Opinion
No. SC11–1263.
2012-08-15
Clarence James Jones, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals the trial court's Order Denying Successive Postconviction Motion to Vacate, entered on March 23, 2011. We have jurisdiction. Seeart. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.
Jones argues that the trial court erred in denying his claim that Porter v. McCollum, 130 S.Ct. 447 (2009), constitutes a fundamental change in the law that is retroactively cognizable in a successive postconviction motion. We have already rejected that claim in Walton v. State, 77 So.3d 639 (Fla.2011).
Jones also argues that the trial court erred by not holding an evidentiary hearing or correcting the record in relation to his claim that, based on newly discovered evidence, Jones's General Educational Development (GED) diploma admitted at trial was not authentic. We agree with the trial court that this claim was untimely and thus reject it as procedurally barred. SeeFla. R.Crim. P. 3.851(d)(1), (2) (requiring 3.851 motions to be filed within one year after the judgment and sentence become final unless, as pertinent here, the facts on which the claim are predicated were unknown to the movant or the movant's attorney and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence); Owen v. State, 986 So.2d 534, 543 (Fla.2008) (recognizing that postconviction claims may be summarily denied when they are legally insufficient, should have been brought on direct appeal, or are positively refuted by the record). Even assuming otherwise, we find no prejudice under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), or Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and no merit in Jones's claim involving correction of the appellate record. We accordingly affirm.
It is so ordered.