Opinion
C. A. 4:23-6265-RBH-KDW
02-07-2024
Matthew Jones, Plaintiff, v. South Carolina State Police and Myrtle Beach Police, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
KAYMANI D. WEST UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Matthew Jones (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this action against the South Carolina State Police and the Myrtle Beach Police. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review such complaints for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district judge. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned recommends the district judge dismiss the Complaint without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff alleges that starting in June 2000, he was the victim of sexual slavery, rape, torture, pedophilia, and other felonious acts. ECF No. 1 at 2-5. Plaintiff states these acts were committed by at least twenty local and state police departments who continuously sexually assaulted and tortured him as he traveled around the United States with his aunt who planned and scheduled this sexual slavery during a road trip that started in Delaware. Id. Plaintiff alleges on one of the stops he was anally and orally raped, beaten, flogged, and tortured by South Carolina State Police Troop 5 and the Myrtle Beach Police Department. Id. at 3. Plaintiff contends he suffered blood loss, deaths, and other external and internal injuries, and he was resurrected from death each time by taking medicine made from a 250-year-old tree and other plants. Id. at 4-5. Plaintiff does not identify the individuals involved in the alleged assaults or the date these assaults occurred.
A search on PACER reveals that during the last year, Plaintiff has filed numerous civil actions in federal courts throughout the country. A review of a representative group of these cases reveal complaints that allege facts and defendants that are virtually identical to the Complaint filed in this case. See Jones v. Georgia State Police, C/A No: 1:23-cv-05597-ELR (N.D.Ga. Dec. 6, 2023); Jones v. Maryland State Police, C/A No: 1:23-cv-03311-JR (D. Md. Dec. 5, 2023); Jones v. Virginia State Police, C/A No.: 1:23-cv-01652-PTG-WEF (E.D. Va. Jan. 30, 2023) (summarily dismissed); Jones v. North Carolina State Police, C/A No.: 7:23-cv-01659-BO-RJ (E.D. N.C. Dec. 5, 2023); Jones v. Tampa Bay Police, C/A No.: 8:23-cv-02839-TPB-JSS (M.D. Fl. Dec. 19, 2023) (summarily dismissed); Jones v. Louisiana State Police, C/A No.: 2:23-cv-07258-LMA-MBN E.D. La. (Jan. 16, 2024 (summarily dismissed); Jones v. Andalusia Police, C/A No.: 1:23-cv-00459-KD-B (S.D. Al. Jan. 31, 2024) (summarily dismissed).
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss the case upon a finding that an action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted or is frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii). A finding of frivolity can be made where the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); Allison v. Kyle, 66 F.3d 71, 73 (5th Cir. 1995).
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal district court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of N.Y., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. Nevertheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts that set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990).
B. Analysis
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Although the court must liberally construe a pro se complaint, the United States Supreme Court has made it clear that a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements to state a claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face, and the reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to state a claim against Myrtle Beach Police. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). It is well settled that only “persons” may act under color of state law, therefore, a defendant in a section 1983 action must qualify as a “person.” A police department, however, is a group of officers in a building, and buildings and correctional institutions, as well as sheriff's departments and police departments, usually are not considered legal entities subject to suit. See Harden v. Green, 27 Fed.Appx. 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001) (explaining the medical department of a prison is not a person pursuant to § 1983); Nelson v. Lexington Cnty. Pet. Ctr., C/A No. 8:10-2988-JMC, 2011 WL 2066551, at *1 (D.S.C. May 26, 2011) (finding that a building, detention center, is not amenable to suit under § 1983 and that Food Service Supervisors was a group of people not subject to suit). Courts that have considered this issue have found a municipal police department is not a legal entity subject to liability under § 1983. See Lyons v. Edgefield County Police, No. 8:05-2503-MBS, 2006 WL 3827501, at *3 (D.S.C. Dec. 28, 2006) (finding police department is not a separate suable entity amenable to suit); Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 750 F.Supp. 1131 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (dismissing city police department as improper defendant in § 1983 action because was not “person” under the statute); Shelby v. City of Atlanta, 578 F.Supp. 1368, 1370 (N.D.Ga. 1984) (dismissing police department as party defendant because it was merely vehicle through which city government fulfills policing functions). Because the Myrtle Beach Police is not a “person” amenable to suit under § 1983, this Defendant should be summarily dismissed.
Plaintiff has also failed to state a claim against the South Carolina State Police. As an initial matter, South Carolina State Police is not an existing entity. To the extent Plaintiff intends to sue the South Carolina Highway Patrol, his claims are subject to summary dismissal. The Eleventh Amendment bars suits by citizens against non-consenting states brought either in state or federal court. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712-13 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996). Such immunity extends to arms of the state, including a state's agencies, instrumentalities, and employees. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). While sovereign immunity does not bar suit where a state has given consent to be sued, or where Congress abrogates the sovereign immunity of a state, neither of those exceptions applies in this case. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 343 (1979) (holding that Congress has not abrogated the states' sovereign immunity under § 1983); see also S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-20(e) (stating that South Carolina has not consented to suit in federal district court). Because the South Carolina Highway Patrol functions as an arm of the South Carolina state government, it is the alter ego of the State of South Carolina for Eleventh Amendment purposes. Cribb v. Pelham, 552 F.Supp. 1217, 1219 (D.S.C. 1982). Accordingly, the South Carolina Highway Patrol is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, and Plaintiff's claims against this Defendant should be summarily dismissed.
Plaintiff's Complaint is also subject to summary dismissal as he fails to allege sufficient factual allegations to state any plausible claim against Defendants. A federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an “obviously frivolous complaint.” Chong Su Yi v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 Fed.Appx. 247, 248 (4th Cir. 2014); see also Holloway v. Pagan River Dockside Seafood, Inc., 669 F.3d 448, 452-53 (4th Cir. 2012) (noting a federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a complaint raising claims “so insubstantial, implausible . . . or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy”). Complaints based on allegations that seem delusional, irrational, and wholly beyond belief are considered factually frivolous. Brunson v. United States, C/A No. 3:14-2540-JFA-PJG, 2014 WL 4402803 (D.S.C. Sept. 3, 2014); see also Brock v. Angelone, 105 F.3d 952, 953-54 (4th Cir. 1997) (dismissing appeal as frivolous and finding plaintiff's allegation that he was being poisoned or experimented upon fanciful or delusional). The undersigned finds Plaintiff's claims are based on fantastic or delusional factual scenarios and therefore recommends the district judge summarily dismiss the Complaint. See Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1316 (4th Cir. 1996) (statute allowing dismissal of in forma pauperis claims “encompasses complaints that are either legally or factually baseless”).
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that this case be dismissed without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. [I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 2317
Florence, South Carolina 29503
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).