Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 04-2843 SECTION "J" (5).
March 22, 2005
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue, Alternatively, To Transfer Venue, filed by Allied Van Lines, Inc. ("Allied"), Transguard Insurance Company of America, Inc. ("Transguard"), and J.J. Carter Sons of Nashville, Inc. ("Carter"). Also before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue, Alternatively, To Transfer Venue, filed by James Emmons ("Emmons"). Plaintiff, Louis Joseph ("Joseph"), filed an opposition to the motions. After considering the motions, opposition, the record and applicable law, the Court finds that this case should be transferred to the Middle District of Tennessee.
Rec. Doc. 10.
Rec. Doc. 17.
Rec. Doc. 14.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is an independent contractor who was hired by Allied through Carter to relocate Emmons from Old Hickory, Tennessee to Watsonville, California. On or about October 20, 2003, Plaintiff commenced moving Emmons' belongings. While loading Emmons' belongings from his home, Plaintiff was told there were additional items in the attic that needed to be loaded. Nevertheless, Joseph entered the attic to remove Emmons' belongings. After Plaintiff entered the attic, the floor of the attic gave way causing Plaintiff to fall through the attic floor to the floor below. As a result of the fall, Plaintiff alleges that he has suffered serious, debilitating, and permanent injuries. Alleging that this Court has jurisdiction over this matter based on diversity of citizenship, Plaintiff filed the instant suit for his injuries in the Eastern District of Louisiana.
Plaintiff's Memo in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, pp. 1-2. (Rec. Doc. 14).
Plaintiff's Memo in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, p. 2. (Rec. Doc. 14). It is disputed among the parties as to whom if anyone told Joseph to enter the attic to remove the items. Notably, Allied's policy prohibited Joseph from entering the attic.
Plaintiff's Memo in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, p. 2. (Rec. Doc. 14).
Plaintiff's Memo in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, p. 2. (Rec. Doc. 14).
Rec. Doc. 1.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
In a suit based solely on diversity of citizenship, venue is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391. Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) provides as follows:
(a) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in (1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought.
Thus, under § 1391(a), venue is proper in (1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought. Further, for the purposes of venue, a corporation is deemed to reside in any district in which the corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced. Notably, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the district he chose is a district of proper venue.
Smith v. Fortenberry, 903 F.Supp. 1018, 1020 (E.D. La. 1995) (citation omitted).
Section 1391(a) (1) does not apply in this suit because all defendants do not reside in the same district. Allied is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Illinois. Transguard is an Illinois corporation with its principal place of business in Illinois. Carter is a Tennessee corporation with its principal place of business in Tennessee. Emmons is a resident of California. Assuming that Allied, Transguard, and Carter could be deemed to reside in the Eastern District of Louisiana under 1391(c), Emmons is not a resident of Louisiana and has also objected to this court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over him. Therefore, since all defendants do not reside in the same district or in the Eastern District of Louisiana, Section 1391(a) (1) is inapplicable to the present matter.
Defendants' Answer. (Rec. Doc. 7).
Defendants' Answer. (Rec. Doc. 7).
Defendants' Answer (Rec. Doc. 7).
Emmons' Memorandum In Support of Motion to Dismiss, p. 1. (Rec. Doc. 17).
Emmons' Memorandum In Support of Motion to Dismiss, p. 2. (Rec. Doc. 17); Answer. (Rec. Doc. 8).
Plaintiff and defendants base their arguments for determining venue on Section 1391(a) (2). Under Section 1391(a) (2), venue is proper in any district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred. Defendants argue that this section makes venue proper in the Middle District of Tennessee because the accident that forms the basis of this suit occurred in this district. Plaintiff, however, argues that venue is proper in the Eastern District of Louisiana because (1) Allied contacted plaintiff in New Orleans to engage his services; (2) plaintiff continues to undergo treatment in Louisiana for his injuries; and (3) plaintiff has continued to reside in Louisiana during the course of his convalescence and disability. Consequently, the issue is whether venue is proper in the Eastern District of Louisiana under § 1391 because "a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim" occurred in the Louisiana.
Notably, the events giving rise to this suit consist of Joseph having to go into Emmons' attic in Tennessee and subsequently falling through the floor of the attic, which resulted in his injuries. The substantial events that gave rise to this claim occurred in the Middle District of Tennessee and thus, venue is only proper in that district. Plaintiff's argument that venue is proper because the substantial events giving rise to the claim occurred in the Eastern District of Louisiana is without merit. First, this case does not involve a contractual dispute between Allied and Joseph, so it is irrelevant that Allied solicited Joseph's services in New Orleans. Further, the place of the accident that caused the injury is the defining factor in determining the substantial part of events, not the place where the plaintiff received treatment or continued to suffer his disability. Accordingly, venue is proper in the Middle District of Tennessee pursuant to § 1391(a) (2) because the accident occurred in that district.
See Jenkins v. Georgia-Pacific Co., 2002 WL 638561, at *1 (E.D. La. 2002) (finding that the event giving rise to plaintiff's claim was the plaintiff's vehicular accident); Smith, 903 F.Supp. at 1020 (same).
Since venue is improper in the Eastern District of Louisiana, the Court must decide whether it should dismiss the case or transfer it to a court of proper venue. Determining whether to transfer or dismiss the case is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Further, 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) provides that "[t]he district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought." Considering that the accident occurred in Tennessee and the parties appear to be subject to personal jurisdiction in Tennessee, the Court finds that it is in the interest of justice to transfer this matter. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Defendants' Motions to Dismiss for Improper Venue, or Alternatively, To Transfer Venue, should be and hereby are DENIED to the extent the motions seek dismissal;
Orleans Limousines and Transportation, Inc. v. The Hurd Insurance Agency, Inc., 2003 WL 1193681, at *4; Karts International, Inc. v. Schweser, 1999 WL 1075937, at *3.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motions to Dismiss for Improper Venue, or Alternatively, To Transfer Venue, should be and hereby are GRANTED to the extent they seek transfer of this case to the Middle District of Tennessee;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter should be and hereby is TRANSFERRED to the Middle District of Tennessee for further proceedings.