Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 99-3754 SECTION "K"(5)
April 24, 2001
Before the Court is plaintiff's Motion for Relief from Judgment pursuant to Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (doc. 201). The motion was set for hearing on March 28, 2001 and was taken on the papers. The Court has considered the pleadings, memoranda and relevant law and finds that the motion shall be denied for the reasons that follow.
On February 7, 2001 this Court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant Robert Clary against plaintiff Jeffrey Joyner (doc. 168). Final Judgment under Rule 54(b) was subsequently entered on February 23, 2001 (doc. 172). Plaintiff filed the instant motion on March 13, 2001, arguing that the Court's order of February 7 was flawed on legal and factual grounds. In essence, plaintiff's motion rehashes his original opposition and more strenuously contends that the Court's reasoning in its earlier order unnecessarily circumscribed defendant's duty. However, plaintiff fails to explain what circumstances merit reconsideration under Rule 60.
Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part as follows:
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud, Etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (I) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
The rule is "a remedial provision intended to prevent injustice by allowing parties their day in court even though some technical error has occurred which would otherwise be grounds for default or dismissal."Greater Baton Rouge Golf Association v. Recreation and Park Commission for the Parish of East Baton Rouge, et al., 507 F.2d 227, 228 (5th Cir. 1975). The Rule 60 motion is not intended to be a vehicle to circumvent the ordinary method of redressing judicial error through appeal. Alvestad v. Monsanto Company, 671 F.2d 908, 912 (5th Cir. 1982). Motions for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) are directed to the discretion of the trial judge, and denial of such a motion is generally reviewed for abuse of discretion. Carter v. Fenner, 136 F.3d 1000, 1005 (5th Cir. 1998)(quoting Seven Elves v. Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396, 402 (5th Cir. 1981)); Edwards v. City of Houston, 78 F.3d 983, 995 (5th Cir. 1996)(en banc).
As evidenced by the face of Rule 60, there are six enumerated grounds that justify relief from judgment. In this case, plaintiff fails to specify which of those grounds forms the basis for his motion. An analysis of plaintiff's motion does not shed much more light on the matter.
Without any further guidance the Court finds that there are no justifiable grounds for relief under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1)-(5) and will treat plaintiff's motion as requesting relief under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6), which allows a court to grant relief from a final order for "any other reason justifying relief." Huff v. International Longshoreman's Association, Local #24, 799 F.2d 1087, 1091 (5th Cir. 1986). The phrase "any other reason" refers to any reason not enumerated in sections (b)(1)-(b)(5), Government Financial Services One Limited Partnership v. Peyton Place, Inc., 62 F.3d 767, 773 (5th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted), and is granted "only if extraordinary circumstances are present." Id. at 775 (citations omitted); Bailey v. Ryan Stevedoring Co., 894 F.2d 157, 160 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 89 (1990). Indeed, "[c]ourts have found few narrowly well-defined situations that clearly present `other reasons justifying relief.'" Wright, Miller Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d: § 2864 at 352. Plaintiff does not present any plausible "extraordinary circumstance" that warrants relief. Aside from his substantive disagreement with the Court's prior order, plaintiff has not provided any new grounds to justify reconsideration. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff's motion is DENIED.