Opinion
4-21-0341WC
04-13-2022
DYLAN JUNIOR, Appellant, v. ILLINOIS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, et al, Express Employment Professionals, Appellees.
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Macon County, Illinois Circuit No. 2020-MR-633 Honorable R.C. Bollinger, Judge, Presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Hoffman, Hudson, Cavanagh, and Barberis concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
HOLDRIDGE PRESIDING JUSTICE.
¶ 1 The Commission's finding that the claimant failed to prove that he sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the court of his employment was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 2 The claimant, Dylan Junior, filed a claim for benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 2012)) against the respondent, Express Employment Professionals (employer), seeking benefits for injuries that he allegedly sustained while working for the employer. After conducting a hearing, Arbitrator Pulia found that the claimant had failed to prove that he sustained accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of his employment. The arbitrator denied benefits on that basis and found the remining issues raised by the claimant (causation, medical benefits, temporary total disability (TTD) benefits, and the nature and extent of the alleged injuries) were moot.
¶ 3 The claimant appealed the arbitrator's decision to the Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission). Commissioners Parker, Flores, and Simpson affirmed and adopted the arbitrator's decision.
¶ 4 The claimant sought judicial review of the Commission's decision in the circuit court of Macon County, which confirmed the Commission's decision.
¶ 5 This appeal followed.
¶ 6 FACTS
¶ 7 The employer is a job staffing company that provides workers to businesses and other entities, including the City of Decatur. On July 12, 2017, the claimant was working at the Williams Street Reservoir, a lot owned by the city. That day, the city instructed the claimant to remove tree branches from a fence and to mow the lawn on the property. While walking on the lawn, the claimant picked up a round object that was lying on the ground with his right hand. The object was a firework, which exploded while the claimant was holding it. The explosion caused extensive injuries to the claimant's right hand and fingers and burns to his left hand, chest, and torso.
¶ 8 The parties dispute how the accident occurred. Based upon the testimony of its expert witnesses and other evidence, the employer maintains that the claimant lit the firework himself. The claimant testified that the firework blew off in his hand immediately after he picked it up. He denies that he lit the firework. The claimant stated that, just before the accident, he was picking up tiny branches and moved them from his right hand to his left hand. He then picked up a baseball size object with his right hand. The object exploded within a split second, and the claimant was knocked unconscious. The claimant further testified that, when he came to, his right hand was "a mess" and he "freaked out" and ran around until firefighters arrived on the scene.
¶ 9 A lighter was found on the ground in the area of the blast. The claimant admitted that he had carried a lighter on the date of the accident. He stated that he lights his cigarettes with his right hand using his lighter, as he is right-hand dominant. After the accident, the claimant told police officers who subsequently arrived at the scene that his lighter was clipped to his belt at the time of the explosion. The claimant testified that he did not see a wick on the firework, and he denied lighting the firework with his lighter.
¶ 10 Dustin Kawaski, a co-worker, was working with the claimant at the reservoir at the time of the injury. Kawaski testified that, on July 12, 2017, there were tree branches from pine trees along the fences around the reservoir. He and the claimant had cut down the branches the day before, but they did not pick the branches up that day because it started raining. They returned the next day to pick up the branches and debris so they could mow the lawn.
¶ 11 Kawaski further testified that, while he was dragging tree branches to a trailer, he heard an explosion. He ran around the other side of the truck and saw the claimant screaming and holding his wrist with blood all over. He then got in the truck and called 9-1-1. As he was calling, Kawaski looked in the rearview mirror and saw firefighters from a nearby firehouse and waved them over. Kawaski stated that the claimant did not tell him what had happened and did not mention finding or lighting a firework before the accident. Kawaski stated that both he and the claimant were performing their work tasks at the time of the blast. Kawaski testified that he saw no fireworks on the ground on July 11, 2017, or July 12, 2017, and the claimant did not point out any fireworks on either of those days. However, in a written statement he completed after the accident, Kawaski wrote that he and the claimant were cleaning limbs on the south side of the fence and there were old fireworks lying all along the fence line.
¶ 12 Kawaski further testified that, on the day of the accident, the claimant had a lighter on his pants. He stated that the lighter found on the ground after the accident was the claimant's. Kawaski had previously noticed that the claimant would have his lighter clipped on his belt loop or looped on his pants. He did not see the claimant remove the lighter on July 12, 2017. He had no idea where the lighter was at the time of the accident.
¶ 13 A Decatur Fire Station was close to the area where the claimant was injured. Some of the firemen at the station heard the explosion. They immediately exited the firehouse, saw smoke and heard screaming coming from the area south of the reservoir. The EMS report notes that the firefighters headed to the scene where they observed a city employee holding onto his mangled and deformed right hand, which was missing many small chunks.
¶ 14 Sergeant Brian Earles of the Decatur Police Department testified by deposition on behalf of the employer. Earles stated that, on July 12, 2017, he was notified of the sound of an explosion near Firehouse 2 on Williams Street. When he arrived, the claimant was receiving medical treatment to his right hand, and shortly thereafter was taken away in an ambulance. Earles looked in the area where the explosion occurred and found a charred object on the ground, which was later determined to be a Torch lighter. Earles testified that the lighter was blackened as if it had been in a fire or explosion. Earles gave this information to the Bomb Squad because they had found other unexploded fireworks on the grass. One of those explosives was a round ball with a wick sticking out of it. Earles testified that one of the items they located was similar in nature to the one the claimant picked up. He stated that the Bomb Squad took possession of these items and that none of them exploded or detonated.
¶ 15 Decatur Police Officer Michael Claypool also testified by deposition on the employer's behalf. Claypool investigated the incident on July 12, 2017, and prepared a report. When he arrived at the scene of the accident, he spoke with Dustin Kawaski, who gave Claypool his account of the accident. After speaking with Kawaski, Claypool canvassed the injury scene and found the remains of a lighter towards the southwest portion of the trailer. Claypool testified that the lighter was stamped "Double Barrel Torch Turbo Blue." He collected it as evidence. Claypool stated that the lighter was covered in carbon, or a grayish-black sticky powder. He testified that the lighter appeared to have been burnt. He took some photographs of the lighter, as well as other fireworks secured around the area. One of the items he retrieved was a brown ball wrapped in some type of tinfoil that had a short neck with a fuse protruding out of it. After he found the lighter, Claypool asked Kawaski what he saw the claimant pick up. Kawaski responded that he saw the claimant pick up a small brown or black ball.
¶ 16 Claypool further testified that he spoke with the claimant in the emergency room at Decatur Memorial Hospital. He stated that the claimant told him he was loading brush onto the flatbed and observed a ball on the ground, and when he went to pick up the ball and throw it away it exploded. Claypool testified that he told the claimant that he had found a lighter on the ground next to where the claimant was standing and asked the claimant if he lit the firework. The claimant denied lighting the firework. He told Claypool that the lighter was on a clip on his right-side front pocket at the time, and when the firework went off the lighter blew it off of him.
¶ 17 Claypool took the claimant's clothing as evidence. He testified that the claimant's jeans smelled of carbon. Claypool did not see any burn marks on the front of the claimant's jeans or his belt.
¶ 18 After the accident, the claimant was taken by ambulance to the trauma center at Decatur Memorial Hospital. The claimant had x-rays that revealed multiple fractures of his right hand. He also had lacerations of the right hand, foreign body presence unspecified, first-degree face bums, and second-degree bums of the abdomen.
¶ 19 Justin Williams was the nurse who treated the claimant at the hospital. His notes reflect that: (1) the claimant worked for city of Decatur and was picking up brush and trash when he found unexploded mortar shell; (2) the claimant stated that" [the] wick was intact and when he picked up the firework it exploded in [his] hand; (3) "per [the Decatur Police Department] who was at bedside," a lighter was found near explosion site; (4) the claimant denied lighting the firework; (5) the claimant had been holding the firework in his right hand, which had a laceration that extended from the thumb webbing to mid palm as well as palm evulsion and exposed bone; (6) the claimant was unable to move his fingers in that hand; and (7) the claimant had first-degree and second-degree burns anterior to his chest, singed hair on his arms and eyebrows, and abrasions on his left hand.
¶ 20 Dr. David Kiel was the treating physician at the hospital. Dr. Kiel's notes state that the claimant "was working this morning picking up brush and left over firework display of the fourth" when he "picked up a baseball size mortar that was lying in the brush and immediately exploded in his right hand." Dr. Kiel diagnosed superficial hair singing of the scalp, first-degree bums to the forehead, injections in the eye globes, first-degree and second-degree bums of the anterior torso, and "a severe folate type of laceration to the right hand with lacerations of all the digits and the thenar eminence through and through."
¶ 21 Treating nurse Amy Jump's notes reflect that the claimant had severely injured his right hand as he was "cleaning up a house [sic] and went to pick up what was a dead firework and it exploded in hand."
¶ 22 The claimant was stabilized at the Decatur Memorial Hospital emergency room and transferred via ambulance to the emergency room at Memorial Health System in Springfield. There, the claimant told his treaters that he was picking up trash at work when he picked up a mortar that exploded in his right hand.
¶ 23 The claimant testified that, before he was transferred from Decatur Memorial Hospital, he was questioned by Claypool. The claimant stated that he told Claypool that he was on pain medicine and did not want to give a statement at that time, but Claypool told him that he was "guilty" if he did not talk.
¶ 24 While at the Memorial Health System, the claimant underwent multiple treatments to his injured right hand including the amputation of his long and ring fingers, surgery to repair his right hand and remaining fingers, the removal of foreign bodies, and wound care for burns on his left hand and abdomen. He had to have a repeat revision amputation of his right long and ring fingers. After he was released from Memorial Health System, the claimant underwent several additional surgeries and other treatments to his right hand. He also received treatment for depressed and suicidal mood, frequent crying spells, and flashbacks and nightmares. He was ultimately diagnosed with acute stress disorder.
¶ 25 The claimant suffered permanent injuries that prevented him from returning to work as a maintenance worker without restrictions. He was completely off work for approximately 16 months after the accident. The claimant testified that he still suffers hearing loss in his left ear, gets migraines at certain frequencies, has a scar on the inside of his thigh where a skin graft was performed, suffers from severe PTSD, suicidal thoughts and depression, and has difficulty sleeping.
¶ 26 The claimant introduced the evidence deposition of Michael Perry. Perry worked at Memorial Medical Center as the manager of patient experience and patient transport. He befriended the claimant when the claimant was a patient there, and he discussed the claimant's accident with him. Perry testified on the claimant's behalf as an expert on fireworks. Perry had 25 years of fireworks training and experience and had been the lead pyrotechnic expert for Lincoln Community Fireworks beginning in 1994. In that capacity, Perry conducted approximately 50 fireworks shows, each of which required him to work with approximately 250 fireworks. Perry stopped renewing his pyrotechnic license in 2017.
¶ 27 Based on his training and knowledge of fireworks, Mr. Perry opined that the claimant did not light the firework that exploded in his hand. Perry testified that, if the claimant had lit the firework with a lighter and the firework exploded, the lighter would have also exploded and caused more severe burns than the claimant had sustained. Perry concluded that the firework either spontaneously combusted due to the weather conditions or was ignited by a tool the claimant was working with at the scene.
¶ 28 In support of these conclusions, the claimant offered into evidence a document entitled "Fireworks Plan Explosions and Bootleg Traffic in Illinois." The document was an official report by the Illinois Legislative Investigating Commission regarding the spontaneous combustion of fireworks that had occurred in 1973 at the Worldwide Fireworks Company in McHenry County. The company specialized in the purchase of certain Brazilian fireworks which, according to the document, were subject to spontaneous combustion when damp and exposed to heat. After interviewing several persons, the Commission concluded that some of these fireworks, which were stored in a trailer during a very hot day, exploded from spontaneous combustion. Based in part on the report of this incident, Perry opined that a consumer firework that gets damp and then dries can be unstable and spontaneously combust. He did not know why that occurred. Perry further testified that the fireworks at issue in the 1973 McHenry County incident contained potassium chlorate, which contributed to their spontaneous combustion. He stated that potassium chlorate is still available today.
¶ 29 Perry further testified that spontaneous combustion in fireworks is well known outside of Illinois and that several states warn the public regarding spontaneous combustion. He presented a publication issued by the Iowa Department of Natural Resources entitled "Safe Fireworks Disposal" and another publication issued by Kansas Department of Health and Environment Bureau of Waste Management entitled "Management and Disposal of Damaged, Unused, or Unexploded Consumer Fireworks." The latter publication provides that" [w]et or damp fireworks should be completely submerged in water inside a closed container and kept submerged until proper disposal can be accomplished. If the fireworks are allowed to dry out, they become unstable and spontaneous combustion can occur." Perry further testified that, while serving as the lead pyrotechnic expert for Lincoln Community Fireworks, he personally witnessed a firework explode without being lit on one occasion. That firework was a 1.4G two-inch shell.
¶ 30 In addition, Perry opined that that several items at the scene could have sparked the firework, including the chainsaws that the claimant and Kawaski were using shortly before the time of the explosion. However, Perry conceded that it was possible that the claimant lit the firework.
¶ 31 On cross examination, Perry stated that, prior to his deposition, he met with the claimant's attorney and reviewed the Iowa and Kansas Safe Handling of Fireworks documents. He testified that, of all the state documents he reviewed, only the Iowa and Kansas documents stated that wet or damp fireworks that are allowed to dry out can become unstable and spontaneously combust. Perry admitted that the other state documents do not mention spontaneous combustion. Perry conceded that he relied on those state opinions that supported his opinions. Perry did not know the basis of the authors' opinions regarding the 1973 McHenry County explosion described in the Illinois State report.
¶ 32 Moreover, Perry conceded that he could not say if the firework that spontaneously combusted in the 1973 McHenry County incident got wet and was allowed to dry out before it exploded. Perry further stated that it was only his opinion that the firework that exploded in the claimant's hand was a homemade or consumer firework and that he had no proof of that. He could not say if the conditions in the claimant's case were the same as those in the 1973 firework case in McHenry County. He further stated that there is no evidence that the firework that exploded in the McHenry County incident was a class 1.4G, consumer-grade mortar shell. He agreed that there is no evidence that potassium chlorate was inside the firework handled by the claimant. Moreover, Perry testified that he was not aware that the claimant's lighter was found on the ground where the incident occurred.
¶ 33 The employer presented the evidence deposition of Paul Early, which was taken pursuant to subpoena. Early worked as a certified bomb technician for the Illinois Secretary of State Bomb Squad for more than 17 years. In that capacity, Early was responsible for the investigation of explosives and incendiary devices. To obtain certification as a bomb technician, Early had to complete training courses given by the FBI and ATF. He was recertified every three years. Early also trained Illinois state police officers in explosives safety and fireworks.
¶ 34 On July 12, 2017, Early responded to the accident scene. He inspected the area and noticed several parts of burned or partially burned commercial fireworks on the ground, which were identified as class 1.4G, consumer-grade fireworks. Early testified that he told Officer Eads that he believed the claimant had most likely attempted to light the mortar.
¶ 35 Early testified that, based upon his training and experience and his investigation of the accident scene, the type of firework found at the scene did not, and could not, explode without an ignition source. He explained that a firework needs an ignition source to explode because it is made of black powder, or gun powder, which requires a flame or spark to explode. Early testified that the black powder, which is the explosive component in the ball, is not shock sensitive. He stated that if black powder was on the table, you could "hit it with a hammer all day long" and it would not ignite. He further opined that the injuries to the claimant's left hand were consistent with the lighter being in the claimant's left hand and the firework in his right hand. Early stated that the location where the lighter was found at the scene reinforced his opinion that the lighter was the ignition source.
¶ 36 Chris Silman, an expert retained by the employer, also testified. Silman is a senior fire and explosive investigator for SEA, Ltd. Silman is responsible for investigations of the origin and cause of fires and explosions. Silman previously worked at the American Chemical Society as a fire investigator in St. Louis and served as a fire marshal for the fire department in Kennet, Missouri. As a fire marshal, Silman was responsible for investigating fireworks and the classification of fireworks. He has a certificate in pyrotechnics from the State of Missouri and has experience in fireworks explosions.
¶ 37 After reviewing police reports of the incident and ambulance and emergency room reports of the claimant's injuries, Silman concluded that the claimant lit the firework, which caused the explosion and the claimant's injuries. He opined that the location of the burns on the claimant's left hand proved that his left hand was near the firework. Silman further opined that there was no evidence that the firework had spontaneously combusted, and no scientific basis for such a conclusion.
¶ 38 In support of these opinions, Silman noted that the police reports revealed that consumer grade 1.4G mortar round-type fireworks and a Blue Torch cigarette lighter were found in the area where the claimant was injured. Silman testified that the information in the police reports regarding the lighter, and the information in the ambulance and emergency room reports regarding the injuries the claimant sustained, suggested that the lighter was likely in the claimant's left hand near the firework when the explosion occurred. He stated that the carbon residue on the lighter, which comes from the black powder inside the firework, also indicated that the lighter was near where the explosion occurred.
Silman also reviewed photographs of the injury scene that confirmed what type of fireworks were at the explosion scene. He also viewed pictures taken at the emergency room which confirmed the location of the injuries to the claimant's hand and torso. Silman did not personally examine the injury scene or take any pictures of his own.
¶ 39 Silman opined that there was no evidence or scientific basis for the conclusion that the firework became wet, dried out, and then became unstable and spontaneously combusted. He disagreed that the reports form Illinois, Iowa, and Kansas proffered by the claimant were scientifically based or authoritative. He testified that the Illinois Legislative Commission's report of the McHenry County incident did not change his opinion that the claimant lit the firework. He further noted that there was no evidence that the firework involved in the claimant's accident was similar to the firework in the McHenry County case. He testified that the Illinois Legislative Commission's report stated that the spontaneous combustion was the result of potassium chlorate. Silman opined that the chemicals used in fireworks today are far different than the chemicals that were used in fireworks in 1973, although he conceded that there is no way to know what chemicals were in the particular firework that caused the claimant's injuries.
¶ 40 The arbitrator found that the claimant failed to prove by a preponderance of the credible evidence that he sustained an accidental injury that arose out of and in the course of his employment. The arbitrator based this finding largely on the opinions of Early and Silman, which it found more persuasive than those of Perry given their extensive training, experience, and certifications in explosives. The arbitrator accorded the most weight to Early's opinion because Early actually investigated the injury site. The arbitrator gave the least amount of weight to Perry's opinions because Perry "d[id] not have the same amount of training, experiences, and certifications as Early and Silman when it comes to explosive investigations." The arbitrator further noted that Perry had admitted that he formulated his opinions based on what the claimant said before reading any materials or reviewing any photos or reports.
¶ 41 The arbitrator also relied upon the physical evidence. Specifically, the arbitrator noted that all of the physical evidence and the opinions of each expert confirmed that the explosion occurred near the claimant's chest and not near the ground as the claimant had suggested. Moreover, the arbitrator observed that the lighter was found covered in carbon on the ground at the site of the injury and there was no damage to the claimant's belt, pants or pant loops. The arbitrator found that this contradicted the claimant's testimony that his lighter was clipped to his belt at the time of the explosion. The arbitrator further found that there was "no credible evidence" to support a finding that the lighter was blown off of the claimant's belt, pants, or pant loop, because there was "absolutely no damage or burns to the claimant's pants that would cause the lighter to become unclipped from his pants."
¶ 42 The arbitrator rejected the claimant's argument that the firework had spontaneously combusted. The arbitrator was persuaded by the evidence suggesting that black powder, "which was in mortars like the one the claimant described holding and [was] found around the area where the claimant was injured," "cannot explode without a spark or flame in excess of 400-450 degrees." The arbitrator found that the claimant's reliance on the 1973 McHenry County incident report (which was the claimant's "primary evidence in support of [his] claim that the firework spontaneously exploded in the claimant's hand") to be "less than persuasive" because "the chemicals in the fireworks in 1973 are not necessarily the same as those in fireworks today" and there was "no evidence that there was potassium chlorate in the firework."
¶ 43 Accordingly, the arbitrator found that the claimant had failed to prove an accident arising out of his employment. The arbitrator denied benefits on this basis and found all of the claimant's remaining claims to be moot.
¶ 44 The claimant appealed the arbitrator's decision to the Commission, which unanimously affirmed and adopted the arbitrator's decision.
¶ 45 The claimant then sought judicial review of the Commission's decision in the circuit court of Macon County. The circuit court confirmed the Commission's decision. The circuit court ruled that the Commission was free to accept Silman's opinions as more credible and persuasive than those of Perry given Silman's background experiences and qualifications. The circuit court further noted that Silman's opinion were consistent with those of Early, who also had training in fireworks and other explosives. The court observed that both Silman and Early "ruled out the possibility that the firework in question could have spontaneously exploded without an ignition source." They also opined that the claimant's injuries were consistent with the lighter being in the claimant's left hand and the firework being in his right hand at the time of the explosion. The court held that this constituted sufficient evidence to support the Commission's finding that the claimant lit the firework and caused his own injuries. The court therefore found that the Commission's finding of no accident arising out of the claimant's employment was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 46 This appeal followed.
¶ 47 ANALYSIS
¶ 48 The claimant argues that the Commission's finding of no compensable accident was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 49 An employee's injury is compensable under the Act only if it arises out of and in the course of the claimant's employment. 820 ILCS 305/2 (West 2012). Both elements must be present at the time of the claimant's injury in order to justify compensation. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 131 Ill.2d 478, 483 (1989). Arising out of the employment refers to the origin or cause of the claimant's injury. Cox v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 406 Ill.App.3d 541, 544 (2010).
¶ 50 For an injury to arise out of the employment, its origin must be in some risk connected with, or incidental to, the employment so as to create a causal connection between the employment and the accidental injury. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 129 Ill.2d 52, 58 (1989). An injury arises out of one's employment if, at the time of the occurrence, the employee was performing acts he was instructed to perform by his employer, acts which he had a common law or statutory duty to perform, or acts which the employee might reasonably be expected to perform incident to his assigned duties. Id. A risk is incidental to the employment when it belongs to or is connected with what the employee has to do in fulfilling his or her job duties. McAllister v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 2020 IL 124848, ¶ 35.
¶ 51 An injury does not arise out of the employment where an employee "voluntarily expose[s] himself to an unnecessary danger entirely separate from the activities and responsibilities of his job." Orsini v. Industrial Comm'n, 117 Ill.2d 38, 47 (1987); see also Purcell v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm 'n, 2021 IL App (4th) 200359WC, ¶ 22; Hatfill v. Industrial Comm'n, 202 Ill.App.3d 547, 553 (1990). Injuries resulting from such conduct are not compensable because they arise out of risks that are personal to the employee rather than risks that are distinctly associated with his job duties. Orsini, 117 Ill.2d at 47.
¶ 52 Whether the claimant sustained an accidental injury that arose out of and in the course of his employment is a question of fact. Hosteny v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm 'n, 397 Ill.App.3d 665, 674 (2009). In resolving disputed issues of fact, it is the Commission's province to assess the credibility of witnesses, draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, determine what weight to give testimony, and resolve conflicts in the evidence, including conflicting expert testimony. Id. at 675. We will overturn the Commission's finding only when it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. A factual finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is "clearly apparent." Swartz v. Industrial Comm'n, 359 Ill.App.3d 1083, 1086 (2005). The test is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the Commission's finding, not whether this court or any other tribunal might reach an opposite conclusion. Pietrzak v. Industrial Comm'n, 329 Ill.App.3d 828, 833 (2002).
¶ 53 There was ample evidence supporting the Commission's decision in this case. Early and Silman each testified that the location of the lighter and the nature of the claimant's injuries suggested that the claimant was holding the lighter in his left hand at the time of the explosion and that the lighter had been near the firework when it exploded. They further testified that the location where the lighter was found, the burnt condition of the lighter, the presence of carbon on the lighter, and the lack of any burns to the claimant's pants, belt, or belt loops suggested that the lighter was close to the firework and was not clipped to the claimant's pants at the time of the explosion as the claimant alleged. Moreover, both Early and Silman testified that the firework at issue in this case could not have exploded without an ignition source. This evidence casts considerable doubt on the veracity of the claimant's account of the incident.
¶ 54 Although Perry rendered conflicting opinions, the Commission was entitled to credit Early's and Silman's opinions over Perry's. It is the Commission's province to assess the credibility of witnesses and resolve conflicts in the evidence, including conflicting expert testimony. Hosteny, 397 Ill.App.3d at 675. The Commission is entitled to rely upon an expert opinion unless the opinion lacks any foundation in the evidence. We will not disturb the Commission's evaluation of the credibility and weight of expert testimony unless the Commission's decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Hosteny, 397 Ill.App.3d at 675.
¶ 55 That is not the case here. Silman's and Early's opinions were consistent with the physical evidence. Perry's theory that the firework spontaneously combusted was speculative, and Silman testified that it lacked any scientific support. Moreover, Perry based his spontaneous combustion theory largely on the 1973 McHenry County incident, but he admitted that there was no evidence that the firework at issue in this case was the same type involved in the McHenry County incident. Nor was there evidence that the firework at issue in this case had been subjected to the same conditions or that it contained potassium chlorate (the compound responsible for the spontaneous combustion in the McHenry County incident). The only other evidence supporting Perry's spontaneous combustion theory was Perry's claim to have witnessed the spontaneous combustion of a 1.4G firework on a single occasion at a fireworks show. Early's and Silman's opinions were more consistent with the nature of the claimant's injuries and with the physical evidence found at the scene of the accident. Given Early's and Silman's extensive training in fireworks and other explosive devices, their informed explanations of how and why fireworks explode, and the consistency of their opinions with the evidence, the Commission's decision to credit their opinions over Perry's was reasonable, and its finding of no compensable accident was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 56 CONCLUSION
¶ 57 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Macon County, which confirmed the Commission's decision.
¶ 58 Affirmed.