Opinion
No. 1-698 / 01-0184.
Filed January 28, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Fayette County, JAMES L. BEEGHLY, Judge.
James R. Jones appeals the district court's summary dismissal of his application for postconviction relief challenging judgment and sentence entered upon court verdicts finding him guilty of two counts of willful injury. AFFIRMED.
Lewis M. Churbuck of Elwood, O'Donohoe, Stochl, Braun Churbuck, New Hampton, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sharon K. Hall, Assistant Attorney General, W. Wayne Saur, County Attorney, and John Sullivan, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by HAYDEN, PETERSON, and HARRIS, Senior Judges.
Senior Judges assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2001).
The applicant in this postconviction case seeks to revisit his conviction on two counts of willful injury, in violation of Iowa Code section 708.4 (1995). A direct appeal from those convictions was dismissed as frivolous. The present appeal challenges the trial court's summary dismissal of the postconviction proceeding. Because we think dismissal was correct, we affirm.
Jones's present claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Iowa Code § 822.3. Jones was sentenced on February 24, 1997, and procedendo following his appeal was issued on August 27, 1997. He filed a pro se application for postconviction relief on September 21, 1999, and was provided with successive counsel. His last postconviction trial counsel was appointed August 21, 2000. A few weeks later, on September 21, 2000, the three-year statute of limitations for the postconviction proceedings expired. On November 22, 2000, in a resistance to the State's motion for summary judgment, Jones, by his attorney, for the first time raised the ineffective representation claims that are the only remaining basis for this postconviction proceeding.
We summarily affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment on Jones's assertion there was no evidentiary support for finding he inflicted serious injury on the victims. Such a finding was in accordance with Jones's stipulation at the original trial. There was overwhelming evidence supporting the stipulation.
Jones argues his new claim should relate back to the time he filed his pro se application in which he relied only on the claimed insufficiency of evidence. He points out that our rules of civil procedure generally apply to postconviction applications. Brown v. State, 589 N.W.2d 273, 274 (Iowa Ct.App. 1998). He then cites Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 69(d), which provides that "[l]eave to amend . . . shall be freely given when justice so requires." But, as the State points out, amendments adding new claims after the expiration of statute of limitations do not qualify. Estate of Kuhn v. Marco, 620 N.W.2d 488, 491 (Iowa 2000). The record indicates that Jones's successive counsel had ample time, prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, to raise the claims now urged.
Summary judgment was correct.
AFFIRMED.