Opinion
NO. 09-15-00313-CR
02-10-2016
EDEN CHANTELLE JONES, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court Jefferson County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 14-20493
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted appellant Eden Chantelle Jones of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and assessed punishment at two years of confinement. The trial court subsequently signed an order that placed Jones on probation for five years and assessed a fine of $2000. In her sole appellate issue, Jones challenges the trial court's refusal to include an instruction on self-defense during the guilt-innocence phase of trial. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
JONES'S ISSUE
Jones's sole appellate issue challenges the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on self-defense. When reviewing claims of jury charge error, we first determine whether there was error in the charge. Price v. State, 457 S.W.3d 437, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). If error exists, we evaluate the harm resulting from the error. Id. When the complaint is preserved, any harmful error is reversible. Id.; Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (op. on reh'g). A trial judge must provide a jury charge that accurately sets forth the law applicable to the case. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 36.14 (West 2007). When the evidence from any source raises a defensive issue and the defendant properly requests a jury instruction on that issue, the trial court must submit the issue. Muniz v. State, 851 S.W.2d 238, 254 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
The indictment alleged that Jones "intentionally and knowingly and recklessly" injured the victim "with a deadly weapon, to wit: a shoe, that in the manner and means of its use and intended use is capable of causing bodily injury and death[.]" To be justified in using deadly force against another person, the actor must be justified in using force pursuant to section 9.31 of the Texas Penal Code, and the actor must reasonably believe that deadly force is immediately necessary for the actor to protect herself against another's "use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force[.]" Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 9.32(a)(2)(A) (West 2011). Section 9.31(b)(1) of the Texas Penal Code provides that the use of force against another is not justified in response to verbal provocation alone. Id. § 9.31(b)(1).
Jones does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the finding that her shoe was a deadly weapon. --------
There was considerable evidence introduced by both the State and Jones. None of the evidence was sufficient to support an instruction on self defense. Jones testified that she saw a shadow coming from behind and believed that someone was running at her, and she heard the person saying, "who is that bitch[?]" Jones testified that she panicked and swung her shoes blindly. In addition, Jones testified that she did not see the victim with any type of weapon, and she did not know who the victim was. Furthermore, Jones testified that the victim never threatened to harm her, and that it was unreasonable for her to swing her shoe at the victim. The victim testified that she was retrieving her belongings from Green's car when Jones struck her with a shoe. Jones testified that she never heard the victim threaten her, nor did she see the victim with a weapon. We conclude that there was no evidence that Jones was justified in striking the victim, and the trial court did not err by refusing to submit a jury instruction on self-defense. See id. §§ 9.31(b)(1), 9.32(a)(2)(A); see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 36.14. We overrule Jones's sole issue and affirm the trial court's judgment of conviction.
AFFIRMED.
/s/_________
STEVE McKEITHEN
Chief Justice Submitted on February 1, 2016
Opinion Delivered February 10, 2016
Do Not Publish Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Johnson, JJ.