Opinion
CIVIL ACTION 18-1034-SDD-EWD
08-15-2019
SHANTRICE L. JONES v. SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY, SAGE REHABILITATION OUTPATIENT, LEIGH ANN BAKER, AMELIA MAJOR, DONNA FITZGERALD-DEJEAN, TERRILYN GILLIS, AND ELAINE LEWNAU
RULING
This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint and Amended Complaint filed by Defendant, Leigh Ann Baker ("Baker"). Plaintiff, Shantrice L. Jones ("Plaintiff"), representing herself pro se, has filed an Opposition to the motion. For the following reasons, Baker's motion shall be granted.
Rec. Doc. No. 29.
Rec. Doc. No. 62.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, an African-American female and a former student of Southern University A & M College ("Southern"), filed this lawsuit against Southern, several Southern employees, and other defendants, alleging they have violated several federal and state laws. Plaintiff enrolled in Southern in 2015 as a speech pathology graduate student. At the time of enrollment, Plaintiff requested unspecified accommodations from Southern based on parenting a special-needs daughter. Southern's response was that it was unaware that Plaintiff was entitled to any such accommodations. Nevertheless, Plaintiff acknowledges that Southern later provided Plaintiff with accommodations in relation to her education.
Plaintiff properly sued the Board of Supervisors of Southern University A & M College.
Rec. Doc. No. 16, ¶¶ 14-15.
Id., ¶¶ 16-17.
Id., ¶¶ 20, 144.
During the relevant time period, Defendant-Movant Baker was the Director of Clinical Education for Southern, and Plaintiff claims that, in the fall of 2016 and the spring of 2017, Baker acted as though she was superior to Plaintiff, allegedly based on Plaintiff's race. Plaintiff alleges that Baker demonstrated "racially motivated micro aggressive behavior" by correcting a term the Plaintiff used in a conversation and also interrupting the Plaintiff in a conversation. Additionally, Plaintiff claims Baker asked Plaintiff if she had any experience performing hearing screenings but did not ask this same question of a Caucasian student. Baker also allegedly sent Plaintiff emails that Plaintiff describes as "badgering" and "harassing" and wherein Baker "threatened dismissal out of the program."
Id., ¶ 4.
Id., ¶ 21.
Id., ¶ 22.
Id., ¶ 19.
Id., ¶¶ 26-27.
In Plaintiff's field of study, Southern requires students to earn a certain number of clinic hours to graduate. In May 2017, Baker assigned Plaintiff three clinical placements, two of which were on campus and which Plaintiff opposed. Plaintiff believes this was done to interfere with her graduation and demonstrates Baker's bias against African-American students. Because Plaintiff refused to participate in these clinics due to her daughter's care needs, Plaintiff alleges Baker indicated Plaintiff would receive a failing grade and be dropped from the clinic.
Rec. Doc. No. 24-1 at 2.
Id., ¶ 29.
Id., ¶ 30.
Id., ¶ 31.
The Plaintiff complained about Baker to Southern's student affairs department, and she was advised that Southern was already investigating other student complaints against Baker. Plaintiff was directed to a university committee led by Tavares Walker ("Walker") that was responsible for investigating complaints brought within the speech and language graduate department.
Id., ¶¶ 33-35.
Id., ¶ 36.
Id., ¶¶ 52-53.
In the fall of 2017, Plaintiff began a clinical placement at Defendant, Sage Rehabilitation Outpatient facility ("Sage") under the supervision of Defendant, Amelia Major ("Major"). Plaintiff contends Baker and Major were friends, and Plaintiff claims that Baker placing her at Sage was a purposeful effort to sabotage Plaintiff's career goals because Baker knew that Sage maintains a strict attendance policy to which Plaintiff would be unlikely to adhere based on the needs of her daughter. Plaintiff alleges that Major discriminated against her by providing Plaintiff the wrong address for the clinic, inviting white students (but not Plaintiff) to therapist meetings, and critiquing the Plaintiff more strictly than white students.
Id., ¶¶ 40-42, 65.
Id., ¶ 42.
Id., ¶ 65.
Id.
Plaintiff's attendance at Sage was sparse, allegedly due to the care needs of her daughter. In early November 2017, Major advised that Plaintiff's numerous absences - 9 out of 15 half or missed days - would affect her grade and possibly lead to her dismissal from the clinic. Plaintiff allegedly responded to Major that Major's behavior was similar to that of Baker's, against whom Plaintiff had filed a complaint. Plaintiff then provided Major with Walker's contact information, ostensibly suggesting that Major would also be subject to this investigation.
Id., ¶¶ 66-67.
Id., ¶ 71.
Id.
Later in November 2017, Plaintiff claims she was "lure[d]" to Southern's campus to meet with Southern professors, also named Defendants herein, Dr. Terrilyn Gillis ("Dr. Gillis"), Dr. Elaine Lewnau ("Dr. Lewnau"), and Dr. Donna Fitzgerald-Dejean ("Dr. Fitzgerald"). Plaintiff alleges that these professors accused her of being a liar, a forger, and of trying to intimidate Major by giving her Walker's information. Plaintiff further alleges these professors then advised her that she was being discharged from the clinic program at Sage.
Id., ¶¶ 78-79. The Court will refer to Dr. Fitzgerald-Dejean as "Dr. Fitzgerald" as Plaintiff refers to this Defendant in this manner throughout her pleadings.
Id., ¶¶ 80-82.
Id., ¶ 83.
Plaintiff subsequently attended another meeting with Dr. Fitzgerald and Dr. Lewnau wherein Dr. Fitzgerald allegedly defamed Plaintiff by stating that Plaintiff had previously threatened to choke Dr. Fitzgerald. Plaintiff further alleges that Dr. Fitzgerald and Dr. Lewnau defamed Plaintiff by calling her a liar and by claiming that Plaintiff had given false information to Major.
Id., ¶¶ 95-96.
Id., ¶ 103.
Id., ¶ 106.
After filing a retaliation complaint with Southern, Plaintiff then attended another meeting with Dr. Fitzgerald and Lewnau. At this meeting, Plaintiff alleges she was told she would receive a failing grade for her Sage internship, would not receive credit for the hours worked, and would be cited for academic dishonesty. The Plaintiff advised Walker of these events, Walker informed Plaintiff that the investigation was ongoing, and he assured Plaintiff that the Defendants "would not be allowed to take such actions against the plaintiff."
Id., ¶¶ 113-18.
Id., ¶ 120.
Id., ¶¶ 121-24 (emphasis in original).
In December 2017, Plaintiff filed an academic grievance against her professors for their alleged treatment of her. Although lacking in specifics, Plaintiff alleges in a wholesale manner that "[t]he defendants" retaliated against her by writing a letter to the registrar's office requesting that it: (1) dismiss Plaintiff from the clinic program; (2) honor the "F" grade she was assigned; (3) suspend her from the Master's Degree program for one year; (4) not allow Plaintiff to enroll in any SECD courses; and administratively remove Plaintiff if she attempts to register for SECD courses. Plaintiff alleges that she was subsequently de-registered from classes and suspended by Dr. Fitzgerald, Dr. Lewnau, Dr. Gillis, and another professor. Plaintiff also alleges that, in later meetings, certain defendants stated they would not abide by the ADA accommodations being provided to Plaintiff by Southern.
Id., ¶ 133.
Id., ¶ 140.
Id., ¶¶ 144, 148.
Plaintiff's academic grievance was initially denied, and she appealed. Pending the appeal, Plaintiff acknowledges that Southern protected her rights, and she continued to enroll in classes and pursue her degree. Plaintiff claims she received the support of Southern's Vice Chancellor James Ammons ("Ammons") during the appeal process, who ensured that Plaintiff remained in all of her classes, and Plaintiff continued to receive ADA accommodations. Ultimately, Plaintiff won her appeal; she was awarded all relief requested by Southern; her "F" grade was expunged; and her Sage clinical hours were credited.
Id., ¶ 165.
Id., ¶ 169.
Id., ¶¶ 139-42, 171-73.
Id., ¶ 144.
Id., ¶¶ 176-78.
Despite this outcome, Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Lewnau responded to the Vice Chancellor's decision by letter dated July 6, 2018, wherein she advised that she and the faculty department were in total disagreement with the grievance response. Plaintiff claims that the defendants continued to question her about missed appointments for clinical hours and required her to prepare a different presentation than she was originally instructed. Nevertheless, Plaintiff acknowledges she was allowed to graduate and earned her degree.
Id., ¶ 181.
Id., ¶¶ 187-89.
Id., ¶ 190.
Notwithstanding her successful appeal and ultimate graduation, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit against Southern, Sage, and related employees, including Baker. Plaintiff purportedly asserts a plethora of claims under federal statutes as well as state law, and she seeks compensatory damages, punitive damages, and injunctive relief. Southern previously moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint on its own behalf and on behalf of its former and current employees named as Defendants. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint ostensibly asserting claims under Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act ("RA"), and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). Separate counsel was engaged to represent the individual Southern Defendants, and Baker now moves to dismiss all claims brought against her in her individual and official capacities.
Rec. Doc. No. 1.
Id.
Rec. Doc. No. 17.
Rec. Doc. No. 16.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 et seq.
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6)
When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, "[t]he 'court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.'" The Court may consider "the complaint, its proper attachments, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice." "To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead 'enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" In Twombly, the United States Supreme Court set forth the basic criteria necessary for a complaint to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. "While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." A complaint is also insufficient if it merely "tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" However, "[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads the factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." In order to satisfy the plausibility standard, the plaintiff must show "more than a sheer possibility that the defendant has acted unlawfully." "Furthermore, while the court must accept well-pleaded facts as true, it will not 'strain to find inferences favorable to the plaintiff.'" On a motion to dismiss, courts "are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation."
In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007)(quoting Martin v. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004)).
Randall D. Wolcott, M.D., P.A. v. Sebelius, 635 F.3d 757, 763 (5th Cir. 2011).
In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d at 205 (quoting Martin v. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d at 467).
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)(internal citations and brackets omitted)(hereinafter Twombly).
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)(internal citations omitted)(hereinafter "Iqbal").
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Taha v. William Marsh Rice University, 2012 WL 1576099 at *2 (quoting Southland Sec. Corp. v. Inspire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 361 (5th Cir. 2004)).
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986)).
Additionally, "[a] liberal reading of plaintiff's pleadings is the only special treatment afforded pro se plaintiffs by the courts." A "court is not required to search for or try to create causes of actions or find material issues of fact for pro se plaintiffs." Indeed, "a pro se litigant is not 'exempt ... from compliance with the relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.' A pro se litigant is not entitled to greater rights than would be a litigant represented by a lawyer."
Kiper v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 2015 WL 2451998, *1 (M.D. La. May 21, 2015)(citing Callahan v. C.I.R., Civ. A. 99-0295-C-M1, 2000 WL 1141607, at *1 (M.D. La. Apr. 10, 2000)).
Id.
NCO Financial Systems, Inc. v. Harper-Horsley, No.07-4247, 2008 WL 2277843 at *3 (E.D.La. May 29, 2008), quoting Birl v. Estelle, 660 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir.1981).
Id., citing Birl, 660 F.2d at 593.
B. Title VI and Title IX Claims
Baker moves to dismiss the individual capacity claims brought against her under Title VI and Title IX, arguing that there is no individual liability under either statute. Baker is correct. In Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., the Supreme Court recognized the similarities between Title VI and Title IX, noting that the two statutes "operate in the same manner." For this reason, jurisprudence interpreting one statute is applicable to the other.
524 U.S. 274, 286 (1998),
Id. at 286.
See Mohamed for A.M. v. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist., 252 F. Supp. 3d 602, 628 n.14 (N.D. Tex. 2017).
Further, the Fifth Circuit has explicitly declared that there is no individual liability under Title VI and Title IX: "Title VI permits suits only against public or private entities receiving funds and not against individuals." The Fifth Circuit held similarly with respect to Title IX, stating: "Liability under Title IX does not extend to school officials, teachers and other individuals." Accordingly, as there is no individual liability under Title VI or Title IX, these claims brought against Baker in her individual capacity are dismissed with prejudice.
Muthukumar v. Kiel, 478 Fed. Appx. 156, 159 (5th Cir. 2012).
Plummer v. Univ. of Houston, 860 F.3d 767, 783 n.12 (5th Cir. 2017). See also Hundall v. Univ. of Texas at El Paso, No. 13-0365, 2014 WL 12496895, at *15 n.23 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 2014) (collecting cases) (Title IX); Kirk v. Monroe City Sch. Bd., No. CV 17-1466, 2018 WL 4292355, at *4-5 (W.D. La. Aug. 24, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 17-1466, 2018 WL 4291750 (W.D. La. Sept. 7, 2018)(dismissing Title VI and Title IX claims against individual defendants).
C. Plaintiff's Title VII Claim
Plaintiff's Title VII claim must also be dismissed. Not only is individual liability unavailable under Title VII, Title VII prohibits discrimination in employment based on protected characteristics including, among other things, race and gender. Plaintiff has not alleged that Baker ever employed Plaintiff or that Baker would qualify as an "employer" under Title VII. There are absolutely no allegations that Plaintiff was the employee of any of the named Defendants, or that any Defendants were Plaintiff's employer, and Title VII is wholly inapplicable to the facts alleged in this case. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Title VII claim against Baker is dismissed with prejudice.
See Baldwin v. Layton, 300 F. App'x 321, 323 (5th Cir.2008) ("Individuals are not liable under Title VII in either their individual or official capacities."); Smith v. Amedisys, Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 448 (5th Cir.2002)(same); Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 652 (5th Cir.1994); Kiper v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 2015 WL 2451998, at *2 (M.D. La. May 21, 2015); Jarvis v. Circle K Stores, 2015 WL 1809228, at *4 (M.D. La. Apr. 21, 2015).
D. Plaintiff's ADA and RA Discrimination and Retaliation Claims
The ADA provides, in relevant part, that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." The ADA also protects individuals from retaliation for opposing any act that is illegal under the ADA or for participating in any investigation, proceeding or hearing under the ADA. The elements of a retaliation prima facie case are: 1) a protected activity; 2) an adverse action; and 3) a causal connection between the two. Jurisprudence establishes that caselaw applicable to Section 504 of the RA Title II of the ADA apply generally to each other.
Ariel B. et rel. Deborah B. v. Fort Bend Independent School Dist., 428 F.Supp.2d 640, 665 (S.D. Tex. 2006)(citation omitted).
PlainsCapital Bank v. Keller Indep. Sch. Dist., 746 F. App'x 355, 358 (5th Cir. 2018).
As with several other statutes Plaintiff invoked, jurisprudence establishes that the ADA and RA prevent disability discrimination by public agencies and the recipients of federal funds, not officials acting in their individual capacities. Accordingly, all individual capacity claims asserted against Baker under the ADA and the RA are dismissed with prejudice.
See Lollar v. Baker, 196 F.3d 603, 609 (5th Cir.1999) (holding that government officials cannot be sued in their individual capacities under Section 504); Burns v. E. Baton Rouge Par. Prison Emergency Med. Servs., No. 14-0245, 2016 WL 1122242, at *5 (M.D. La. Mar. 4, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, No. 14-245, 2016 WL 1189335 (M.D. La. Mar. 22, 2016)("[b]ecause the term 'public entity' in Title II does not include individuals, individual defendants cannot be held personally liable for violations of Title II of the ADA."); Decker v. Dunbar, 633 F. Supp. 2d 317, 357 (E.D. Tex. 2008), aff'd, 358 F. App'x 509 (5th Cir. 2009)(recognizing that "the Fifth Circuit has held that there is no individual liability in lawsuits under the Rehabilitation Act ... there is likewise no individual liability for claims of violations under [Title II] of the ADA."); Willis v. Lacox, No. 9:10CV108, 2012 WL 441198, at *8 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 10, 2012)(dismissing claims under the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the ADA brought against individual defendants "because there is no individual liability under the ADA or the RA...").
E. Official Capacity Claims
Plaintiff sued Baker in both her individual and official capacities. However, as set forth by this Court in its previous Rulings in this case, "an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity." Official-capacity suits are nothing more than a "way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent."
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985)(citing Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690, n. 55 (1978)).
Id.
All allegations of Baker's conduct in connection with Plaintiff's claims took place while Baker was an employee of Southern and was functioning as the Direction of Clinical Education. Because an official capacity suit against Baker is essentially a suit against Southern, and Southern has been named as a Defendant in this matter, Plaintiff cannot maintain official capacity claims against Baker under any theories asserted. Further, the Court has dismissed the ADA and RA claims against Southern in a previous Ruling for Plaintiff's failure to state a claim under those statutes.
Rec. Doc. No. 16, ¶ 165.
See Rec. Doc. No. 83.
F. Defamation Claim under Louisiana Law
Both federal and state courts in Louisiana have held that, "[t]o maintain a defamation action under Louisiana law, a plaintiff must prove the following elements: '(1) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (2) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (3) fault (negligence or greater) on the part of the publisher; and (4) resulting injury.'" If any single element of the tort is lacking, the cause of action fails. Further, "'[t]he fault requirement is generally referred to in the jurisprudence as malice, actual or implied.'"
Schmidt v. Cal-Drive International, Inc., 240 F.Supp.3d 532, 542 (W.D. La. 2017)(quoting Kennedy v. Sheriff of E. Baton Rouge, 935 So.2d 669, 674 (La. 2006); Henry v. Lake Charles American Press, L.L.C., 566 F.3d 164, 181 (5th Cir. 2009)).
Id. at 542 (citing Costello v. Hardy, 864 So.2d at 139.
Id. (quoting Kennedy at 674).
Baker moves to dismiss the defamation claim purportedly asserted against her because Plaintiff has not presented allegations which attribute any allegedly defamatory statement made by Baker. To the extent Plaintiff has ostensibly asserted a defamation claim against Baker when she alleges "and the other defendants" in Paragraph 145 of her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the Rule 12(b) pleading requirements. Any references to Baker contained in wholesale, generalized references to "the defendants" fail to meet the Rule 12(b) pleading standard as a matter of law. 13 Courts within the Fifth Circuit have routinely held that such generalized references to actions by all defendants are insufficient to state a claim. As Baker
Plaintiff does not allege whether Leigh Ann Baker made any defamatory statements; what those defamatory statements were; or to whom the defamatory statements were published. Further, Plaintiff has not put forth any factual allegations that any allegedly defamatory statements made by Leigh Ann Baker, assuming there were any, were made with actual malice.Accordingly, any defamation claim purportedly asserted against Baker is dismissed with prejudice.
Rec. Doc. No. 29-1 at 13.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant Leigh Ann Baker's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint and Amended Complaint is GRANTED. Plaintiff's claims against Baker are dismissed with prejudice.
Rec. Doc. No. 29.
Plaintiff has already once amended her Complaint and does not seek leave to amend in her Opposition. The Court finds that further attempts to amend would be futile as a matter of fact and law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana on August 15, 2019.
/s/ _________
CHIEF JUDGE SHELLY D. DICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA