted his state remedies by proceeding through the two-step grievance procedure afforded by the prison facility. Because petitioner challenges a disciplinary proceeding, he is not required to file a state application for writ of habeas corpus. See Ex parte Palomo, 759 S.W.2d 671, 674 (Tex.Crim.App. 1988) (recognizing that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals does not entertain "matters such as loss of good time credit, disciplinary proceedings and inmate classification by way of a writ of habeas corpus").
II. DUE PROCESS
Petitioner alleges constitutional violations resulting from a disciplinary proceeding in which he lost good-time credits. (Pet. at 5, 7-8.) Specifically, petitioner alleges that he lost good-time credits as punishment for a disciplinary infraction, and that he also received a reduction in his line classification from S3 to L1, lost thirty days commissary privileges and a thirty-day cell restriction.
"Federal habeas relief cannot be had `absent the allegation by a plaintiff that he or she has been deprived of some right secured to him or her by the United States Constitution or the laws of the United States.'" Malchi v. Thaler, 211 F.3d 953, 957 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Orellana v. Kyle, 65 F.3d 29, 31 (5th Cir. 1995)). If a prisoner is eligible for release on mandatory supervision, "there is a constitutional expectancy of early release created by Texas's mandatory supervision scheme in place prior to September 1, 1996 for earned good time credits." Id. at 957-58. Such expectancy requires that "the loss of good time credits under a state statute that bestowed mandatory sentence reductions for good behavior . . . be accompanied by certain procedural safeguards in order to satisfy due process." Madison v. Parker, 104 F.3d 765, 769 (5th Cir. 1997). Challenges to disciplinary proceedings do not generally raise a cognizable constitutional violation, however, unless the petitioner has lost good-time credits and is eligible for mandatory supervision. See Malchi, 211 F.3d at 957-58; Madison, 104 F.3d at 769.
When a state creates a right to good time credit and recognizes that its revocation is an authorized sanction for misconduct, a prisoner's interest therein is embraced within the Fourteenth Amendment "liberty" concerns so as to entitle him to those minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances and required by the due process clause to insure that this state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated.Madison, 104 F.3d at 768 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974)).
Petitioner concedes that he is serving a sentence for murder and is therefore ineligible for release on mandatory supervision. ( See Pet. ¶¶ 4, 16.) According to the mandatory supervision statute in effect when he was convicted of murder, petitioner is in fact ineligible for mandatory supervision. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.18, § 8(c)(1) (Vernon 1991) (stating that "[a] prisoner may not be released to mandatory supervision . . . if the prisoner is serving a sentence for . . . a first degree felony under Section 19.02, Penal Code (Murder)). Because he is ineligible for release to mandatory supervision, petitioner has no protected liberty interest in the loss of his accrued good time. See Malchi, 211 F.3d at 957-58.
With regard to petitioner's reduction in line classification, loss of commissary privileges, and cell restriction, "the Due Process Clause does not protect every change in the conditions of confinement having a substantial adverse impact on the prisoner." Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 478 (1995). Lawful incarceration results in the loss of many rights and privileges that most citizens enjoy. Id. at 485; Madison, 104 F.3d at 767. States may, nevertheless, create liberty interests that are protected by the due process clause. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484-85; Madison, 104 F.3d at 767.
[T]hese interests will be generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485. Disciplinary restrictions that alter the conditions of confinement, including commissary and cell restrictions, do not implicate due process. See id. at 958; Madison, 104 F.3d at 768. The courts have specifically held, furthermore, that "[i]nmates have no protectable property or liberty interest in custodial classifications." Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716, 719 (5th Cir. 1999). Such restrictions are not penalties which represent the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a state might create a liberty interest.
In the absence of a constitutionally protected liberty interest, prisoners may not challenge disciplinary proceedings through a petition for writ of habeas corpus. In this instance, petitioner has established no liberty interest sufficient to justify habeas relief. He has failed to state a cognizable constitutional violation. Further, the punishments imposed upon him as of the result of the challenged disciplinary proceeding do not implicate due process.
Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts provides that "[i]f it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibit annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge shall make an order for its summary dismissal and cause the petitioner to be notified." Because petitioner asserts no constitutional violation, the Court should summarily dismiss this action under Rule 4.
III. EVIDENTIARY HEARING
Upon review of the pleadings filed herein, an evidentiary hearing appears unnecessary.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that, pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, the District Court summarily DISMISS petitioner's application for habeas corpus relief, brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.