Opinion
NO. 01-18-00841-CR
04-07-2020
RANDALL DALE JONES, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 412th District Court Brazoria County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 82911-CR
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted appellant, Randall Dale Jones, of the second-degree felony offense of failure to comply with sex offender registration requirements and assessed his punishment at twenty years' confinement. In two points of error, appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to show that (1) he relocated from his registered address to a new address requiring him to notify local authorities of an intent to change address and (2) he was required to register with Brazoria County Sheriff's Office. We affirm.
See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 62.051 (setting out sex offender registration requirements); id. art. 62.102(c) (increasing punishment for offense of failure to comply with registration requirements to next highest degree felony if person has been previously convicted of offense under same article).
Background
On May 15, 2001, appellant was convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a child and sentenced to five years' imprisonment. On May 2, 2011, appellant pleaded guilty to non-compliance with sex offender registration requirements and, pursuant to a plea bargain, was sentenced to three years' imprisonment.
Prior to his release on February 7, 2014, appellant completed the Pre-Release Notification Form under the Texas Sex Offender Registration Program. The program required appellant to register annually during his lifetime and to appear at Brazoria County Sheriff's Office within seven days of his release to verify and complete his registration.
On February 13, 2014—six days after his release—appellant met with Lynda Donnell at Brazoria County Sheriff's Office to execute a second Pre-Release Notification Form. Appellant's second pre-release form stated that he had a lifetime duty to register with an annual verification requirement and it listed Brazoria County's Sheriff's Office as the notifying agency.
On July 21, 2016, appellant completed a Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) Sex Offender Update Form changing his registration address to 107 Casey Lane, Holiday Lakes, Texas 77515. The update form listed Brazoria County Sheriff's Office as the verification law enforcement agency.
Cindy Clark, the town clerk for Holiday Lakes, testified that utility service to the property located at 107 Casey Lane was disconnected on August 22, 2016—one month after appellant signed the Sex Offender Update Form.
In November 2016, Brazoria County Sheriff's Office provided appellant's name and address to Deputy Ronnie Eaton to conduct a verification check. Deputy Eaton visited 107 Casey Lane on November 14, 2016, at 6:37 a.m., November 18, 2016, at 11:11 a.m., November 28, 2016, at 10:18 a.m., January 19, 2017, at 8:59 a.m., and January 27, 2017, at 9:36 a.m. At no time was Deputy Eaton able to make contact with appellant or anyone else at 107 Casey Lane.
Following the unsuccessful verification checks, Donnell spoke with appellant by phone on February 21, 2017. In the recorded call, Donnell told appellant that she was aware that he had been absent from 107 Casey Lane and that he needed to tell her where he was living. Appellant told Donnell that he was staying "in the same area" and that he had been staying "on and off" with the mother of his baby. When Donnell told appellant that he could register the address of his baby's mother if he was staying with her, appellant told her that sex offenders were not permitted to stay there. Appellant told Donnell that he had a "right to live free" and that he had "just been doing what [he] had to." Appellant agreed to call Donnell the next morning and provide her with the address of his residence. Appellant failed to call Donnell the next morning and Donnell did not hear from appellant during the next five months. Donnell requested a warrant for appellant's arrest in July 2017.
On February 24, 2017, Donnell asked Holiday Lakes Chief of Police Harold Douglas to verify whether appellant was living at 107 Casey Lane. Chief Douglas arrived at the residence at 9:30 a.m. When he knocked on the front door, it swung open. Chief Douglas noticed that the doorjamb was damaged and appeared to have been kicked in. After he cleared the house and found no one home, he observed that there was no electricity or running water, and that the refrigerator door was open but not cooling and contained spoiled food. He also noticed some ramen noodle packets in the cupboards that had been partially eaten by insects or rodents. Chief Douglas testified that there was a door hanger on the front door and that it was still there when he returned to the residence at 10:20 that evening. Based on his observations, Chief Douglas believed that the property was abandoned. When Chief Douglas returned to the residence on February 26, 2017, no one was at the property but it appeared that someone had mowed the overgrown grass and fixed the doorjamb.
On May 8, 2017, Stephen Buchanan, an investigator with Brazoria County Sheriff's Office, went to 107 Casey Lane to check if appellant was living there. When he arrived, the front door was open and it did not appear that anyone was living there. Officer Buchanan observed someone other than appellant mowing the grass. The man told Officer Buchanan that he did not live there but gave him the property owner's business card. Officer Buchanan later spoke with the property owners' secretary who provided information consistent with the officer's earlier findings at the house.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In two points of error, appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to show that (1) he relocated from his registered address to a new address requiring him to notify local authorities of an intent to change address and (2) he was required to register with Brazoria County Sheriff's Office.
A. Standard of Review
In determining the sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, we view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational factfinder could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Lucio v. State, 351 S.W.3d 878, 894 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). We defer to the factfinder to resolve conflicts, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). "Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt." Id. Evidence is insufficient when (1) the record contains no evidence, or merely a "modicum" of evidence, probative of an element of the offense; (2) the evidence conclusively establishes a reasonable doubt; or (3) the acts that the State alleges, if true, do not constitute the charged crime. Kiffe v. State, 361 S.W.3d 104, 107-08 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref'd); see also Jackson, 443 U.S. at 314-19; Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
B. Applicable Law
A person with a reportable conviction or adjudication under chapter 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure must register with the local law enforcement authority in any municipality if he resides or intends to reside there for more than seven days. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 62.051(a). Aggravated sexual assault constitutes a reportable offense under chapter 62. See id. art. 62.001(5)(A) (listing aggravated sexual assault as reportable conviction or adjudication). If a registrant "intends to change address . . . [he] shall, not later than the seventh day before the intended change, report in person to the local law enforcement authority designated as the person's primary registration authority by [the Department of Public Safety] . . . and provide the authority . . . with the person's anticipated move date and new address." Id. art. 62.055(a). A person who is required to register as a sex offender and fails to comply with the requirements of chapter 62 commits an offense under that chapter. See id. art. 62.102.
C. Analysis
In his first point of error, appellant argues that the State failed to prove his noncompliance with article 62.005(a) because the evidence is insufficient to prove that he relocated from his registered address to a new address thereby requiring him to notify local authorities of an intent to change address.
Appellant does not dispute that he was required to register as a sex offender under chapter 62.
The jury heard evidence that the town of Holiday Lakes disconnected water service at 107 Casey Lane one month after appellant registered the address as his residence, and that there was no subsequent attempt to reconnect service prior to appellant's arrest. Deputy Eaton testified that he visited 107 Casey Lane five times between November 2016 and February 2017 to perform a verification check but was unable to make contact with appellant or anyone else at the residence.
Chief Douglas testified that when he visited the property on the morning of February 27, 2017, the front door swung open and the doorjamb was broken. He observed that the grass was overgrown, there was no electricity or running water in the house, the refrigerator door was open but not cooling and contained spoiled food, and the ramen noodle packets in the cupboards had been partially eaten by insects or rodents. Chief Douglas testified that there was a door hanger on the front door and that it was still there when he returned to the residence at 10:20 that evening. Chief Douglas testified that, based on his observations, the property appeared to be abandoned.
Officer Buchanan testified that when he visited 107 Casey Lane, the front door was open and it did not appear that anyone was living there. Officer Buchanan testified that when he contacted the property owner's office, the secretary provided information that was consistent with his earlier findings.
The jury also heard the recorded phone call between appellant and Donnell regarding appellant's residency status. Donnell told appellant that officers had visited 107 Casey Lane numerous times but that appellant was never there, and that he needed to tell her where he was living. Appellant told Donnell that he was staying "in the same area" and that he had been staying "on and off" with the mother of his baby. When Donnell told appellant that he could register the address of his baby's mother if he was staying with her, appellant told her that sex offenders were not allowed to stay there. Appellant told Donnell that he had a "right to live free" and that he had "just been doing what [he] had to." Although appellant agreed to call Donnell the next morning to provide the address where he was staying, he never called her and did not contact her during the next five months prior to his arrest.
This Court has found similar evidence sufficient to support a jury's finding that a defendant was no longer residing at his registered address and failed to report a change of address. See Burnett v. State, 506 S.W.3d 545 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. ref'd). There, in addition to the defendant's absence from the registered address on three days in a one-month period, the investigator testified that the mobile home appeared uninhabited because the yard was full of overgrown grass, there were dead rodents inside, there was no running water, the kitchen cabinets were all open, and there was no furniture in the living room or dining area. See id. at 548-49. During his second visit nearly two weeks later, the investigator found open cabinets and no dishes near the sink. See id. at 546. When the investigator later returned to the residence a third time, he found the business card that he had placed in defendant's doorway one week earlier still undisturbed. See id. at 546-47. A deputy who accompanied the investigator also believed that the residence was abandoned. See id. at 546. We concluded that the evidence was sufficient to establish that the defendant was no longer residing at the address, and it permitted an inference that appellant intended to change his address as of that date. See id. at 549; see also Gilder v. State, 469 S.W.3d 636, 641 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. ref'd) (holding that evidence showing defendant had vacated his registered address as of certain date supported both inference that he was living at new address on that date and conclusion that he intended to change his address on that date).
Here, in addition to the officers' observations of the residence over a six-month period, appellant told Donnell that the mother of his child lived at a residence in Freeport at which he stayed "on and off" but which did not permit sex offenders. The jury could have reasonably inferred from this evidence that appellant lived with his baby's mother but that he did not register the new address because he was not supposed to be staying there. The jury could have also reasonably inferred that appellant's statements that he had a "right to live free" and had "just been doing what [he] had to" meant that he had changed his address but that he could not admit to it. See Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.
In light of the numerous unsuccessful verification attempts, the physical description of the residence during the visits, appellant's statements to Donnell, and appellant's failure to call Donnell to clarify his living situation during the ensuing months, the jury could have reasonably concluded that appellant had changed his address without notifying Brazoria County Sheriff's Office within the seven-day period. See Thomas v. State, 444 S.W.3d 4, 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (noting finder of fact is sole judge of credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to testimony and evidence). We therefore overrule appellant's first point of error.
In his second point of error, appellant argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to prove that he was required to register with Brazoria County Sheriff's Office.
A person with a reportable conviction or adjudication under chapter 62 must register with the "local law enforcement authority" if he resides or intends to reside there. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. arts. 62.001(2), 62.051(a). The Department of Public Safety determines which local law enforcement authority serves as a registrant's primary registration authority. See id. art. 62.004(a) ("[The Department of Public Safety] shall determine which local law enforcement authority serves as the person's primary registration authority based on the municipality or county in which the person resides . . . .").
The State introduced the following exhibits at trial: (1) appellant's first Pre-Release Notification Form under the Texas Sex Offender Registration Program, completed prior to his release on February 7, 2014, requiring appellant to register annually during his lifetime and to appear at Brazoria County Sheriff's Office within seven days of his release to verify and complete his registration; (2) appellant's second Pre-Release Notification Form, completed on February 13, 2014, showing that appellant had a lifetime duty to register with an annual verification requirement and listing Brazoria County's Sheriff's Office as the notifying agency; and (3) appellant's Texas Department of Public Safety Sex Offender Update Form, completed on July 21, 2016, changing appellant's registration address to 107 Casey Lane, Holiday Lakes, Texas 77515, and listing Brazoria County Sheriff's Office as the verification law enforcement agency. The jury also heard testimony from Donnell that the police chief of Holiday Lakes and an investigator conducted verification checks at appellant's registered address at the request of Brazoria County Sheriff's Office.
Appellant argues that once he notified Brazoria County Sheriff's Office of his intent to move to 107 Casey Lane, in Holiday Lakes, it became the responsibility of the Chief of Police of Holiday Lakes to regulate his registration requirement. Appellant's argument is unavailing. Code of Criminal Procedure article 62.004(a) makes clear that it is the Department of Public Safety's responsibility to determine the proper registering authority. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 62.004(a) ("[T]he department shall determine which local law enforcement authority serves as the person's primary registration authority based on the municipality or county in which the person resides . . . ."); id. art. 62.001(1) ("'Department' means the Department of Public Safety."). "'Local law enforcement authority' means . . . the office of the chief of police of a municipality, the office of the sheriff of a county in this state, or a centralized registration authority." Id. art. 62.001(2).
The pre-release forms and the update form issued by the Department of Public Safety—the department in charge of determining the proper registering authority— constitute sufficient evidence from which a rational juror could have concluded that Brazoria County Sheriff's Office was the primary registration authority for appellant's address at 107 Casey Lane. See id. art. 62.004(a); see also McBurnett v. State, No. 01-11-00183, 2012 WL 3228813, at *2-3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (finding evidence sufficient to show that defendant's primary registration authority was Houston Police Department where State presented uncontroverted testimony showing that Department of Public Safety had determined that defendant's primary registration authority was HPD). Based on this evidence, the jury could have reasonably concluded that Brazoria County Sheriff's Office was the local law enforcement authority responsible for appellant's registration. Accordingly, we overrule appellant's second point of error.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Russell Lloyd
Justice Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Lloyd and Kelly. Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).