Opinion
CASE NO. 2:09-cv-1063-MEF.
May 25, 2011
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Marquette Jones ("Jones") sued his former employer Southern Pan Services ("Southern Pan") for discriminatory discharge and discriminatory compensation based on race. The Court granted Southern Pan's motion for summary judgment, finding that Jones, a black male, could not establish that he was as qualified as the Hispanic workers that Southern Pan retained. This cause is now before the Court on the Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate (Doc. # 44) this Court's order granting the defendant Southern Pan Services's motion for summary judgment. Alternatively, Jones moves for reconsideration of the Court's decision. For the following reasons, Jones's Motion to Vacate is due to be DENIED.
I. LEGAL STANDARD
The District Court has substantial discretion in ruling on a motion for reconsideration. Groover v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 90 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1256 (M.D. Ala. 2000). Reconsideration of a previous order is an "extraordinary remedy to be employed sparingly." Id. Courts have recognized only three grounds for reconsideration: 1) an intervening change in controlling law; 2) the availability of new evidence; and 3) the need to correct clear error or manifest injustice. Id. Merely expressing disagreement with the Court's opinion is not enough to justify relief. Pres. Endangered Areas of Cobb's History, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 916 F. Supp. 1557, 1560 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (A motion for reconsideration is not "an opportunity for the moving party and their counsel to instruct the court on how the court `could have done it better' the first time.").
DISCUSSION
Because Jones does not allege either that new facts have arisen or that an intervening change in the law occurred, his motion to vacate must be based on the argument that the Court's decision was a manifest injustice. See Groover, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 1256. First, Jones argues that the Court abused its discretion by denying his Motion to Supplement his evidentiary submissions in response to the defendant's motion for summary judgment. Second, Jones argues that the Court incorrectly decided whether Jones was as qualified as the Hispanic workers Southern Pan retained when that question should have been left to a jury. Third, Jones argues that he could establish a prima facie claim for discriminatory compensation, and therefore the Court's dismissal of this claim was improper. A. Motion to Supplement Jones's Evidentiary Submissions
Jones also complains about the way in which the Court crafted the "factual background" portion of it's memorandum opinion and order. Jones seems to contend that the Court erred by constructing its own version of the facts instead of merely cutting and pasting the recitation of the facts as found in Jones's brief. While the Court must draw all factual inferences in the non-movant's favor, those inferences should be drawn based on the evidence presented, and not the narrative contained in the plaintiff's brief.
Jones argues first that this Court abused its discretion in denying the Plaintiff's Motion to Supplement his evidentiary submissions. After responding to the motion for summary judgment, Jones moved this court to supplement his response with the affidavit of Jones's former supervisor at Southern Pan. (Doc. # 29). However, Jones's motion did not provide any explanation for why he did not or could not locate the witness until after the response deadline had passed. Accordingly, this Court denied Jones's motion to supplement.
On his motion to vacate, Jones still does not provide any reason why the witness could not be located before the response deadline. Jones should have known the identity of the witness, as the witness was reportedly his supervisor. Jones may have been displeased with the Court's ruling on his motion to supplement, but he presents no grounds for reversing it. A motion for reconsideration is not "an opportunity for the moving party and their counsel to instruct the court on how the court `could have done it better' the first time." Cobb's History, Inc., 916 F. Supp. at 1560.
B. Jones's Ability to Establish Pretext
This Court granted Southern Pan summary judgment because Jones failed to demonstrate that he was as qualified as the Hispanic workers that Southern Pan retained. In other words, Jones could not demonstrate that Southern Pan's proffered reason for dismissing him was pretextual. In the instant motion, Jones vehemently argues that his deposition qualifies as evidence just as much as Southern Pan's submitted evidence. The Court does not dispute that Jones's deposition is evidence. However, Jones admits in his deposition that he never discussed work experience or background with any of the Hispanic men Southern Pan retained. (Doc. # 27 Ex. 1 at 127). Therefore, his conclusion that he was as qualified as the Hispanic men is pure conjecture. While Jones's deposition is evidence, it certainly is not evidence which demonstrates pretext.
Jones also argues that the Hispanic employees's applications demonstrate a lack of specialized skills, and therefore demonstrates pretext. However, the applications included no place to describe or list employment skills, and provided applicants with only limited ability to explain employment history. Jones calls this "making excuses" about the evidence. But his criticism of the Court's decision does not demonstrate the kind of "manifest injustice" that a motion for reconsideration is meant to address. Jones is merely attempting to get a second bite at the apple because he is dissatisfied with the Court's ruling on summary judgment. Accordingly, his motion for reconsideration is due to be denied.
C. Jones's Claim for Discriminatory Compensation
Jones's claim that he can establish a claim for discriminatory compensation is dependent on his ability to demonstrate that he was as qualified as the Hispanic workers Southern Pan retained. As explained above, he cannot do so. Accordingly, this portion of his motion is also due to be denied.
III. CONCLUSION
Jones has failed to demonstrate new facts, an intervening change in the law, or a manifest injustice. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that his Motion to Vacate is DENIED. It is further ORDERED that the stay of execution on the pending bill of costs is LIFTED. The clerk of the court is DIRECTED to tax costs against Jones.
A copy of this checklist is available at the website for the USCA, 11th Circuit at www.ca11.uscourts.gov Effective on April 9, 2006, the new fee to file an appeal will increase from $255.00 to $455.00. CIVIL APPEALS JURISDICTION CHECKLIST1. Appealable Orders : Appeals from final orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291: 28 U.S.C. § 158Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre 701 F.2d 1365 1368 28 U.S.C. § 636 In cases involving multiple parties or multiple claims, 54Williams v. Bishop 732 F.2d 885 885-86 Budinich v. Becton Dickinson Co. 108 S.Ct. 1717 1721-22 100 L.Ed.2d 178LaChance v. Duffy's Draft House, Inc. 146 F.3d 832 837 Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a): Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and Fed.R.App.P. 5 28 U.S.C. § 1292 Appeals pursuant to judicially created exceptions to the finality rule: Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. 337 U.S. 541 546 69 S.Ct. 1221 1225-26 93 L.Ed. 1528Atlantic Fed. Sav. Loan Ass'n v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc. Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp. 379 U.S. 148 157 85 S.Ct. 308 312 13 L.Ed.2d 199 2. Time for Filing Rinaldo v. Corbett 256 F.3d 1276 1278 4 Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1): 3 THE NOTICE MUST BE RECEIVED AND FILED IN THE DISTRICT COURT NO LATER THAN THE LAST DAY OF THE APPEAL PERIOD — no additional days are provided for mailing. Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(3): Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4): Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(5) and 4(a)(6): Fed.R.App.P. 4(c): 28 U.S.C. § 1746 3. Format of the notice of appeal : See also 3pro se 4. Effect of a notice of appeal : 4
Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction conferred and strictly limited by statute: (a) Only final orders and judgments of district courts, or final orders of bankruptcy courts which have been appealed to and fully resolved by a district court under , generally are appealable. A final decision is one that "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." , , (11th Cir. 1983). A magistrate judge's report and recommendation is not final and appealable until judgment thereon is entered by a district court judge. (c). (b) a judgment as to fewer than all parties or all claims is not a final, appealable decision unless the district court has certified the judgment for immediate review under Fed.R.Civ.P. (b). , , (11th Cir. 1984). A judgment which resolves all issues except matters, such as attorneys' fees and costs, that are collateral to the merits, is immediately appealable. , 486 U.S. 196, 201, , , (1988); , , (11th Cir. 1998). (c) Appeals are permitted from orders "granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions . . ." and from "[i]nterlocutory decrees . . . determining the rights and liabilities of parties to admiralty cases in which appeals from final decrees are allowed." Interlocutory appeals from orders denying temporary restraining orders are not permitted. (d) : The certification specified in (b) must be obtained before a petition for permission to appeal is filed in the Court of Appeals. The district court's denial of a motion for certification is not itself appealable. (e) Limited exceptions are discussed in cases including, but not limited to: , , , , , (1949); , 890 F.2d 371, 376 (11th Cir. 1989); , , , , , (1964). Rev.: 4/04 : The timely filing of a notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional. , , (11th Cir. 2001). In civil cases, Fed.R.App.P. (a) and (c) set the following time limits: (a) A notice of appeal in compliance with the requirements set forth in Fed.R.App.P. must be filed in the district court within 30 days after the entry of the order or judgment appealed from. However, if the United States or an officer or agency thereof is a party, the notice of appeal must be filed in the district court within 60 days after such entry. Special filing provisions for inmates are discussed below. (b) "If one party timely files a notice of appeal, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date when the first notice was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by this Rule 4(a), whichever period ends later." (c) If any party makes a timely motion in the district court under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of a type specified in this rule, the time for appeal for all parties runs from the date of entry of the order disposing of the last such timely filed motion. (d) Under certain limited circumstances, the district court may extend the time to file a notice of appeal. Under Rule 4(a)(5), the time may be extended if a motion for an extension is filed within 30 days after expiration of the time otherwise provided to file a notice of appeal, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause. Under Rule 4(a)(6), the time may be extended if the district court finds upon motion that a party did not timely receive notice of the entry of the judgment or order, and that no party would be prejudiced by an extension. (e) If an inmate confined to an institution files a notice of appeal in either a civil case or a criminal case, the notice of appeal is timely if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail system on or before the last day for filing. Timely filing may be shown by a declaration in compliance with or a notarized statement, either of which must set forth the date of deposit and state that first-class postage has been prepaid. Form 1, Appendix of Forms to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, is a suitable format. Fed.R.App.P. (c). A notice of appeal must be signed by the appellant. A district court loses jurisdiction (authority) to act after the filing of a timely notice of appeal, except for actions in aid of appellate jurisdiction or to rule on a timely motion of the type specified in Fed.R.App.P. (a)(4).