Opinion
Civil Action NO. 99-3754, Section "K"(5).
March 7, 2001.
Before the Court is ENSCO Offshore Company's ("ENSCO") motion for summary judgment (doc. 124). The Court heard oral argument on the motion on January 4, 2001 and has considered the pleadings, memoranda and relevant law and finds that the motion shall be granted for the reasons that follow.
The factual background of this matter has been set forth in great detail in several prior orders issued by this Court. See Record Documents 35, 74, 118 and 168. Therefore only those facts directly pertinent to the motion before the Court will be discussed.
ENSCO's involvement in this matter arises from its contract with Hall-Houston whereby ENSCO provided personnel and a jack up rig to rework Hall-Houston's well. Plaintiff essentially seeks to hold ENSCO liable based on three activities: (1) ENSCO's failure to use a wear bushing while performing drilling operations, which allegedly damaged the wellhead and contributed to plaintiff's injuries; (2) ENSCO's toolpusher relaying a message from the company man to Joyner to get a seal on the wellhead; and (3) ENSCO's milling operations created large metal shavings that damaged the bowl in the wellhead. It is defendant's argument that ENSCO owes no duty to plaintiff and that in any event, it did not breach whatever duty was owed under Louisiana law.
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment should be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record "which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Stults v. Conoco, 76 F.3d 651, 655-56 (5th Cir. 1996) (citingSkotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 912-13 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53 (1986))). When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. The nonmoving party must come forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986); Tubacex, Inc. v. M/V Risan, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995).
Thus, where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no "genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356-57 (1986). Finally, the Court notes that the substantive law determines materiality of facts and only "facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986). The
Court now turns to the merits.
Plaintiff's cause of action arises under Louisiana law, and not the general maritime law. See Record Document 35. Although there are assertions to the contrary, plaintiff's cause of action, if any, arises under Louisiana Civil Code article 2315. ENSCO cannot have liability under the "strict liability" statutes, Louisiana Civil Code articles 2317 and 2317.1 because ENSCO did not have garde, or custody, of the allegedly defective wellhead as required under those articles.
To determine "fault under [article 2315], Louisiana courts apply a duty-risk analysis, which the Louisiana Supreme Court has resolved into the following three inquiries: (1) was the affirmative conduct a cause in fact of the resulting harm; (2) was there a duty to protect this plaintiff from this type of harm arising in this manner; and (3) was that duty breached." Ellison v. Conoco, Inc., 950 F.2d 1196, 1203 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hospital, 556 So.2d 559, 566 (La. 1990).
"Whether an alleged tortfeasor owes a duty to protect others from a particular risk of harm is a legal question to be determined by the trial court." Martin v. Watson's Grocery, 615 So.2d 999, 1001 (La.App. I Cir. 1993). "[I]n making this determination, the court must look to the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the accident at issue."Id.; See also Parish v. L.M. Daigle Oil Co., Inc., 742 So.2d 18 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1999).; Caldwell v. Let the Good Times Roll Festival, 717 So.2d 1263 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1998); Mays v. Gretna Athletic Boosters, Inc., 668 So.2d 1207 (La.App. 5th Cir. 1996). "In determining the duty owed, the Court should consider the plaintiff's experience and familiarity with the premises and its dangers." Gibbons v. Noble Drilling Corp., 1998 WL 283299 at *1 (E.D.La. 1998) (citing Walker v. Union Oil Mill, Inc., 369 So.2d 1043 (La. 1979) Fleming v. M. Bruenger Co., 1995 WL 324604 (E.D. La. 1995)).
With respect to the alleged platform negligence in this case, the Court should consider whether ENSCO "in the management of its property . . . acted as a reasonable man in view of the probability of injury to others." Gibbons at * 1. Courts have analogized the duties of a drilling contractor to those of an owner or occupier of land. See Arabie v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 688 F. Supp. 1111 (W.D.La. 1988); Gibbons v. Noble Drilling Corp., 1998 WL 283299 (E.D.La. 1998). As such, the drilling contractor's duty "includes the responsibility to discover any unreasonably dangerous conditions on his premises and to either correct those conditions or warn potential victims of their existence." Arabie at 1116 (citations omitted). Moreover, the drilling contractor "is not liable for an injury resulting from a condition which should have been observed by an individual in the exercise of reasonable care or which was as obvious to a visitor as the [drilling contractor]." Id. Indeed, a drilling contractor does not owe a duty to a plaintiff to intercede in the manner in which a plaintiff chooses to perform his task. Id. at 1117. The mere fact that an ENSCO toolpusher relayed a message to Joyner to get a seal on the wellhead is insufficient to create a duty on the part of ENSCO. Indeed, ENSCO's duty as a drilling contractor does not encompass the risk that a wellhead specialist such as Joyner would injure himself when exerting too much force using a work method of his choosing on a wellhead that he knew was not in prime condition. As ENSCO's duty does not encompass that particular risk to this plaintiff, defendant's motion must be granted.
Even if there were a duty in this case, there is no factual dispute as to a breach of that duty. In his deposition testimony, plaintiff readily admits that he was aware of the damage allegedly caused by the failure to use a wear bushing and that caused by the milling operations. With respect to plaintiff's knowledge of the allegedly dangerous conditions and his decision to proceed with his work, this case is quite similar to that in Arabie. In Arabie, the court stated that, "it is clear under the circumstances that plaintiff was fully aware of the hazardous condition complained about but voluntarily chose to encounter it anyway, and thereby failed to exercise reasonable care for his own safety. There was no breach of duty on the part of the defendants. Arabie at 1117. Likewise, in this case ENSCO did not breach a duty of reasonable care to Joyner, who knew of the damage and proceeded to work on the wellhead regardless. Accordingly,
As to ENSCO's responsibility for failure to use a Wear bushing, plaintiff's expert opined that it is customarily the duty of the operator, in this case Hall-Houston.
IT IS ORDERED that ENSCO's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.