Jouthe v. City of New York

47 Citing cases

  1. Segrede v. City of New York

    21-CV-2255 (CM) (S.D.N.Y. May. 28, 2024)

    Bektic-Marrero v. Goldberg. 850 F.Supp.2d 418. 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (emphasis added) (citing Jouthe v. City of New York. 2009 WL 701110, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. March 10. 2009)). “[P]rison officials have a duty ... to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners."

  2. Barkai v. Nuendorf

    21-CV-4060 (KMK) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2024)

    Other courts have held as much. For example, in Jouthe v. City of New York, 05-CV-1374, 2009 WL 701110 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2009), the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants conspired to deprive plaintiff Jouthe of his constitutional rights. Id. at *16.

  3. Cabello-Setlle v. Cnty. of Sullivan

    21 Civ. 7477 (NSR) (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 22, 2022)   Cited 3 times

    Particularly relevant here, it is well established that “routine handcuffing . . . absent something more, cannot constitute a cognizable excessive force claim.” Jouthe v. City of New York, No. 05 Civ. 1374, 2009 WL 701110, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2009). Although handcuffing that causes injury may constitute excessive force, “[t]here is a consensus among District Courts in this Circuit that tight handcuffing does not constitute excessive force unless it causes some injury beyond temporary discomfort and bruising.”

  4. Roman v. City of Mount Vernon

    21-CV-2214 (KMK) (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 19, 2022)   Cited 18 times
    Declining to credit Plaintiff's previous admission made in prior iterations of his complaint where an amended complaint omitted reference to that fact

    ), Plaintiff has met this burden. See Jouthe v. City of New York, No. 05-CV-1374, 2009 WL 701110, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2009) (“A police officer may also be held liable for malicious prosecution if he provides false information to the prosecutor that influences a decision whether to prosecute.” (quotation marks omitted)). Therefore, Plaintiff has established his burden with respect to all three remaining Defendants who were involved in the initiation of Plaintiff's prosecution.

  5. Tutora v. Aramark Corr. Servs.

    17-CV-9170 (KMK) (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 22, 2022)

    ; Jouthe v. City of New York, No. 05-CV-1374, 2009 WL 701110, at *18 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2009) (“It is well-established that private employers are not liable under [§] 1983 for the constitutional torts of their employees, unless the plaintiff proves that action pursuant to official policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort.”

  6. Stinson v. Saint Vincent's Hosp.

    3:20-cv-00704 (VAB) (D. Conn. Jun. 3, 2022)

    Nor are there allegations that either the actions of Dr. Doe 1 or the actions of the John Doe security guards meet the requirements of the public function test, the close nexus test, or the compulsion test for determining when private conduct can be attributed to the state. See, e.g., Wilson v. Agustino, No. 3:12-CV-1554 (VLB), 2013 WL 331255, at *1-*3 (D. Conn. Jan. 28, 2013) (dismissing a claim against a Saint Francis Hospital emergency room physician who treated plaintiff after his arrest by Hartford Police Officers because no facts were asserted to show that the conduct of the private physician could be attributed to the State of Connecticut) (collecting cases); Jouthe v. City of New York, No. 05-CV-1374 (NGG) (VVP), 2009 WL 701110, at *20 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2009) (concluding that the plaintiff failed to offer evidence that a private security guard employed by Long Island Jewish Medical Center was a state actor subject to liability under § 1983 because no facts suggested that the security guard was a designated “safety officer” or “special policeman” under New York law) (collecting cases)

  7. Zeng v. Chell

    19-CV-3218 (JGK) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2022)   Cited 6 times

    See Compl. 11 51, 70, 152, 168. While this allegation without more may be insufficient, see, e.g., Jouthe v. City of New York, No. 05-cv-1374, 2009 WL 701110, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2009) (collecting cases}, the plaintiff also alleges that Officer Wiltshire and Detective Febus "violently dragged" the plaintiff to the precinct. Id. ¶ 52.

  8. Barnes v. City of New York

    17-CV-1303 (WFK) (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2021)   Cited 4 times

    Thus, "once a criminal Defendant has been formally charged, the chain of causation between the officer's conduct and the claim of malicious prosecution is broken by the intervening actions of the prosecutor, thereby abolishing the officer's responsibility for the prosecution." Jouthe v. City of New York, 05-CV-1374, 2009 WL 701110, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Mar.10, 2009) (Garaufis, J.). Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim against Detective Garofalo fails as a matter of law because Detective Garofalo did not initiate the prosecution against Plaintiff.

  9. Moroughan v. Cnty. of Suffolk

    514 F. Supp. 3d 479 (E.D.N.Y. 2021)   Cited 33 times

    Private individuals are liable under § 1983 "where the private actor operates as a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents." Jouthe v. City of New York , No. 05-CV-1374, 2009 WL 701110, at *18 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2009) (quoting Tancredi v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 316 F.3d 308, 312 (2d Cir. 2003) ). Plaintiff contends that, even if the Court determined DiLeonardo and Bienz were acting as private actors, there would still be triable issues of material fact as to whether both joined in a common goal with the NCPD and SCPD in depriving plaintiff of his rights in the wrongful arrest, imprisonment, and subsequent prosecution of plaintiff, thus triggering joint activity liability under § 1983.

  10. Hettiarachchi v. Cnty. of Suffolk

    14-cv-6731 (DLI) (SLB) (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 30, 2020)

    A plaintiff may establish a municipal policy or custom by showing, inter alia, that "an official with policymaking authority took action or made a specific decision[,] which caused the alleged violation of constitutional rights." Jouthe v. City of New York, 2009 WL 701110, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2009) (citing Pembraur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483-84 (1986)). Spota "had the authority to set department-wide personnel policies" in the DA's Office and, therefore, was an official with policymaking authority.