Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-0918-22
11-02-2023
J.P. ELECTRIC, INC., properly identified as Juan Perez Electric Co., Plaintiff-Respondent, and Juan Perez, Plaintiff/Third-Party Defendant-Respondent, v. LPMG CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT, LLC, Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant, and 1 North Boston, LLC, and David Novotny, Defendants, and David Pratts, Defendant/Third-Party Defendant.
Brian E. O'Neill (Elliott Greenleaf, PC), attorney for appellant. Respondents have not filed a brief.
Brian E. O'Neill (Elliott Greenleaf, PC), attorney for appellant.
Respondents have not filed a brief.
Before Judges Sabatino, Mawla and Vinci.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SABATINO, P.J.A.D. This appeal involves a straightforward application of the terms of the Offer of Judgment provisions in Rule 4:58-1 to - 6. Defendant LPMG Construction Management, LLC ("LPMG"), appeals from the court's post-trial denial of its application for an award of counsel fees and costs pursuant to Rule 4:58-6.
In February 2018, plaintiff J.P. Electric, Inc. filed a complaint against LPMG (and other defendants that were dismissed from the action). Before trial, LPMG served upon plaintiff in March 2022 an offer of judgment under Rule 4:58-1 "to allow judgment to be entered against it and in favor of [p]laintiff for damages in the amount of $5,000 ... to resolve all of [p]laintiff's claims in this action of any kind, including all claims for damages of any kind, actual or otherwise ...." Plaintiff rejected the offer.
The trial court held a two-day bench trial. At the close of plaintiff's evidence, the court granted LPMG's motion for involuntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 4:37-2(b). Thereafter, LPMG moved for over $50,000 in attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Rule 4:58-6.
The trial court denied defendant's application for fees. In its written decision of October 28, 2022, the court explained that "a dismissal pursuant to R [ ule ] 4:37-2(b) precludes an award of attorney's fees as it is a dismissal. The court finds R [ ule ] 4:58-3(c) does not provide for any allowances for fees when ‘the claimant's claim is dismissed.’ "
On appeal, LPMG argues the trial court misapplied the pertinent Rules, stressing that an involuntary dismissal under Rule 4:37-2(b) represents an adjudication on the merits of the case.
The trial court correctly and sensibly applied the pertinent Rules. "[W]e review the meaning or scope of a court rule de novo, applying ‘ordinary principles of statutory construction to interpret the court rules.’ " DiFiore v. Pezic, 254 N.J. 212, 228, 296 A.3d 425 (2023) (quoting State v. Robinson, 229 N.J. 44, 67, 160 A.3d 1 (2017) ).
Although Rule 4:58-3(a) authorizes an offeror to recover fees "[i]f the offer of a party other than the claimant is not accepted, and the claimant obtains a judgment ... that is favorable to the offeror as defined by this rule," that authorization does not apply when "the claimant's claim is dismissed," see Rule 4:58-3(c)(1), or "a no-cause verdict is returned," see Rule 4:58-3(c)(2).
Because a successful motion under Rule 4:37-2(b) results in the "dismissal of the action" as "the plaintiff has shown no right to relief[,]" no verdict was returned so the trial court's denial of fees was manifestly correct. The policy reasons underlying the zero-recovery exceptions to Rule 4:58-3(c) would be undermined if such fee-shifting were permitted. See Schettino v. Roizman Dev., Inc., 158 N.J. 476, 486, 730 A.2d 797 (1999) (noting that the preclusion of fee-shifting under the Rule in instances when a plaintiff does not prevail "prevent[s] the transformation of the offer-of-judgment rule into a general fee-shifting rule").
Affirmed. Lest there be any doubt, a mid-trial involuntary dismissal does not entitle a defendant offeror to fee-shifting under the Rule.