Opinion
No. CV 06-5004384
January 31, 2008
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISQUALIFY OR RECUSE THE COURT
This case was initiated by the plaintiff seeking to dissolve the defendant corporation of which she and the defendant, Katherine Wayland (hereinafter also "Wayland") were equal stockholders, the only members of the board of directors, the plaintiff being secretary/treasurer and the defendant Wayland being president. The plaintiff also called for injunctive relief claiming, inter alia, that Wayland had violated her fiduciary duties. The defendants responded with a counterclaim accusing the plaintiff of violating her fiduciary duties as well as other accusations also seeking injunctive relief. With the consent of all parties, this case was tried to the court and with the consent of both parties the court took up first the issues of who had violated whose fiduciary duties. The trial lasted fifty-six days at which point the Court continued the trial so that it could rule on the defendants' motion to dismiss and the plaintiff's motion to dismiss. By decisions dated December 14, 2007 the Court denied the plaintiff's motion to dismiss but granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, the latter on the basis that the plaintiff had engaged in perjury in her deposition of May 2007 and had willfully failed to disclose important documents that confirmed her perjury. This was followed by the instant motion by the plaintiff to disqualify or recuse the Court dated January 4, 2008. After briefs were filed by the parties, a hearing was scheduled for January 22, 2008 for oral argument only, not an evidentiary hearing, on the plaintiff's motion to recuse. The Court determined that an evidentiary hearing was not required because one is required only when the facts are disputed. Bondelli v. Bondelli, 18 Conn.App. 207 (1989). The facts as alleged by the plaintiff are not disputed, mainly because they are taken from transcripts and decisions made by this Court. Therefore, there was and is no need for an evidentiary hearing and referral to another judge.
"Whether the evidence requires disqualification is an issue that in, the first instance, is left to the exercise of a trial judge's discretion." Joyner v. Commissioner of Corrections, 55 Conn.App. 602, CT Page 1941 609 (1999). "The matter of a judge's recusal is in the reasonable discretion of that judge." Consiglio v. Consiglio, 48 Conn.App. 654, 661-2 (1978).
Accordingly, although the Court could have decided the motion on the papers without holding a hearing, to be absolutely fair, the Court permitted oral argument which took place on January 22, 2008.
ISSUES AND FINDINGS:
1. It is well settled law in Connecticut that the ruling against a party on a motion to dismiss or any other motion during or before a trial is not grounds for recusal. The fact that the plaintiff in this case does not like the Court's ruling on the cross motions to dismiss is irrelevant to whether or not the Court should recuse itself.
2. Plaintiff cites as the main thrust of her motion to recuse the case of Cameron v. Cameron, 187 Conn. 163, 164-65 (1982). This case is distinguishable from the case at bar. In Cameron, supra, a dissolution of marriage case, the financial issues were contested. Plaintiff's attorney said that the defendant's financial affidavit did not include $4,000.00 in cash. Defendant said during the defendant's deposition of December 8, 1980 it was in an attache case at home and the attorney for the defendant further said that it was shown in the $4,000.00 listed in the affidavit as savings bank deposits. The Court proceeded to demand that a confirming deposit slip be produced: "If not, counselor, either you or your client is in serious trouble in perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate a fraud on this court." Counsel asked whether the Court was alluding to his involvement. The Court replied "I said either you or your client." The Court then proceeded to address the defendant's attorney, Attorney Joblin, stating that "you have had trouble with this court before in some of your clients' absconding." Attorney Joblin replied that he had "never done anything unprofessional before your honor or any other judge." The Court then responded: "That's questionable." Here are the main differences between Cameron, supra and the case at bar:
a. The Court criticized the integrity of the attorney for the defendant. This Court has never criticized the integrity of the plaintiff's attorney.
b. The Court stated what it did before the defendant took the witness stand. In the case at bar, the plaintiff testified in early November for at least two days in opposition to the defendants' motion to dismiss and in favor of the plaintiff's motion to dismiss.
c. In Cameron the Court in a spontaneous outburst during the trial before the defendant had even testified stated the defendant and his attorney were trying to commit a fraud on the Court and that the defendant had lied in his deposition. In the case at bar, perjury was not mentioned except as a necessary part of the decision on the motion to dismiss well after plaintiff had testified on the motions to dismiss.
d. The plaintiff's motion to disqualify or recuse the Court rehashes many of the arguments made before this Court regarding its complaint. The Court will not go over every issue raised by the plaintiff in support of said motion, but does state that the Court at no time assumed a position of advocacy for the defendants. In the items mentioned on p. 26 of the motion to recuse the plaintiff finds fault with the Court suggesting that Wayland might wish to testify in response to the testimony of the plaintiff. This occurred on or about November 6, 2007. First of all, the Court is the finder of fact in this case and, of course, wanted to hear all relevant evidence. It is true that the Court suggested that Wayland perhaps should testify but stated, to defendants' attorney, inter alia: "That's up to you. That's your decision." The Court did not order Wayland to testify and as the Court recalls, her testimony was immaterial to the Court's decision. The remainder of the plaintiff's accusations, even if true, do not rise to the level of recusal.
3. The most important case regarding a motion to recuse is found in Joyner v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 55 Conn.App. 602, 608-9 (1999). The Court stated: "It has long been settled that the bias or prejudice sufficient to result in a disqualification `must stem from an extra-judicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case,'" citing United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966), Barca v. Barca, 15 Conn.App. 604, 613, cert. denied, 209 Conn. 824. Grinnell, supra, also cites Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 31.
Further, "a judge `has a duty to sit where not disqualified which is equally as strong as the duty not to sit where disqualified.'" State v. Medina, 228 Conn. 281, 313 (1994), quoting Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S 824, 837 (1972), on a memorandum of decision by Chief Justice Rehnquist on a motion to recuse: "a federal judge has a duty to sit where not disqualified which is equally as strong as the duty to not sit where disqualified." (Emphasis in original.)
It is absolutely clear that the alleged bias was all within what this Court learned from its participation in the case. It did not learn anything about this case from an extra judicial source. In contrast, the judge in Cameron, supra, criticized the attorney on matters well outside the case being tried.
4. For the Court to recuse itself would be a waste of judicial resources. Plaintiff cited in oral argument that it would be a waste of judicial resources because he would win this issue on appeal. That remains to be seen. However, if the Court were to recuse itself, it would mean the assignment of another judge who would have to hear the fifty-six days of trial all over again. Perhaps, according to the plaintiff's point of view, there should be two judges trying every case so that in the event one judge should appear to be biased and recuses himself or herself, the other judge would then take over without having to go back to the beginning of the case. This clearly would be a waste of judicial resources. To recuse the Court would, frankly, give the plaintiff another bite of the apple which is not fair to the defendants nor to the efficient administration of justice.
CONCLUSION
For all of the above reasons, the plaintiff's motion to recuse or disqualify the Court dated January 4, 2008 is denied.