While a "trial court generally has broad discretion to remove a juror for cause[,] … this discretion is narrowed once deliberations have begun[.]" Jones v. State, 314 Ga. 214, 222 (2) (b), 875 S.E.2d 737 (2022).

This discretion, however, narrows "once deliberations have begun, and even more so when removing a dissenting juror from a jury that appears to be divided." Jones v. State, 314 Ga. 214, 222 (2) (b), 875 S.E.2d 737 (2022). "[B]ecause removing a dissenting juror when the jury is deadlocked risks violating a defendant’s right to a unanimous verdict, a trial judge must exercise the utmost care in determining that good cause exists before removing the juror."

See also Carter v. State , 314 Ga. 317, 319 (2) (a), 877 S.E.2d 170 (2022). "[P]roof of a shared criminal intent with the actual perpetrator is necessary to establish that one is a party to the crime," Sams v. State , 314 Ga. 306, 310 (2), 875 S.E.2d 757 (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted), and the jury may infer a shared criminal intent from the defendant's "presence, companionship, and conduct before, during, and after the offense," Jones v. State , 314 Ga. 214, 232 (3), 875 S.E.2d 737 (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted). The evidence here was sufficient to support Mason's convictions for malice murder.

Although "mere presence at the scene of a crime is not sufficient evidence to convict one of being party to a crime," a jury is entitled to infer criminal intent from a defendant's "presence, companionship, and conduct before, during, and after the offense." Jones v. State , 314 Ga. 214, 231-32 (3), 875 S.E.2d 737 (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted). Here, there was sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that Appellant committed the crimes at issue.

And although the defendant's mere presence at the scene is not enough to convict him as a party to the crime, the jury may infer his criminal intent from his "presence, companionship, and conduct before, during, and after the offense." Jones v. State , 314 Ga. 214, 231-32 (3), 875 S.E.2d 737 (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted).

To establish that a defendant is a party to a crime-the State must show "proof of a shared criminal intent with the actual perpetrator." Henderson-317 Ga. at 72 (2)-891 S.E.2d 884 (citation and punctuation omitted) (alterations accepted). That shared criminal intent may be inferred from the defendant’s "presence-companionship-and conduct before-during-and after the offense," Jones v. State-314 Ga. 214-232 (3)-875 S.E.2d 737 (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted). But the defendant’s mere presence at the crime scene-without more-is not enough to show a shared criminal intent.

(Citation omitted.) Jones v. State, 314 Ga. 214, 231 (3) (875 S.E.2d 737) (2022).

Of course, this discretion is not unfettered, and must be exercised with the utmost care once jury deliberations have begun, especially when considering whether to remove a dissenting juror when the jury is deadlocked, given the need to safeguard a defendant's right to a unanimous verdict. See Jones v. State , 314 Ga. 214, 223 (2) (b), 875 S.E.2d 737 (2022). Here, Basulto requested Juror No. 26's removal before the jury was sworn in and before the State began its presentation of evidence in the case, relying on information apparently acquired only after the juror had been deemed competent and selected for service.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Jones v. State , 314 Ga. 214, 231-232 (3), 875 S.E.2d 737 (2022). Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdicts, the evidence presented at trial showed the following.