Opinion
Case No. 1:05-cv-700.
December 16, 2005
OPINION
This is a habeas corpus action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Promptly after the filing of a petition for habeas corpus, the Court must undertake a preliminary review of the petition to determine whether "it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court." Rule 4, RULES GOVERNING § 2254 CASES; see 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If so, the petition must be summarily dismissed. Rule 4; see Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1970) (district court has the duty to "screen out" petitions that lack merit on their face). A dismissal under Rule 4 includes those petitions which raise legally frivolous claims, as well as those containing factual allegations that are palpably incredible or false. Carson v. Burke, 178 F.3d 434, 436-37 (6th Cir. 1999). After undertaking the review required by Rule 4, the Court concludes that Petitioner fails to raise a meritorious federal claim.
Discussion
I. Factual Allegations
Petitioner is incarcerated in the Florence Crane Correctional Facility. Petitioner was convicted in the Wayne County Circuit Court of one count of involuntary manslaughter, two counts of assault with intent to commit great bodily harm less than murder and possession of firearm during the commission of a felony. He was sentenced to concurrent prisons terms of nine to fifteen years for the manslaughter conviction and five to ten years for each of the assault convictions to be served following a two-year term for the felony-firearm conviction. In the instant action, Petitioner challenges the denial of his parole by the Michigan Parole Board on or about October 6, 2005.
The petition and supporting brief, which consist almost entirely of rambling legalese, assert violations of Petitioner's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection rights. Petitioner repeatedly argues that he was denied parole, while other "similarly situated" prisoners were released on parole. He also makes sweeping allegations that Respondents intentionally discriminated against him in making their parole decision. For example, Petitioner argues that he "has been wrongfully unlawfully denied of his protected rights by Respondents (via Respondents' duly constituted agents and/or employees), when Respondents have intentionally committed various wrongfully unlawfully arbitrary capricious decisions toward Petitioner, making the Respondents' invidiously dissimilar or illegitimacy, by intentionally treating Petitioner differently than other similarly situated individual persons." (Br. in Supp. of Pet., 9-10, docket #2.) In addition, Petitioner contends that the parole board relied upon inaccurate information in his Pre-sentence Investigation Report (PER) and his parole guideline score sheet.
II. Due Process
Petitioner contends that his due process rights were violated when the parole board relied upon inaccurate information in making its decision to deny his parole. Petitioner cannot sustain a due process claim arising from the denial of his parole because he has no liberty interest in being released on parole. There is no constitutional or inherent right to be conditionally released before the expiration of a prison sentence. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). Although a state may establish a parole system, it has no duty to do so, and thus, the presence of a parole system by itself does not give rise to a constitutionally-protected liberty interest in parole release. Id. at 7; Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 373 (1987). Rather, a liberty interest is present only if state law entitles an inmate to release on parole. Inmates of Orient Corr. Inst. v. Ohio State Adult Parole Auth., 929 F.2d 233, 235 (6th Cir. 1991).
In Sweeton v. Brown, 27 F.3d 1162, 1164-65 (6th Cir. 1994) (en banc), the Sixth Circuit, noting "the broad powers of the Michigan procedural authorities to deny parole," has held that the Michigan system does not create a liberty interest in parole. Subsequent to its 1994 decision, the Sixth Circuit has recognized the continuing validity of Sweeton and has continued to find that Michigan's parole scheme creates no liberty interest in being released on parole. See Ward v. Stegall, No. 03-1804, 2004 WL 614581 (6th Cir. March 24, 2004); Martin v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., No. 03-3642, 2003 WL 22976604, at *1 (6th Cir. Dec. 8, 2003); Bullock v. McGinnis, No. 00-1591, 2001 WL 180978, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 14, 2001); Turnboe v. Stegall, No. 00-1182, 2000 WL 1679478, at *1 (6th Cir. Nov. 1, 2000); Hawkins v. Abramajtys, No. 99-1995, 2000 WL 1434695, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 19, 2000); Irvin v. Michigan Parole Bd., No. 99-1817, 2000 WL 800029, at *2 (6th Cir. June 14, 2000). Also, in unpublished decisions, the Sixth Circuit has held that particular parts of Michigan's statutory parole scheme do not create a liberty interest in parole. See Fifer v. Michigan Dep't of Corr., No. 96-2322, 1997 WL 681518, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 30, 1997); Moran v. McGinnis, No. 95-1330, 1996 WL 304344, at *2 (6th Cir. June 5, 1996); Leaphart v. Gach, No. 95-1639, 1995 WL 734480, at *2 (6th Cir. Dec. 11, 1995); Vertin v. Gabry, No. 94-2267, 1995 WL 613692, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 18, 1995); Neff v. Johnson, No. 92-1818, 1993 WL 11880, at *1 (6th Cir. Jan. 21, 1993); Janiskee v. Michigan Dep't of Corr., No. 91-1103, 1991 WL 76181, at *1 (6th Cir. May 9, 1991); Haynes v. Hudson, No. 89-2006, 1990 WL 41025, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 10, 1990). Finally, the Michigan Supreme Court has recognized that there is no liberty interest in parole under the Michigan system. Glover v. Michigan Parole Bd., 596 N.W.2d 598, 603-04 (Mich. 1999).
Because Petitioner has no liberty interest in being paroled, he cannot show that any false or inaccurate information was relied upon to a constitutionally-significant degree. See Maiden v. Johnson, No. 98-1479, 1999 WL 507207, at *1 (6th Cir. June 10, 1999); Draughn v. Green, No. 97-1263, 1999 WL 164915, at *2 (6th Cir. March 12, 1999); Perotti v. Marshall, No. 85-3776, 1986 WL 16695 (6th Cir. March 14, 1986). Therefore, Petitioner fails to state a claim for a violation of his due process rights.
III. Equal Protection
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that a state may not "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws," which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV; City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). To prove his equal protection claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate "intentional and arbitrary discrimination" by the state; that is, he must demonstrate that he "has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment." Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). While Petitioner repeatedly asserts that he was intentionally treated differently from other similarly situated prisoners who were released on parole, Petitioner's allegations on this point are wholly conclusory. He merely states that he is being treated differently from other prisoners. Petitioner provides no specific factual allegations to support his contention. Conclusory allegations of unconstitutional conduct without specific factual allegations fail to state a claim under § 1983. See Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 726 (6th Cir. 1996); Chapman v. City of Detroit, 808 F.2d 459, 465 (6th Cir. 1986); Smith v. Rose, 760 F.2d 102, 106 (6th Cir. 1985); Jackson v. Madery, Nos. 04-1805, 04-1871, 2005 WL 3077136 (6th Cir. Nov. 17, 2005).
Conclusion
In light of the foregoing, the Court will summarily dismiss Petitioner's application pursuant to Rule 4 because he fails to raise a meritorious federal claim.
Certificate of Appealability
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), the Court must determine whether a certificate of appealability should be granted. A certificate should issue if Petitioner has demonstrated a "substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This Court's dismissal of Petitioner's action under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases is a determination that the habeas action, on its face, lacks sufficient merit to warrant service. It would be highly unlikely for this Court to grant a certificate, thus indicating to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals that an issue merits review, when the Court has already determined that the action is so lacking in merit that service is not warranted. See Love v. Butler, 952 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1991) (it is "somewhat anomalous" for the court to summarily dismiss under Rule 4 and grant a certificate); Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1990) (requiring reversal where court summarily dismissed under Rule 4 but granted certificate); Dory v. Comm'r of Corr. of the State of New York, 865 F.2d 44, 46 (2d Cir. 1989) (it was "intrinsically contradictory" to grant a certificate when habeas action does not warrant service under Rule 4); Williams v. Kullman, 722 F.2d 1048, 1050 n. 1 (2d Cir. 1983) (issuing certificate would be inconsistent with a summary dismissal).
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has disapproved issuance of blanket denials of a certificate of appealability. Murphy v. Ohio, 263 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2001). Rather, the district court must "engage in a reasoned assessment of each claim" to determine whether a certificate is warranted. Id. at 467. Each issue must be considered under the standards set forth by the Supreme Court in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000). Murphy, 263 F.3d at 467. Consequently, this Court has examined each of Petitioner's claims under the Slack standard.
Under Slack, 529 U.S. at 484, to warrant a grant of the certificate, "[t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong." Id. "A petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that . . . jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). In applying this standard, the court may not conduct a full merits review, but must limit its examination to a threshold inquiry into the underlying merit of petitioner's claims. Id.
The Court finds that reasonable jurists could not find that this Court's dismissal of each of Petitioner's claims was debatable or wrong. Therefore, the Court will deny Petitioner a certificate of appealability.
A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered.