Opinion
06-24-1937
JORDAN'S WEARING APPAREL, Inc., et al. v. RETAIL SALES CLERKS UNION OF NEW JERSEY, NEWARK LOCAL, et al.
Henry Gottfried, of Newark (Meyer E. Ruback, of Newark, of counsel), for complainants. Samuel L. Rothbard, of Newark, for defendants.
Suit for injunction by Jordan's Wearing Apparel, Inc., and others against the Retail Sales Clerks Union of New Jersey, Newark Local, and others. On order to show cause for preliminary injunction.
Preliminary injunction ordered.
Henry Gottfried, of Newark (Meyer E. Ruback, of Newark, of counsel), for complainants. Samuel L. Rothbard, of Newark, for defendants.
STEIN, Vice Chancellor.
The complainants in their bill of complaint charge the defendants with conducting an unlawful strike, picketing, violence, threats, and intimidation of their respective employees and patrons of their retail mercantile establishment.
The Court of Chancery will in a proper case extend its protective arm by an injunction to persons and corporations against unlawful interference with the lawful conduct of business or industry.
The evidence gathered from the affidavits now before me upon the return of an order to show cause in which is contained an intermediate restraint presents this situation:
Complainants are engaged in retail merchandizing. About May 1, 1937, Canadian Fur Trappers Corporation, one of the complainants, received a letter from one Robert Brown who described himself therein as the general manager of Retail Sales Clerks Union of New Jersey, stating that its employees had designated the Retail Sales Clerks Union of New Jersey, Newark Local, as the agent for collective bargaining and enclosed in the letter a copy of an agreement, requesting discussion of the same within five days. The agreement was to apply with equal force to all of the complainants herein.
As a result, a conference was held on May 7, 1937, between the parties by their respective representatives but without result. Complainants at this point say an adjournment was requested in order that the matter might be further considered. This is denied by the defendants who say that an extension of the time within which the contract was to be acted upon was granted until the next day (May 8) at noon.
Promptly at 12 o'clock noon on May 8, some of the complainants' employees who had joined the defendant Union walked out on strike and established a system of picketing.
In the meantime and on May 7, other employees of complainants who refused to join the Retail Sales Clerks Union of New Jersey, joined a union affiliated with the American Federation of Labor and known as Retail Clerks International Protective Association, Local No. 115A and the complainants entered into contract with this union on behalf of its employees. The reason given by complainants for entering into contract with this union is the desire on their part to enter into contract with a union affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, with which the defendant was not affiliated, although the defendant Union untruthfully represented that it was so affiliated.
The signs and placards carried by the strikers when the intermediate restraint was granted read: "Retail Clerks Union of Newark affiliated with New. Era A. F. of L." The defendant Union now says it was chartered by the New Era Group of the Retail Clerks International Protective Association which in turn was affiliated with the A. F. L., and that "since the commencement of this suit, said New Era Group, including the defendant union, have become affiliated with the committee for Industrial Organization, otherwise known as the C. I. O., and is chartered thereby." (Italics mine.) The proof before me is that there is no such organization affiliated with the A. F. of L.
The facts in evidence and the legal inferences to be drawn therefrom prove that the defendant Union misrepresented its affiliation with the A. F. of L. and that in fact it was not on May 7 or 8 affiliated with any recognized labor organization in this country. It is admitted that its affiliation with the C. I. O. did not become a fact until after the commencement of this suit. Such conduct on the part of the defendant Union does not commend itself to a court of conscience.
The employers apparently recognized unionization for collective bargaining, and to that end entered into contract with a union agreeable to them and chosen by some of their employees.
If the purpose as declared by defendants originally was organization of the complainants' employees for collective bargaining in order to bring about betterment in conditions of hours, wages, and labor, that result has been accomplished. If the purpose was to compel an agreement with the defendant Union to the exclusion of any other union, the purpose of collective bargaining must be regarded as secondary, and to this we do not believe that even the defendants will subscribe. If it be the purpose of the defendants to close complainants' establishment to all union employees not members of its union (the closed shop), that purpose is unlawful. Certain it is that complainants are caught in an apparent strife between unions for supremacy. And here we pause to say that an employer cannot be compelled under existing law to enter into-contract with any union.
Preliminary injunction will issue.