Opinion
No. FST CV 03 0193834
September 16, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This is a motion for summary judgment (#117) filed by the defendant, Beth Israel Society. The facts are very clear and are undisputed. The plaintiff, Sheila Josephs, was an employee of the defendant, and was injured after falling in the driveway located on the defendant's premises in the course of her leaving her employment for that day.
The defendant has filed for summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiff was an employee of the defendant and that the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act set forth in General Statutes § 31-284(a) bars this present personal injury action.
General Statutes § 31-284(a) provides: "An employer who complies with the requirements of subsection (b) of this section shall not be liable for any action for damages on account of personal injury sustained by an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment or on account of death resulting from personal injury so sustained, but an employer shall secure compensation for his employees as provided under this chapter, except that compensation shall not be paid when the personal injury has been caused by the wilful and serious misconduct of the injured employee or by his intoxication. All rights and claims between an employer who complies with the requirements of subsection (b) of this section and employees, or any representatives or dependents of such employees, arising out of personal injury or death sustained in the course of employment are abolished other than rights and claims given by this chapter, provided nothing in this section shall prohibit any employee from securing, by agreement with his employer, additional compensation from his employer for the injury or from enforcing any agreement for additional compensation."
At issue is General Statutes § 31-275(1)(A), which provides in relevant part "Arising out of and in the course of his employment means an accidental injury happening to an employee . . . originating while he has been engaged in the line of his duty in the business or affairs of the employer upon the employer's premises, or while engaged elsewhere upon the employer's business or affairs by the direction, express or implied, of the employer . . ."
The plaintiff relies on General Statutes § 31-275(1)(E) which provides in relevant part: "[A] personal injury shall not be deemed to arise out of the employment if the injury is sustained: (i) At the employee's place of abode and (ii) while the employee is engaged in a preliminary act or acts in preparation for work . . ."
"Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party . . . The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that the party is, therefore, entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rocco v. Garrison, 268 Conn. 541, 548, 848 A.2d 352 (2004). "[T]he party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lombardo's Ravioli Kitchen, Inc. v. Ryan, 268 Conn. 222, 237, 842 A.2d 1089 (2004).
In Hughes v. American Brass Co., 141 Conn. 231, 235, 104 A.2d 896 (1954), an employee was injured on his way to work on a passway in a parking lot adjacent to the employer's plant and maintained by the employer. The Supreme Court held that "[t]he essential causal connection appears . . . to support the . . . conclusion that the accidental injury arose out of the employment."
In Kuharski v. Bristol Brass Corporation, 132 Conn. 563, 567, 46 A.2d 11 (1946), the plaintiff was injured while going to work as he was crossing a street lying between two of the employer's plants. The court concluded that the plaintiff was using the street as an "incident" of his employment, and that consequently the injury arose out of it.
The claimant's decedent in Moran v. New York N.H.H.R. Co., 109 Conn. 94, 97, n. 3, 145 A. 567 (1929), was leaving the employer's premises after work by climbing steps and succumbed from exertion. The court concluded the commissioner was justified in holding that the death arose out of the employment.
For other cases dealing with cases involving going to and leaving work, see Taylor v. M.A. Gammino Construction Co., 127 Conn. 528, 531-32, 18 A.2d 400 (1941).
The fact that the incident occurred on the employer's premises renders the so-called "coming and going rule" inapplicable. That rule generally denies workers' compensation benefits for injuries sustained by employees while they are traveling to and from their place of employment. See General Statutes § 31-275(1)(E); True v. Longchamps, Inc., 171 Conn. 476, 478, 370 A.2d 1018 (1976).
Accordingly, the plaintiff is eligible for workers' compensation benefits for injuries sustained while leaving from work because said injuries occurred on the employer's premises. Hence, she is not entitled to maintain this personal injury action against her employer because of General Statutes § 31-284(a).
The defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted.
So Ordered.
William B. Lewis, J.T.R.