Opinion
No. 111,343.
2014-11-14
Starr L. JONES, Appellant, v. STATE of Kansas ex rel. SECRETARY, the KANSAS DEPARTMENT FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Appellee.
Appeal from Shawnee District Court; Larry D. Hendricks, judge. Opinion filed November 14, 2014. Affirmed.Pantaleon Florez, Jr., of Topeka, for appellant.David W. Davies, of Kansas Department for Children and Families, for appellee.
Appeal from Shawnee District Court; Larry D. Hendricks, judge. Opinion filed November 14, 2014. Affirmed.
Pantaleon Florez, Jr., of Topeka, for appellant. David W. Davies, of Kansas Department for Children and Families, for appellee.
Before MALONE, C.J., GREEN, J., and BUKATY, S.J.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Starr L. Jones appeals from a judgment of the trial court dismissing her petition and denying her motion for declaratory judgment. The trial court determined that her case was barred by claim preclusion, issue preclusion, the statute of limitations, and the statute of repose. Jones contends that her claim is not time barred because the Kansas Department for Children and Families (KDCF) has continued to collect on this alleged debt since 2003. Nevertheless, Jones seeks to relitigate the same issues on which she failed to prevail in 2002. Because we determine that she is estopped from bringing the present case, we affirm the trial court's order dismissing her case.
I
On October 23, 2002, KDCF sued Jones seeking reimbursement for foster care assistance for Jones' child, K.M.C., totaling $11,341.67. This amount represented care provided between January 1997 and August 2002. In her answer, Jones alleged that K.M.C. was not in the State's custody, nor had the child ever been in foster care. Moreoever Jones asserted that she had never placed her child on Aid for Dependent Children in 1998. When a hearing was held, Jones appeared pro se. She told the court that B.D.B., rather than K.M.C. was in foster care. After the parties presented their arguments, the trial court determined that Jones was the parent of both K.M.C. and B.D.B. It further determined that Jones owed a duty to support the children. The trial court determined that the support rights had been assigned to KDCF, and it granted full judgment in addition to court costs to KDCF. Jones did not appeal.
KDCF later sued Jones on May 29, 2003, seeking $760, and again on October 16, 2003, seeking $486 in additional reimbursement for the children's care. Jones was served with both petitions but failed to respond or otherwise defend the claims. In both cases, the trial court ruled in favor of KDCF and eventually consolidated all three cases.
Jones moved to clarify on March 1, 2011, contending that KDCF would not tell her the total amount due, that KDCF would not tell her what the amounts were for, and that KDCF had sought money for times when the children were in her care. The trial court later held a hearing on the motion and Jones appeared pro se. The trial court determined that several of her claims were untimely. It further determined that she continued to owe $1,491.56 and denied her request for reimbursement from KDCF.
On September 18, 2013, Jones sued KDCF. She alleged that KDCF had falsely claimed that her son and daughter were not in her custody. KDCF moved to dismiss the case, arguing that Jones' claims were barred by res judicata, collateral estoppel, the statute of limitations, and the statute of repose. Jones filed a response, and the trial court entered a memorandum decision and order granting KDCF's motion on all counts.
Did the Trial Court Err in Finding That Jones' Suit Was Barred by Claim Preclusion?
Whether claim preclusion applies is an issue of law over which appellate courts exercise de novo review. Rhoten v. Dickson, 290 Kan. 92, 106, 223 P.3d 786 (2010).
Jones argues that the trial court improperly found that her claim was precluded by an earlier adjudication. Res judicata is comprised of two related doctrines: (1) claim preclusion and (2) issue preclusion (collateral estoppel). Knowles v. Fleetwood Motorhomes of California, Inc., 40 Kan.App.2d 573, 577, 194 P.3d 38 (2008). “[W]hen a court of competent jurisdiction has entered a final judgment on the merits of a cause of action, the parties to the suit and their privies are thereafter bound not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose.” Stanfield v. Osborne Industries, Inc., 263 Kan. 388, 397, 949 P.2d 602 (1997), cert. denied 525 U.S. 831 (1998). All other issues that a party could have but failed to raise are deemed waived. Drach v. Bruce, 281 Kan. 1058, 1079, 136 P.3d 390 (2006), cert. denied 549 U.S. 1278 (2007). A party cannot raise an issue in a new case that it could have raised previously without “seriously undercutting the orderly process of the law.” Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 313, 115 S.Ct. 1493, 131 L.Ed.2d 403 (1995).
Under Kansas law, claim preclusion requires four elements: (1) the same claim; (2) the same parties; (3) the claim was or could have been raised; and (4) a final judgment on the merits. In re Tax Appeal of Fleet, 293 Kan. 768, 777–78, 272 P.3d 583 (2012). A “final judgment” for appeal purposes is not synonymous with a “final judgment” for the purposes of res judicata because the two serve different policies. Magstadtova v. Magstadt, 31 Kan.App.2d 1091, 1095, 77 P.3d 1283 (2003). Res judicata protects parties from “the cost and vexation of multiple suits,” while the single appeal rule “discourage[s] the piecemeal review of an action.” Grimmett v. S & W Auto Sales Co., 26 Kan.App.2d 482, 487, 988 P.2d 755 (1999).
Jones' only contention under this claim of error was that the order in 2002 was not a final judgment on the merits. She cites Griffith v. Stout Remodeling, Inc., 219 Kan. 408, 548 P.2d 1238 (1976), for the proposition that the trial court should have heard her case because she received no trial in the earlier case. In Griffith, the plaintiff filed a suit against a remodeling company under alternative tort and contract theories, but the trial court required her to proceed under only one. The plaintiff elected to continue under the tort theory, which was later dismissed because the statute of limitations barred the claim. On appeal, our Supreme Court reasoned that the trial court had deprived the plaintiff of her day in court by requiring her to choose only one theory. 219 Kan. at 414. So the court held that trial court had not entered a final judgment on her contract claim. See 219 Kan. at414–15.
Here, as the trial court likewise determined, Griffith is distinguishable from the present case. The record indicates that Jones participated in the 2002 case by answering the suit and arguing the case on its merits. Unlike in Griffith, at no point in the process did the trial court cut short her ability to present her case. Rather, both parties argued the case, which proceeded to a final judgment. Furthermore, the trial court stated that Jones was properly served with notice of the later petitions filed in May and October of 2003, so she cannot claim she did not have her day in court. As a result, Jones' argument fails.
Was the Trial Court Correct in Finding That Jones' Suit Was Barred by Issue Preclusion?
Like claim preclusion, appellate courts exercise unlimited review over the doctrine of issue preclusion. Rhoten, 290 Kan. at 113.
Collateral estoppel prevents a party from attacking a prior adjudication if three elements are present;
“ ‘ “(1) a prior judgment on the merits which determined the rights and liabilities of the parties on the issue based upon ultimate facts as disclosed by the pleadings and judgment; (2) the parties must be the same or in privity; and (3) the issue litigated must have been determined and necessary to support the judgment.’ “ “ Venters v. Sellers, 293 Kan. 87, 98, 261 P.3d 538 (2011).
Jones disputes the first and third elements. She contends, as in her argument against claim preclusion, that there has not been a prior judgment on the merits. This issue was discussed in the previous section, so we will not address it again here. Jones also argues without explanation that the trial court's 2002 decision was not necessary to support its judgment. Though, in order to find that KDCF is entitled to reimbursement, a district court must determine that the children were in KDCF's custody, that KDCF had expended money in supporting the children, and that the defendant owed a duty to support the children. See, K.S.A. 39–718b; see also, State ex rel. Secretary of SRS. v. Rice, 34 Kan.App.2d 535, 539, 121 P.3d 458 (2005) (“The State, in the exercise of its parens patriae duties, is authorized to provide assistance to children who are not receiving adequate provision by their parents. However, if such assistance is provided while the duty to provide for the child rests with a parent or legal guardian, the State is entitled to recoup its expenditures made in providing for the children.”).
In essence, Jones seeks to litigate the exact issue she litigated in 2002—whether she owed KDCF money for child support. Her petition indicates as much. Paragraph five states: “In the State Court proceedings for reimbursement, judgments were entered against plaintiff for amounts not due or owing to the state of Kansas for reimbursement.” Paragraph nine provides; “Plaintiff has repeatedly denied liability for the amounts claimed due and owing, however, over her objections to the courts, the state has been allowed to collect monies....” She cannot continue to argue the same case under the guise of “how much do I owe” when the trial court told her the amount due in a hearing on her motion to clarify in 2011. Thus, she is precluded from relitigating the issue.
Did the Trial Court Err in Finding That Jones' Suit Was Barred by the Statute of Limitations and the Statute of Repose?
“The interpretation and application of a statute of limitations is a question of law over which an appellate court exercises unlimited review.” Schoenholz v. Hinzman, 295 Kan. 786, 791, 289 P.3d 1155 (2012).
Under Kansas' statute of limitations, a party must bring an action based on fraud within 2 years of its discovery. K.S.A. 60–513(a)(3). Such an action accrues when “the act giving rise to the cause of action first causes substantial injury.” K.S.A. 60–513(b). Similarly, the statute of repose provides that a party may not bring an action “more than 10 years beyond the time of the act giving rise to the cause of action.” K.S.A. 60–513(b). Both provisions serve a similar goal—encouraging diligence on the part of plaintiffs by precluding stale claims. Welch v. City of Kansas City, 204 Kan. 765, 771, 465 P.2d 951 (1970). The two are different, however, in that the statute of limitations begins to run when the cause of action accrues while the statute of repose cuts off a plaintiff's remedy regardless of whether it ever accrued. See v. Hartley, 257 Kan. 813, 819, 896 P.2d 1049 (1995).
Jones appears to argue without citing any authority that because she has been forced to wrongfully pay KDCF over the years, KDCF has been in a “continuing state of violation,” so her cause of action did not accrue until her most recent payment. The difficulty with her argument is that the action she complains of is not the individual payments she has made but the judgments KDCF obtained in 2002 and 2003. If Jones' reasoning were correct, any judgment debtor could collaterally attack a judgment several years later simply by making payments to toll the statute of limitations. Furthermore, her argument fails because the statute of limitations is focused on the defendant's actions and not the plaintiffs. See, e.g., Hartley, 257 Kan. at 821 (“In the instant case, the act giving rise to plaintiffs cause of action occurred on ... the date upon which the defendant performed the initial surgery.”). Here, KDCF's first action causing her substantial injury occurred in 2002. Thus, her claims are well past the 2–year limit on fraudulent claims,
Jones also argues that the statute of repose does not bar her claim. Jones filed her case on September 18, 2013, which was less than 10 years after KDCF filed its third petition on October 16, 2003. The previous two petitions were filed more than 10 years before the present action. Nonetheless, her point is moot because her claim is barred by the statute of limitations.
Did the Trial Court Err in Denying Jones' Request for Declaratory Judgment?
In reviewing whether a trial court erred in denying declaratory judgment, appellate courts employ an abuse of discretion standard. Westar Energy, Inc. v. Wittig, 44 Kan.App.2d 182, 192, 235 P.3d 515 (2010). Abuse of discretion means that the decision was (1) arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; (2) based on an error of law; or (3) based on an error of fact. Northern Natural Gas Co. v. ONEOK Field Services Co., 296 Kan. 906, 935, 296 P.3d 1106 (2013). The party asserting that the trial court abused its discretion bears the burden of establishing such abuse. Harsch v. Miller, 288 Kan. 280, 293, 200 P.3d 467 (2009).
In order for a court to grant a declaratory judgment, there must be an actual controversy. 22A Am.Jur.2d, Declaratory Judgments § 11. Trial courts review two principal criteria when rendering declaratory judgments: (1) judgment would serve a useful purpose in clarifying and settling legal relations at issue; and (2) judgment would provide certainty. Wichita Computer & Supply, Inc. v. Mulvane State Bank, 15 Kan.App.2d 258, 262, 805 P.2d 1255, rev. denied 248 Kan. 999 (1991). “Moreover, declaratory actions cannot be used as a way of retrying matters previously litigated.” Wichita Computer & Supply, Inc., 15 Kan.App.2d at 262.
Jones argues that a declaratory judgment would have been useful because it “is uncertain as to how much money [she] owes.” This is simply incorrect. Jones moved to clarify on March 1, 2011, seeking to determine how much she owed, and the trial court told her that she owed $1,491.56. Instead, Jones seeks to use a motion for a declaratory judgment as a way of retrying her 2002 case. As a result, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying her motion for declaratory judgment.
Affirmed.