Opinion
No. 2-08-258-CR
Delivered: November 12, 2009. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Appealed from the 297th District Court of Tarrant County.
PANEL: DAUPHINOT, GARDNER, and WALKER, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
I. INTRODUCTION
Appellant Quincy Paul Jones appeals his conviction for two counts of sexual assault of a child. In two points, Jones argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss for violation of his right to a speedy trial and by overruling his objection to the voluntariness of his confession. We will affirm.II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2004, Jones lived with his then-girlfriend M.B., their daughter, and M.B.'s two other children in Tarrant County. Jones later moved to Muncie, Indiana. In December 2005, over a year after Jones moved out, M.B.'s fifteen-year-old daughter K.L. told M.B. that Jones had sexually assaulted her on multiple occasions when he lived with them. M.B. called the Mansfield police department. Mansfield police obtained a warrant for Jones's arrest and contacted the police department in Muncie, Indiana. Muncie child abuse investigator Sergeant Darrin Clark went to Jones's last known address, and when no one answered, he left his business card. He also contacted Jones's probation officer Heather Pierce and explained that he needed to speak with Jones regarding some allegations against him in Texas. Pierce told Jones that he "needed to cooperate with the Muncie Police Department." Jones complied, and during an interview at the Muncie police station on February 14, 2006, he admitted to the sexual assault and was arrested. Jones remained in jail from the time of his arrest on February 14, 2006, until his jury trial on July 15, 2008. Seven months after his arrest, and although represented by court-appointed counsel, Jones filed a pro se application for writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his constitutional right to a speedy trial had been violated. Trial was then set for October 24, 2006, November 6, 2006, March 5, 2007, and June 4, 2007. Although neither the State nor Jones filed motions for continuances or announced not ready for trial, trial was not held on any of those dates. On June 4, 2007, the trial court allowed Jones's appointed attorney to withdraw due to a conflict with Jones, and four days later, the court appointed new counsel for Jones. Trial was then set for August 20, 2007, November 5, 2007, and February 4, 2008, but trial was not held on those dates. Again, neither the State nor Jones filed motions for continuances or announced not ready for trial. On June 5, 2008, Jones filed a pro se "Plea of M[ercy]," in which he asked the court for "help in speedy completion" of his trial. Approximately one month later, and twenty-nine months after Jones's arrest, his attorney filed a motion to dismiss for failure to grant a speedy trial. Jury selection began four days later on July 15, 2008. The following day, the trial court conducted a pre-trial hearing on Jones's motion to dismiss and denied the motion. The jury ultimately found Jones guilty of both counts and assessed Jones's punishment for each count at thirty-five years' imprisonment and a $6,000.00 fine. The trial court ordered the sentences to run concurrently.III. SPEEDY TRIAL
In his first point, Jones argues that the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss violated his right to a speedy trial under the United States and Texas Constitutions.A. The Right to a Speedy Trial
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 10 of the Texas Constitution guarantee an accused the right to a speedy trial. See U.S. Const. amend. VI; Tex. Const. art. I, § 10; see also Zamorano v. State, 84 S.W.3d 643, 647 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Orand v. State, 254 S.W.3d 560, 565 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2008, pet. ref'd). Texas courts analyze claims of a denial of this right, both under the federal and state constitutions, the same. See Harris v. State, 827 S.W.2d 949, 956 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 942 (1992). In Barker v. Wingo, the United States Supreme Court qualified the literal sweep of the right to a speedy trial by analyzing the constitutional question in terms of four specific factors:(1) whether the delay before trial was uncommonly long;
(2) whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for the delay;
(3) whether in due course, the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial; and
(4) whether the defendant suffered prejudice as a result of the delay.407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2192 (1972). Under Barker, courts must analyze federal constitutional speedy trial claims by first weighing the strength of each of the above factors and then balancing their relative weights in light of the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant. Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 648. None of the four factors is either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right to a speedy trial; instead, all must be considered together along with any other relevant circumstances. Id. No one factor possesses "talismanic qualities"; thus, courts must "engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process" in each individual case. Id. (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 533, 92 S. Ct. at 2193).
B. Standard of Review
In reviewing the trial court's ruling on a speedy trial claim, we apply a bifurcated standard of review: an abuse of discretion standard for the factual components and a de novo standard for the legal components. Id. Review of the individual Barker factors necessarily involves factual determinations and legal conclusions, but the balancing test as a whole is a purely legal question. Cantu v. State, 253 S.W.3d 273, 282 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Under this standard, we defer not only to a trial judge's resolution of disputed facts, but also to the trial judge's right to draw reasonable inferences from those facts. Id. at 281. In assessing the evidence at a speedy trial hearing, the trial judge may completely disregard a witness's testimony, based on credibility and demeanor evaluations, even if that testimony is uncontroverted. Id. The trial judge may disbelieve any evidence so long as there is a reasonable and articulable basis for doing so. Id. And all of the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the trial judge's ultimate ruling. Id.C. Analysis of the Barker Factors 1. Length of Delay
The length of delay is a "triggering mechanism" for analysis of the other Barker factors. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-32, 92 S. Ct. at 2192-93; Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 648. Depending on the nature of the charges, a postaccusation delay of about one year is "presumptively prejudicial" for purposes of the length-of-delay factor. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 n. 1, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 2691 n. 1 (1992). If the accused shows that the interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing "ordinary" from "presumptively prejudicial" delay, then the court must consider, as one factor among several, the extent to which that delay stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim. Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 649 (quoting Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652, 112 S. Ct. at 2690-91). This second inquiry is significant to the speedy trial analysis because the "presumption that pretrial delay has prejudiced the accused intensifies over time." Id. The State here concedes that the twenty-nine-month delay between Jones's arrest and trial weighs in Jones's favor and triggers an analysis of the remaining Barker factors. Furthermore, because the delay stretched well over twice the length of time needed to trigger the inquiry, this factor weighs heavily in favor of Jones. See, e.g., Shaw v. State, 117 S.W.3d 883, 890 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (holding delay of thirty-eight months weighed heavily in appellant's favor); Rodriquez v. State, 227 S.W.3d 842, 844 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2007, no pet.) (holding delay of thirty-two months between arrest and trial weighed heavily against the State).2. Reasons for the Delay
The second factor — reasons for the delay — seeks to ensure that courts do not simply concentrate on the sheer passage of time without taking into account the reasons underlying the delay. See Rashad v. Walsh, 300 F.3d 27, 34 (1st Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1236 (2003). Under Barker, "different weights should be assigned to different reasons" for the delay. 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S. Ct. at 2192. The inquiry into causation involves a sliding scale: deliberately dilatory tactics must be weighed more heavily against the State than periods of delay resulting from negligence. Id. Furthermore, valid reasons for delay should be weighed only slightly, if at all, against the State. State v. Munoz, 991 S.W.2d 818, 824 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Like the first factor, the State also concedes that this factor weighs in Jones's favor, although "only `slightly.'" At the hearing on Jones's motion to dismiss, the trial court's court coordinator testified that the State had never failed to announce ready for trial at any of the trial settings or moved for a continuance. She explained that the trial court is a busy court and had approximately 1,600 cases pending at that time. The court coordinator could not testify as to why Jones's trial had been reset so many times but said it was conceivable that it was reset because other defendants could have been in custody longer than Jones, thus giving their cases preference over his. Although a neutral reason such as an overcrowded docket weighs less heavily against the State, it should nevertheless be considered because the ultimate responsibility for bringing cases to trial in a timely manner rests with the government. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S. Ct. at 2192; Parkerson v. State, 942 S.W.2d 789, 791 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, no writ). However, because no evidence exists here that the State used deliberately dilatory tactics, we agree with the State that this factor weighs only slightly against the State. See, e.g., Murphy v. State, 280 S.W.3d 445, 453 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2009, pet. ref'd) (holding second factor did not weigh heavily against State when no evidence existed that State used purposeful dilatory tactics).3. Assertion of the Right
We next consider the extent to which Jones affirmatively sought a speedy trial. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531-32, 92 S. Ct. at 2192. The nature of the speedy trial right makes it "impossible to pinpoint a precise time in the process when the right must be asserted or waived, but that fact does not argue for placing the burden of protecting the right solely on defendants." Id. at 527, 92 S. Ct. at 2190. The right to a speedy trial "is constitutionally guaranteed and, as such, is not to be honored only for the vigilant and the knowledgeable." Id. at 527 n. 27, 92 S. Ct. at 2190 n. 27 (quoting Hodges v. United States, 408 F.2d 543, 551 (8th Cir. 1969)). Whether and how a defendant asserts this right is closely related to the other three factors because the strength of the defendant's efforts will be shaped by them. Id. at 531, 92 S. Ct. at 2192. Filing for a dismissal instead of a speedy trial generally weakens a speedy trial claim because it may show a desire to have no trial instead of a speedy one. Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 283. In this case, Jones first asserted his right to a speedy trial approximately six months after he was arrested by filing an application for writ of habeas corpus. The State argues that the application for writ of habeas corpus is not "the proper starting point from which to measure [Jones's] assertion of his speedy trial right" because Jones attached it to the end of a motion to reduce bail and because he asserted the violation of his right to a speedy trial as his third and final ground for habeas relief — "buried in the last substantive paragraph of this eleven-page bail reduction motion." Nevertheless, Jones specifically alleged in that application,I have been incarcerated for over 200 days without a trial date or trial being conducted and request a hearing to hear my right to be released on bail. . . . My constitutional right to a speedy trial [has] been violated.Although he did not directly request a speedy trial, he asserted a violation of his right to a speedy trial, and he did not request dismissal for failure to grant a speedy trial. See Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 283; Phillips v. State, 650 S.W.2d 396, 401 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) ("[A] defendant's motivation in asking for dismissal rather than a prompt trial is clearly relevant, and may sometimes attenuate the strength of his claim."). Over twenty months later, Jones again asserted his right to a speedy trial in his pro se "Plea of M[ercy]," in which he stated that he was "not sure" if his right to a speedy trial had been waived by his appointed counsel or by himself and that he would never waive that right and asked the court for "help in speedy completion." Trial was ultimately set for the following month, providing some evidence that the trial court considered his pro se motion. See Robinson, 240 S.W.3d at 923. Assuming the trial court considered this motion, thus making it subject to review, Jones did not request a hearing on his request for a speedy trial. See Cook v. State, 741 S.W.2d 928, 940 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (weighing third Barker factor against appellant because no evidence other than two motions for speedy trial filed with court showed that appellant asserted his right to a speedy trial by requesting hearings to present evidence on the matter), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 488 U.S. 807, 109 S. Ct. 39 (1988). Thus, although Jones's second pro se motion shows that he attempted to assert his right to a speedy trial, it tips the scales only slightly in his favor. Finally, the motion to dismiss, filed by Jones's attorney twenty-nine months after Jones's arrest, shows a desire to have no trial instead of a speedy trial and weakens Jones's case. See Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 283. Jones submits that the third Barker factor weighs in his favor but concedes that it does not weigh "as heavily as it would had he repeatedly asserted his right to speedy trial." We agree. Considering the two pro se filings, filed six months and twenty-seven months after Jones's arrest, and the motion to dismiss filed twenty-nine months after his arrest, we weigh this factor at least slightly against the State and in favor of Jones.