Opinion
1-22-0684WC
10-13-2023
MARIA JUAREZ, Appellant, v. THE ILLINOIS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION et al., (Pactiv, Appellee).
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County No. 21L050305 Honorable Daniel P. Duffy, Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Holdridge and Justices Hoffman, Mullen, and Barberis concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
CAVANAGH, JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: (1) The circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction to decide the issues before it. (2) The Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission's finding claimant did not suffer a compensable work-related accident is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 2 Claimant, Maria Juarez, applied for benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 2012)) for injuries sustained in two alleged work-related accidents: (1) on March 3, 2011, claimant slipped on oil and fell, sustaining injuries to her back, arm, and buttocks (case No. 12-WC-7561) and (2) on December 2, 2011, she slipped and fell off a platform, injuring her head and the entire right side of her body (case No. 12-WC-7563) (the application for adjustment of this claim does not appear in the record). The cases were consolidated.
¶ 3 On October 19, 2018, an arbitrator conducted a hearing on the consolidated cases and, in her decision filed on May 29, 2019, she found claimant had suffered a compensable work-related accident on March 3, 2011, but no compensable work-related accident on December 2, 2011. Claimant pursued review only on case No. 12-WC-7563, the case related to the December 2, 2011, accident.
¶ 4 On June 17, 2021, the Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission) issued a unanimous decision affirming and adopting the decision of the arbitrator.
¶ 5 Claimant sought judicial review in the circuit court of Cook County, where, on April 21, 2022, the court confirmed the Commission's decision in a written order.
¶ 6 This appeal followed.
¶ 7 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 8 Following is a recitation of the facts relevant to this appeal taken from the evidence adduced at the arbitration hearing.
¶ 9 Claimant testified, through an interpreter, that on December 2, 2011, she was working for appellee Pactiv as a machine operator. The nature of her job required her to perform her duties from a platform, from which she was to constantly move from one side to the other. While performing her duties, she slipped off the platform and fell to the floor, striking her head and ribs. She said she lost consciousness.
¶ 10 Claimant testified that she is a diabetic and takes daily medication for that condition, which she would generally do at her 9 a.m. break. She had not taken her medication prior to her fall. However, she denied feeling dizzy, weak, or tired. She said she regained consciousness on the way to the hospital and at no time did she discuss with the paramedics what had happened.
¶ 11 According to a paramedic's report, which was submitted into evidence by Pactiv, rescue reported to the premises at 8:31 a.m. after someone from Pactiv had called for an ambulance. In the narrative portion, the report indicated claimant was unconscious and lying on the floor but that she had not suffered any trauma. However, the report also indicated claimant was alert but confused and lethargic; she was able to answer their questions. The paramedics' impression was claimant was experiencing diabetic symptoms. They administered an intravenous bolus to control her elevated blood sugar. Witnesses reported to the paramedics that after claimant indicated she was thirsty and was not feeling well, she laid on the floor.
¶ 12 Claimant further testified she traveled via ambulance to the hospital, where she advised medical personnel she had "slipped and fell hitting the back of her head and passed out." She complained of dizziness, headache, back pain, and shoulder pain. She advised she had not eaten breakfast or taken her diabetes medication and had consumed a sugary drink because she was thirsty.
¶ 13 Claimant's primary care physician, Dr. Jack Leong, testified in an admitted evidentiary deposition that he had treated claimant for diabetes for many years. Though the medications would effectively treat claimant's diabetes, she had informed him she did not always take them as prescribed because she could not afford the cost. In September 2011, testing showed claimant's blood sugar had not been controlled for an extended period. (We note the arbitrator's written decision indicated Dr. Leong testified claimant's diabetes "had been well controlled," which is contrary to Dr. Leong's deposition testimony.) In October 2011, Dr. Leong increased claimant's insulin dosage. By November 2011, her diabetes was still not well controlled. Claimant saw Dr. Leong several days after the December 2, 2011, incident, at which time she reported she had lost consciousness at work "from her head hitting something."
¶ 14 Dr. Leong opined claimant's diabetes was not related to her fall, but he admitted hyperglycemia can cause dizziness and thirst. He had not reviewed the ambulance or hospital records but acknowledged if claimant had not eaten breakfast or taken her medication and had consumed a beverage containing sugar, those actions could have resulted in dizziness and, in turn, caused claimant's fall.
¶ 15 Dr. Leong referred claimant to Dr. Kevin Tu of G &T Orthopaedics and Sports Medicine for pain in her right shoulder. According to Dr. Tu's records, claimant advised him she was injured at work on December 2, 2011. She reported she was ascending a step, when she slipped, fell, and landed on her right shoulder. Claimant later corrected the mechanism of the injury, reporting that she fell off scaffolding. Dr. Tu believed the problem was emanating from claimant's cervical spine and her description of ascending stairs and falling could have caused the cervical radiculopathy and right shoulder impingement she was experiencing.
¶ 16 Claimant also saw Dr. Sue Harsoor, a pain-management physician, who administered several epidural steroid injections. Claimant reported to Dr. Harsoor she was standing on a platform, twisting to the left and right, when she slipped. She had extended her right arm to stop her fall, but she fell on her right side and hit her head, which caused her to lose consciousness. Claimant denied any history of vertigo or dizziness. She reported she was able to perform all activities of daily living.
¶ 17 Dr. Sean Salehi, a neurosurgeon, reviewed images of claimant's spine and recommended additional imaging to determine the pathology and a course of treatment. Claimant reported to him she had fallen backward from a step after losing her footing, causing her to fall onto the right side of her neck and back. After several visits, Dr. Salehi released her to work with no restrictions.
¶ 18 Claimant also presented to Dr. Jesse Butler of Spine Consultants for evaluation. He also believed claimant could return to work without restrictions, noting he had found no structural basis for her complaints. She said she had been working on the edge of a stage when she fell to the floor, striking her head, neck, right shoulder, and right hip. She also reported she had fainted.
¶ 19 Dr. Kathleen Weber, a physician certified in internal medicine and sports medicine, performed an independent medical evaluation. Dr. Weber noted the differences between the mechanisms of injury claimant had reported to various medical providers. Specifically, Dr. Weber found it curious that on one occasion, claimant reported her foot slipped backward off a step, causing her to fall, and on another occasion, she reportedly lost her balance and twisted her ankle while stepping to the right, causing her to fall. Similarly, claimant described for Dr. Weber yet another mechanism of injury inconsistent with the paramedics' and hospital reports. Dr. Weber also noted from the paramedics' report that a witness had heard claimant tell her coworkers she was not feeling well, was reportedly thirsty, and was seen lying down. The paramedics had noted claimant was suffering from fainting, dizziness, diabetic symptoms, and/or hyperglycemia. Dr. Weber further noted claimant had told hospital personnel, at the time of the incident, she had neither eaten breakfast nor taken her diabetic medication and felt dizzy. Dr. Weber found significant Dr. Salehi's records, describing a "fairly normal" exam "other than the subjective complaints of numbness." Dr. Weber opined, based on the foregoing, claimant had experienced no traumatic injury; she had simply "laid down." Her symptoms were likely related to an underlying condition, "possibly uncontrolled diabetes," rather than the result of a work injury.
¶ 20 On May 24, 2019, the arbitrator issued a written decision in favor of Pactiv, ultimately finding claimant had failed to prove she suffered a compensable work-related injury. The arbitrator noted "several discrepancies between [claimant's] testimony, medical records, subjective complaints and non-rebutted exhibits entered into evidence by [Pactiv]." Due to these "discrepancies and contradictions," the arbitrator found claimant's testimony was not credible. In addition, the arbitrator found "a lack of evidence that the employment conditions significantly contributed (or in any way contributed) to the injury by increasing the risk of a fall." Of particular interest to claimant is the arbitrator's finding she "failed to prove that she was exposed to a risk distinctly associated with her employment creating a causal connection between her employment and the accidental injury." Claimant sought review of the arbitrator's decision before the Commission.
¶ 21 On June 17, 2021, the Commission affirmed and adopted the arbitrator's decision. Claimant pursued judicial review of the Commission's decision to the circuit court of Cook County.
¶ 22 On April 21, 2022, the circuit court confirmed the Commission's decision.
¶ 23 This appeal followed.
¶ 24 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 25 A. The Circuit Court's Subject Matter Jurisdiction
¶ 26 Claimant's argument relies on her misinterpretation of the circuit court's written order. In its order, the court correctly identified the two prongs an employee must prove before she is awarded compensation for an injury under the Act. The court wrote: "In order to recover benefits under the [Act], a claimant must prove that she was injured in an accident that [(1)] 'arose out of and [(2)] 'in the course of her employment.'" Citing Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 129 Ill.2d 52, 57-58 (1989), the court noted the "in the course of' prong refers only to whether the injury occurred at a physical work location during working hours, while the "arose out of' prong refers to whether claimant can prove a causal connection between the injury and some risk connected to a claimant's job.
¶ 27 The Commission affirmed and adopted the arbitrator's decision without commentary or further analysis. The arbitrator found that although claimant may have sustained injuries "in the course of' her employment, she failed to prove such injuries "arose out of' her employment. That is, the incident (whatever it was and whatever injury ensued) occurred at her work location during work hours. However, claimant had failed to prove the existence of any work-related risk that contributed to an injury. The arbitrator, and ultimately the Commission, found the manifest weight of the evidence did not support claimant's contention that she fell from a platform or that the condition of the workplace was tied to any injury she may have sustained. The arbitrator's decision noted plenty of evidence that tended to contradict claimant's version but supported witnesses' accounts that claimant was not feeling well, was very thirsty, and had laid down on the floor. See Stapleton v. Industrial Comm'n, 282 Ill.App.3d 12, 16 (1996).
¶ 28 In Stapleton, the court noted:
"A claimant may not recover if the risk to which he was exposed was a risk personal to him. An idiopathic fall is a type of accident which results from an internal, personal weakness of the claimant. If the fall is unexplained, resultant injuries are compensable. If the fall is idiopathic, resultant injuries are not compensable unless the employment significantly contributed to the injury by placing claimant in a position of greater risk of injury from falling." Id.
¶ 29 Therefore, based on the evidence and a credibility assessment, the Commission determined claimant was not entitled to benefits because she had, as the arbitrator found, "failed to prove that she was exposed to a risk distinctly associated with her employment creating a causal connection between her employment and the accidental injury." Without specifically so holding, it seems the Commission, after adopting the arbitrator's decision in full, determined no accident had occurred at all; yet, as an alternative, it noted claimant's failure to prove the "arise out of' prong. The discussion regarding the meaning of "arise out of' was unnecessary given the finding that if claimant fell at all, the fall was idiopathic in nature.
¶ 30 In its decision, the circuit court discussed and explained in detail the analysis typically associated with determining whether there was a causal connection between an injury suffered during a work-related accident and the existence of any risk associated with claimant's job duties. Again, this discussion was unnecessary. The court could have narrowed its review to simply whether the Commission's finding that claimant's fall was idiopathic in nature was supported by the evidence. If the court determined that finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence, the court could have remanded the case back to the Commission for further determination. Instead, the court engaged in a risk analysis, which led to claimant's argument presented here.
¶ 31 It is undisputed that claimant's injury occurred at work during work hours and therefore satisfied the "in the course of' prong. However, satisfying that prong does not equate to a compensable injury. Caterpillar Tractor, 129 Ill.2d at 58. As stated, for an injury to be compensable, it must also "arise out of' the employment. Id. An injury does not "arise out of' the employment if it is personal and/or idiopathic in nature except when employment conditions significantly contribute to the injury by increasing the risk of falling. Stapleton, 282 Ill.App.3d at 16. That exception does not apply here, as there was no evidence to support the same. Because the Commission determined claimant's fall, if any, was personal or idiopathic in nature and because the exception does not apply, the analysis ends there, without the need to further discuss or mention the level of risk involved or, as claimant contends, analyze the three categories of employment-related acts delineated in Caterpillar Tractor. See Caterpillar Tractor, 129 Ill.2d at 58 ("Typically, an injury arises out of one's employment if, at the time of the occurrence, the employee was performing [(1)] acts he was instructed to perform by his employer, [(2)] acts which he had a common law or statutory duty to perform, or [(3)] acts which the employee might reasonably be expected to perform incident to his assigned duties.").
¶ 32 Rather than narrowing its decision to whether the record supported the Commission's decision that claimant's fall was idiopathic in nature, the circuit court cited and discussed our supreme court's decision in McAllister v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm 'n, 2020 IL 124848.. There, the court addressed whether a claimant who was injured while performing an everyday activity such as standing up from a kneeling position was exposed to an employment-related risk. Id. ¶¶ 46-47. As stated above, this employment-related risk analysis does not apply to the case at bar-a case involving an idiopathic cause of injury. Nevertheless, the circuit court stated in its order as follows:
"In this case [claimant] claimed the fall she suffered occurred during the course of her duties at work. Under McAllister, that was enough to establish that the injury 'arose out of her employment. See McAllister, 2020 IL 124848 at ¶ 61. It was unnecessary, therefore, for the arbitrator to classify the claimed fall as 'idiopathic' [in] nature (or-as [claimant] urges on appeal-to analyze whether the nature of the platform on which she worked increased the degree of injury from the fall).”
¶ 33 Not only is that statement an inaccurate statement of McAllister and of the law in general, but it also misled claimant to believe she had sufficiently proved the "arose out of' element and that the arbitrator unnecessarily classified claimant's fall as "idiopathic."
¶ 34 In its decision, the circuit court went on to state:
"The larger issue, here, is that the arbitrator did not believe that [claimant] was injured in a fall at all. Pointing to inconsistencies in her account, coupled with the testimony of the paramedics who treated her at the scene that seemingly suggested [claimant] laid down following a diabetic episode of some kind, the arbitrator found [claimant] failed to prove her case by a preponderance of the evidence. In sum, the arbitrator did not find the claimant credible and the Commission affirmed that finding. And this court confirms the Commission's decision on that basis."
¶ 35 Although we generally review the decision of the Commission, not the circuit court, we must review the court's decision here because claimant argues the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. In particular, claimant argues the court "correctly reversed the Commission's decision that [claimant's] injury did not arise out of her employment because it was at odds with McAllister." But, claimant argues, the court went further and denied compensation "on [a] new basis," finding claimant had failed to prove an accident occurred. Claimant asserts the court lacked jurisdiction to determine that no accident had occurred since, she claims, the arbitrator (and the Commission) did not make such a finding. Claimant argues that any reference made by the arbitrator questioning whether an accident occurred at all was dicta and not the basis for denying compensation. We disagree.
¶ 36 Subject matter jurisdiction relative to judicial review of administrative actions is simply the power to review administrative decisions. Illinois State Treasurer v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 2015 IL 117418, ¶ 14. Though the circuit courts are courts of general jurisdiction, in administrative review, the reviewing court derives" 'special statutory jurisdiction'" from the act that confers jurisdiction on it to conduct the review and must strictly comply with the procedures prescribed therein. Id. These principles have long been held to apply to review of the decisions of the Commission. Id. ¶ 15. Such review is governed by section 19(f) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/19(f) (West 2020)). Id. ¶ 16.
¶ 37 Relevant here, subsection 19(f)(1), (2) provides that a circuit court has the "power to review all questions of law and fact presented by" the record of the Commission, and "may confirm or set aside the decision of the Commission." 820 ILCS 305/19(f)(1), (2) (West 2020).
¶ 38 Claimant asserts the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to confirm the Commission's decision on a basis other than that relied on by the Commission. Claimant cites no authority for such a proposition, and we are aware of none. In fact, it is well established a decision of the Commission "may be sustained upon any ground warranted by the record regardless of whether the particular reasons given therefor[e] in the written opinion are correct." Grischow v. Industrial Comm'n, 228 Ill.App.3d 551, 561 (1992).
¶ 39 To be clear, claimant does not challenge the circuit court's power to review her claim, nor does she assert any abnormalities which could have deprived the court of jurisdiction, such as those delineated in section 19(f). (820 ILCS 305/19(f) (West 2020)).
¶ 40 Thus, not only did the circuit court have subject matter jurisdiction to review the Commission's decision, what claimant raises is not truly a jurisdictional challenge. Instead, she objects to the court's consideration, weighing, and balancing of the evidence, which we address in the next section.
¶ 41 Before moving forward however, we summarize the problematic use of several concepts which appear to have stoked confusion before the Commission and circuit court. First, the arbitrator noted claimant did not demonstrate "she was exposed to a risk distinctly associated with her employment" as a component of the conclusion she failed to establish a causal connection between "her employment and the accidental injury." The arbitrator previously determined claimant was not credible and that the mechanism of injury was based solely on her testimony. Consistent with these findings, and prior to the arbitrator's injection of the aforementioned language, the arbitrator found claimant failed to prove her injuries arose out of and in the course of her employment. Thus, the arbitrator's subsequent use of "distinctly associated with her employment" was simply not necessary to the conclusion relative to causation and needlessly introduced confusion, which the parties and the court understandably felt had to be addressed.
¶ 42 Second, the circuit court introduced additional and unnecessary confusion by finding claimant established her injury "arose out of" her employment. Nevertheless, the court confirmed the Commission's decision, based on the finding that claimant was not credible, which resulted in the denial of claimant's application for benefits because she had failed to prove her injuries arose "out of and in the course of her employment." That is, the court's discussion of causation and risk introduced, yet misled, what claimant believed to be a compelling basis to seek further review.
¶ 43 In sum, based on this court's review of the record, the arbitrator found the evidence did not support claimant's version of the events. Rather, the evidence supported the likelihood that claimant did not suffer a fall related to any work-related condition but that she fell ill due to her uncontrolled diabetes. Given this evidence, the arbitrator found, and the Commission confirmed, claimant failed to prove that she sustained a compensable injury arising out of and in the course of her employment. We conclude the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction and the authority to review these findings related to claimant's credibility, whether claimant fell on December 2, 2011, and whether any claimed injuries were the result of a work-related accident.
¶ 44 B. Whether a Work-Related Accident Occurred
¶ 45 Claimant also challenges the Commission's factual finding that claimant did not suffer a compensable injury arising out of and in the course of her employment. We will not reverse these types of determinations unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Durand v. Industrial Comm n, 224 Ill.2d 53, 64 (2006). Further, we do not "reweigh the evidence, or reject reasonable inferences drawn from it by the Commission, simply because other reasonable inferences could have been drawn." Id. The Commission's factual findings "are against the manifest weight of the evidence only when an opposite conclusion is clearly apparent-that is, when no rational trier of fact could have agreed with the agency." Id. It is the province of the Commission "to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve conflicts in the evidence, assign weight to be accorded the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from the evidence." Hosteny v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm 'n, 397 Ill.App.3d 665, 674 (2009).
¶ 46 Claimant recognizes there were several conflicting versions of the mechanism of her purported injuries. Claimant asserts (1) she provided the only credible account, (2) each account she provided was consistent with the others, and (3) no one observed her fall. She argues the only contradictory evidence was unreliable hearsay from a Pactiv colleague. She also claims it was Pactiv that introduced diabetes as a likely cause of her fall. In short, she asserts we should reject the Commission's credibility determination and accept her description of the mechanism of injury. We disagree, as these findings are exclusively within the Commission's purview.
¶ 47 Further, we disagree with claimant's characterization of the evidence. The Commission noted repeatedly the numerous contradictions among claimant's testimony, the medical records, and other exhibits. In support of its findings, among other factors, the Commission relied on (1) the paramedics' assessment there was no trauma at the scene, based on their observations and witness statements, and (2) claimant's statements to hospital personnel she had neither eaten breakfast nor taken her diabetes medication. The Commission also noted Dr. Leong's testimony he had been treating claimant for diabetes for two years prior to her fall and Dr. Weber's reasoned opinion claimant's symptoms were related to an underlying condition, not to her work. Additionally, the Commission found claimant had failed to offer evidence of any work conditions that would have contributed to a risk of falling. Instead, she relied solely on her own testimony describing the mechanism of her injuries.
¶ 48 Dr. Leong, claimant's primary care physician, reported she had historically not always taken her medications as prescribed due to the cost. He also reported claimant's blood sugar had not been controlled for an extended period several months prior to the incident, leading to an increased dose of insulin. Dr. Leong testified because claimant's diabetes was not well controlled in November 2011, hyperglycemia could have caused her reported dizziness and thirst. Though Dr. Leong had not reviewed the ambulance or hospital records, he acknowledged the possibility that claimant's empty stomach and lack of medication, coupled with the intake of a sugary beverage, could have caused dizziness and a subsequent fall. Thus, there was ample evidence to support the theory that, if claimant fell, it was likely due to her underlying diabetes.
¶ 49 Therefore, we find a rational trier of fact could have concluded, as the Commission did, that claimant did not suffer a work-related accident. We defer to the inferences drawn and credibility determinations made by the Commission. For these reasons, we conclude the Commission's finding claimant failed to prove she sustained a compensable accident at work was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 50 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 51 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court's judgment, which confirmed the Commission's decision.
¶ 52 Affirmed.