A decision to liquidate, including the legality of the liquidation itself, becomes final unless a protest of the decision is filed within 90 days of the entry of liquidation. 19 U.S.C. § 1514; see Juice Farms, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1344, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (parties bound by even erroneous, illegal liquidation not protested within 90 days); United States v. A.N. Deringer, Inc., 66 C.C.P.A. 50, 593 F.2d 1015, 1020 (1979) (any protest of liquidation, including a challenge to its legality, must occur within 90 days). This court may hear a challenge to a denied timely protest of liquidation.

Without timely protest, all liquidations become final and conclusive under 19 U.S.C. § 1514." Juice Farms, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1344, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1995). In Juice Farms, Customs erroneously liquidated twenty entries of orange juice while suspension orders were in effect.

Second, monitoring the liquidation of entries subject to an antidumping duty order is a serious challenge even for importers who have access to complete information regarding an entry. See, e.g., Juice Farms, Inc. v. U.S., 68 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding Customs' violation of statutory suspension of liquidation not actionable by importer who discovered improper liquidations after protest period had expired). Defendant-Intervenors were themselves apparently unaware that their entries had been prematurely liquidated until notified by Commerce.

In those cases, the precedent of the Federal Circuit "does not recognize a distinction between `void' and `voidable' liquidations for purposes of determining the applicability of the protest requirement of section 1514." Cherry Hill Textiles, 112 F.3d at 1559 (citing Omni U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 840 F.2d 912 (Fed. Cir. 1988), andJuice Farms, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1344 (Fed Cir. 1995)). These cases, however, do not address a situation in which Commerce and Customs have failed to effectuate a § 1516a(c) court-ordered injunction.

We review the CIT's “decision to grant the Government's motion to dismiss [for lack of subject matter jurisdiction] de novo as a question of law.” Juice Farms, Inc. v. United States , 68 F.3d 1344, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 1995). “[T]he party invoking [the CIT's] jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing it.” Norsk Hydro Can., Inc. v. United States , 472 F.3d 1347, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2006).

The court expressly rejected the argument that "voidable" liquidations must be protested, but "void" liquidations do not. The decision in Deringer was followed by this court in Omni U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 840 F.2d 912 (Fed. Cir. 1988), and Juice Farms, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 1995), both of which confirmed that this court does not recognize a distinction between "void" and "voidable" liquidations for purposes of determining the applicability of the protest requirement of section 1514. In the Omni case, Customs was supposed to hold the liquidation of the entries in suspense, but instead liquidated the entries prematurely.

Rather, defendant argues that plaintiff was required to protest the purported deemed liquidation that was announced in the Bulletin Notice, and only if the protest were denied could the matter be heard in this Court. According to defendant, this is the holding in Juice Farms, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (" Juice Farms"). In Juice Farms, the plaintiff importer's entries were subject to a suspension of liquidation pending an antidumping review.

We review de novo the Trade Court's decisions to grant the government's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Hutchison Quality Furniture, Inc. v. United States , 827 F.3d 1355, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Juice Farms, Inc. v. United States , 68 F.3d 1344, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ). The party invoking the Trade Court's jurisdiction, here the plaintiff, bears the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction.

Even if the implementation of a remedy for the erroneous liquidations had to await a final decision by the Trade Court in the antidumping proceeding (as the government contends), the protest remedy would have been adequate because it would have ultimately resulted in reliquidation at the proper rate.Under our decision in Juice Farms, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1344 (Fed.Cir.1995), Carbon's ability to protest the liquidation pursuant to § 1514 bars resort to § 1581(i). In Juice Farms, Commerce had suspended liquidation of Juice Farms Inc.'s (“Juice Farms”) orange juice entries pending investigation and administrative reviews of an antidumping duty order.

We narrowly concluded that the deemed liquidation in Cherry Hill was "final and conclusive" against both the importer, surety, and the government because the importer or surety had never protested the deemed liquidation: "Without timely protest, all liquidations become final and conclusive under 19 U.S.C. § 1514." Id. at 1559 (quoting Juice Farms, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1344, 1346 (Fed. Cir.1995)). This court concluded in Cherry Hill that "a `deemed liquidation' under section 1504 . . . subjects any further collection efforts by the government in connection with the same entry to dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."