Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-3423-12T4
08-12-2014
KRISTA JOSEPH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEIGHBORS MOVING AND STORAGE, Defendant-Respondent.
Law Offices of Malcolm Blum, attorneys for appellant (Jennifer M. Blum, on the brief). Respondent Neighbors Moving and Storage has not filed a brief.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Hayden and Rothstadt. On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County, Docket No. SC-000694-12. Law Offices of Malcolm Blum, attorneys for appellant (Jennifer M. Blum, on the brief). Respondent Neighbors Moving and Storage has not filed a brief. PER CURIAM
In this small claims matter, plaintiff Krista Joseph appeals from the Special Civil Part's March 8, 2013 order granting defendant Neighbors Moving and Storage summary judgment. The Special Civil Part judge entered the order as "unopposed" and did not provide any written or oral statement of reasons for the order's entry. Plaintiff essentially argues that the court abused its discretion in entering the order without granting plaintiff a requested adjournment so that she would have an opportunity to respond to the motion. Defendant did not file a brief opposing plaintiff's appeal and, from our review of the record, we are satisfied that the court abused its discretion by denying plaintiff's request for an adjournment of the summary judgment motion. Accordingly, we now reverse and remand.
In her pro se March 29, 2012 complaint, plaintiff alleged that she contracted with defendant for moving services. She claimed some of her property was damaged or lost during the move. After filing her complaint, the court listed the matter for trial on April 12, 2012. On that date, the court entered a default against defendant because it failed to appear. Plaintiff then obtained a default judgment against defendant in the amount of $3000 plus costs, and a writ of execution. She subsequently filed a motion seeking a turn over order after levying on defendant's bank account. Defendant responded to the motion by filing a cross-motion to vacate the default judgment and the writ of execution. On January 11, 2013, the court entered a turnover order in plaintiff's favor and noted that it was "unopposed." However, on January 25, 2013, the court granted, also as unopposed, defendant's motion to vacate the default. The court listed the matter for trial on March 1, 2013.
The order noted that "[t]he order for turnover of funds dated January 11, 2013 is also vacated. (see attached)." If there was an attachment, it was not included in the record before us.
Defendant subsequently filed a summary judgment motion, claiming plaintiff named the wrong company as defendant. According to the motion's annexed "Certification of Service," defendant's attorney served plaintiff with a copy of the motion via overnight delivery so that she would have received the motion on February 13, 2013. As per the court rules, the motion did not state a return date but rather instructed plaintiff that she had ten days from the date of service to oppose the motion by filing a certification or affidavit. R. 6:3-3(c)(1), (2).
The motion did not, however, contain the required language set forth in (c)(3) indicating the appropriate form of response to the summary judgment motion.
After the motion had been filed, plaintiff hired an attorney to try the case. On February 21, 2013, plaintiff's attorney wrote to the court to advise that counsel had just been retained to represent plaintiff "in the trial scheduled for March 1, 2013," that counsel was asking for an adjournment "of the trial to exchange limited discovery," and the request was being made with her adversary's consent. The letter, however, made no mention of the pending summary judgment motion. Based on that letter, the court adjourned the trial date to March 15.
During the week before March 4, plaintiff's counsel received a copy of the pending summary judgment motion from defendant's attorney and learned that it was to be decided on March 7. She immediately contacted the court to request an adjournment so that she could file plaintiff's opposition to the motion. The court denied the request.
Counsel then wrote to the court on March 4 to explain why additional time was needed to file a response. According to counsel's letter, she mis-diaried the motion's return date by confusing it with the March 15 trial date. She attributed her error to the "stress" caused by her being "in the process of preparing for surgery" the following week, and her need to care for her mother who "recently suffered" from medical problems that required counsel to take her to doctor appointments and for other medical care. Counsel also informed the court that she was in the process of compiling information in opposition to the motion, which appeared to contradict defendant's claim that plaintiff sued the wrong entity. Despite counsel's attempt to postpone the return date, the court again refused to adjourn the motion. Despite the court's refusal, on March 7 plaintiff's counsel supplied the court with documents that appeared to have supported plaintiff's claim that she sued the correct entity. The court subsequently entered its order granting summary judgment and this appeal followed.
We are satisfied that the judge's refusal to grant plaintiff's request for an adjournment of the summary judgment motion was an abuse of the court's discretion. We recognize that the granting or denial of an adjournment request rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. Abtrax Pharms., Inc. v. Elkins-Sinn, Inc., 139 N.J. 499, 513 (1995) (citing Allegro v. Afton Village Corp., 9 N.J. 156, 161 (1952)); see also Rocco v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 330 N.J. Super. 320, 343-44 (App. Div. 2000); State v. D'Orsi, 113 N.J. Super. 527, 532 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 58 N.J. 335 (1971). For that reason, a trial judge has considerable discretion in ruling upon requests for adjournments which we will not second-guess "unless it appears an injustice has been done." Allegro, supra, 9 N.J. at 161; Rocco, supra, 330 N.J. Super. at 343 (citing Nadel v. Bergamo, 160 N.J. Super. 213, 218 (App. Div. 1978)).
We also recognize that the course of managing cases in our courts does not always run smoothly and, in many instances, conduct by an attorney or a litigant requires a denial of an adjournment request. See, e.g., Vargas v. Camilo, 354 N.J. Super. 422, 430-31 (App. Div. 2002), certif. denied, 175 N.J. 546 (2003). However, such conduct, if any, must be balanced against the fact that cases are often expedited more efficiently when judges permit rather than intractably deny adjournment requests that only briefly delay matters. Notwithstanding expanding caseloads and goals for disposing of cases within specified time periods, our court rules remain "a means to the end of obtaining just and expeditious determinations between the parties on the ultimate merits." Ragusa v. Lau, 119 N.J. 276, 284 (1990) (quoting Tumarkin v. Friedman, 17 N.J. Super. 20, 26-27 (App. Div. 1951), certif. denied, 9 N.J. 287 (1952)); see also Ponden v. Ponden, 374 N.J. Super. 1, 9-10 (App. Div. 2004), certif. denied, 183 N.J. 212 (2005); Tucci v. Tropicana Casino & Resort, Inc., 364 N.J. Super. 48, 53 (App. Div. 2003).
We cannot discern any reason for the trial court's denial of plaintiff's adjournment request. The trial court did not provide any reasons for its denial of the adjournment or, for that matter, its granting of the motion. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the court found, or defendant in fact suffered from, any prejudice by granting the adjournment request. There is nothing to suggest that defendant even opposed the request and, when taking into consideration the fact that defendant has not filed any opposition to plaintiff's appeal, we are satisfied that the adjournment should have been granted, and the motion disposed of on the merits. We conclude, therefore, that an injustice was done here.
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Fisher, 408 N.J. Super. 289, 302 (App. Div. 2009) ("Even litigants who have not challenged a motion for summary judgment or any other relief are entitled to a recitation of the reasons for the granting (or denial) of relief. More significantly, even in an uncontested motion, the judge must consider whether undisputed facts are sufficient to entitle a party to relief. It is not enough to suggest that there is no opposition, especially if the facts do not warrant the granting of relief in the first instance.").
The March 4 letter did not, however, indicate that defendant's attorney had been sent a copy of the correspondence.
--------
Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION