Opinion
No. 11–P–1930.
2013-02-5
David JONES v. SUPERINTENDENT, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Norfolk & another.
By the Court (GRAHAM, VUONO & HANLON, JJ.).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The pro se plaintiff, David Jones, is a prisoner at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Norfolk (MCI Norfolk). The defendants are the superintendent of MCI Norfolk and a sergeant at the prison. Jones appeals from a Superior Court judgment allowing the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissing his complaint challenging the results of a disciplinary hearing.
Jones was disciplined, on the testimony of the sergeant for wearing jewelry (“two silver wedding bands or rings, and a gold chain”)
that had not been listed on his property form at the time he was transferred to the prison.
Jones refers to the chain as a “religious chain and cross attachment,” although the disciplinary record indicates that no medal was attached to the chain. There was other testimony indicating that a cross had fallen off of the chain.
Jones appealed the disciplinary hearing officer's findings to the superintendent, who denied the appeal. Jones then filed a complaint in Superior Court, challenging the results of the hearing and seeking declaratory relief under G.L. c. 231A. A Superior Court judge then allowed the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case.
Because the property form did not document Jones's ownership of the jewelry, he was charged with stealing it, or receiving stolen property, or otherwise being in possession of contraband. He received a punishment of loss of canteen privileges for receipt or possession of contraband and loss of telephone privileges for “accepting or purchasing ... anything of value from another inmate or an inmate's friend(s) or family.” The other charges were dismissed.
On appeal, the defendant argues that the motion judge erred because there exist genuine issues of material facts in dispute, and also that he properly included in his complaint a regulatory cause of action for which he could seek relief. Finally, he argues that his due process rights were violated due to the defendants' unlawful disciplinary actions that deprived him of his property. We affirm.
The docket entry reads, “A review of the administrative record filed in lieu of an answer sufficiently documents the allegations against the plaintiff. A reviewing Court is limited to correcting only substantial errors of law apparent in the record adversely affecting material rights.... Motion for summary judgment is allowed.”
We note, at the outset, that the request for declaratory relief under G.L. c. 231A, is inappropriate. See Pidge v. Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Inst., Cedar Junction, 32 Mass.App.Ct. 14, 17 (1992). (“Inmates challenging alleged improprieties in prison disciplinary proceedings under State Law must proceed by way of an action in the nature of certiorari”). See also Puleio v. Commissioner of Correction, 52 Mass.App.Ct. 302, 306 n. 2 (2001).
However, Jones also properly filed this action in the nature of certiorari. In such an action, the proper method of review is confined to the administrative record for the purpose of correcting “only a substantial error of law, evidenced by the record, which adversely affects a material right of the plaintiff.” Santiago v.. Russo, 77 Mass.App.Ct. 612, 613 (2010), quoting from Sheriff of Plymouth County v. Plymouth County Personnel Bd., 440 Mass. 708, 710 (2004). See G.L. c. 249, § 4. We need inquire only if the decision was legally tenable and supported by substantial evidence on the record; we leave credibility determinations to the hearing officer. Beryl v. Superintendent, Souza–Baranowski Correctional Center, 55 Mass.App.Ct. 906, 907 (2002); Allen v. Dept. of Correction, 69 Mass.App.Ct. 682, 684 (2007). “[I]nquiry about the presence or absence of genuine issues of material fact, germane to summary judgment procedure, is inappropriate” under this form of review. Bielawski v. Personnel Admr. Of the Div. of Personnel Admin., 422 Mass. 459, 464 (1996).
We see no error. The hearing officer found Jones guilty of the infraction “based on [the sergeant's] written disciplinary report ... coupled with his eyewitness oral testimony as it clearly reveals that Inmate Jones was in possession of a chain which was deemed to be contraband.” Jones's MCI Norfolk inmate property inventory form is included in the record, and does not reflect the confiscated wedding bands and gold chain as being in Jones's possession at the time he entered the facility. Jones, himself, concedes that his MCI Norfolk inmate property form does not reflect the items; he argues only that the form is incomplete.
Significantly, it appears that Jones never before complained of the inaccuracy of the facility inventory form prior to the disciplinary hearing. On this basis, it was reasonable for the disciplinary hearing officer to conclude that Jones had “obtained these items via illicit means.” We agree with the motion judge that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding of guilty and that granting the defendants' summary judgment motion was appropriate after determining there were no triable issues.
For this reason, we need not reach the merits of the defendants' immunity argument.
Finally, the sanctions imposed on Jones (loss of canteen and telephone privileges) “did not create a liberty interest” giving rise to any Federal or State due process claims. Drayton v. Commissioner of Correction, 52 Mass.App.Ct. 135, 138 (2001). See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995); Murphy v. Cruz, 52 Mass.App.Ct. 314, 318–319 (2001).
Judgment affirmed.