A decision to liquidate, including the legality of the liquidation itself, becomes final unless a protest of the decision is filed within 90 days of the entry of liquidation. 19 U.S.C. § 1514; see Juice Farms, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1344, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (parties bound by even erroneous, illegal liquidation not protested within 90 days); United States v. A.N. Deringer, Inc., 66 C.C.P.A. 50, 593 F.2d 1015, 1020 (1979) (any protest of liquidation, including a challenge to its legality, must occur within 90 days). This court may hear a challenge to a denied timely protest of liquidation.

Upon challenge, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that jurisdiction exists. Juice Farms, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1344, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Plaintiff claims this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a).

Id. at 1347, 1349. The court concluded that, under our decision in Juice Farms, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1344 (Fed.Cir.1995), the 2005 reliquidations became final, “whether legal or not,” once AHAC failed to challenge them in court. Am. Home, 964 F.Supp.2d at 1347 (quoting Juice Farms, 68 F.3d at 1346).

"[Such] bulletin notices supply sufficient notice and thus trigger the ninety-day period for protests." Juice Farms, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1344, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Fujitsu filed Protest No. 2704-98- 100059 on February 11, 1998, challenging Customs' assessment of interest on the subject entries liquidated on November 14, 1997, and December 5, 1997.

We have held that the Court of International Trade's authority to hear a claim under section 1581(a) depends upon the importer raising the claim in a valid protest filed with Customs within the prescribed 90-day period, or alternatively, in a protest coming within an exception that excuses a failure to meet the deadline. See Juice Farms, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1344, 1345-46 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Section 1581(i) provides in pertinent part as follows:

The court expressly rejected the argument that "voidable" liquidations must be protested, but "void" liquidations do not. The decision in Deringer was followed by this court in Omni U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 840 F.2d 912 (Fed. Cir. 1988), and Juice Farms, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 1995), both of which confirmed that this court does not recognize a distinction between "void" and "voidable" liquidations for purposes of determining the applicability of the protest requirement of section 1514. In the Omni case, Customs was supposed to hold the liquidation of the entries in suspense, but instead liquidated the entries prematurely.

See Compl. ¶ 1. For this Court to exercise jurisdiction over a claim under § 1581(a), the party filing suit must have filed a valid protest against Customs in a timely manner. See U.S. Shoe Corp. v. United States, 114 F.3d 1564, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997), aff'd, 523 U.S. 360 (1998); Juice Farms, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1344, 1345-46 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Atari Caribe, Inc. v. United States, 16 CIT 588, 592, 799 F. Supp. 99, 104 (1992). To qualify as valid, a

According to defendant, "[e]ven if there were no unliquidated entries, that would not necessarily mean that suspension was removed because Customs could have liquidated the entries by mistake while suspension was in effect." Id. at 18 (citing Juice Farms, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). Whether Commerce's e-mail was a means of seeking information from Customs on entries Customs was "holding in suspension" is of no consequence because the event that results in application of § 1504(d) is the receipt by Customs of notice of the removal of suspension of liquidation.

We narrowly concluded that the deemed liquidation in Cherry Hill was "final and conclusive" against both the importer, surety, and the government because the importer or surety had never protested the deemed liquidation: "Without timely protest, all liquidations become final and conclusive under 19 U.S.C. § 1514." Id. at 1559 (quoting Juice Farms, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1344, 1346 (Fed. Cir.1995)). This court concluded in Cherry Hill that "a `deemed liquidation' under section 1504 . . . subjects any further collection efforts by the government in connection with the same entry to dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."

Thus, section 1514(a) precludes the CIT from reviewing a challenge to-and ordering reliquidation based on-an erroneous decision by U.S. Customs and Border Protection ("Customs" or "CBP") unless the statutory protest requirements are met. See, e.g., Juice Farms, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1344, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Mitsubishi Elecs. Am., Inc. v. United States, 18 CIT 167, 172, 848 F.Supp. 193, 197 (1994). In litigation under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) seeking to challenge an antidumping or countervailing duty determination, the finality of liquidation is governed by a different statutory provision, 19 U.S.C. § 1516a.