Neither does the provision in G.L.c. 210, § 12, that a petition seeking to change the name of a person "shall be granted unless such a change is inconsistent with public interests," displace the "best interests" standard applicable to matters relating to the care and custody of children. See Jones v. Roe, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 660, 662 (1992). That standard is applicable to controversies surrounding the surnames of children, whether born to married or unmarried parents.

The person filing the petition bears the burden of demonstrating that the name change is in the child's best interests. See Jones v. Roe, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 660, 664, 604 N.E.2d 45 (1992). We have previously stated that, in considering the child's best interests, some factors to be considered "include the effect of the change of the child's surname on the preservation and development of the child's relationship with each parent and other siblings; the length of time the child has utilized a given name; the age of the child as it may relate to his or her identification with the surname; and the difficulties and embarrassment that the child may experience from bearing the present or proposed surname."

Of particular note, at least three of those cases reversed or vacated trial court judgments that changed a child's name to the surname of the father. Gomesv. Candido, 99 Mass.App.Ct. 825, 833 (2021); Richardsv. Mason, 54 Mass.App.Ct. 568, 572 (2002); Jonesv.Roe, 33 Mass.App.Ct. 660, 665 (1992). See Cormierv. Quist, 77 Mass.App.Ct. 914, 916 (2010).

Id. at 571 (provision in G.L. c. 210, § 12, that a petition seeking to change the name of a person "shall be granted unless such a change is inconsistent with public interests" does not displace the "best interests" standard). See Petition of Two Minors for Change of Name, 25 Mass. App. Ct. 941, 941 (1988); Jones v. Roe, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 660, 662 (1992). See also Kindregan Inker, Family Law and Practice §§ 62.1 62.5 (3d ed. 2002); Harvey, Moriarty, Ryan, Massachusetts Domestic Relations § 23-107 (2003).

The petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that the name change is in the child's best interests. Id., citing Jones v. Roe, 33 Mass.App.Ct. 660, 664 (1992).

Petition of Two Minors for Change of Name, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 850, 856 (2006). Relevant considerations are to be found in Jones v. Roe, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 660 (1992); Richards v. Mason, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 568, 571-572 (2002); and Petition of Two Minors, supra. We specified in Jones that among the considerations relative to the best interest equation are "the effect of the change in the child's surname on the preservation and development of the child's relationship with each parent and other siblings; the length of time the child has utilized a given name; the age of the child as it may relate to his or her identification with the surname; and the difficulties and embarrassment that the child may experience from bearing the present or proposed surname."

See In re Marriage of Schiffman, 620 P.2d 579, 580, 583 (Cal. 1980) (abolishing a common law rule giving the father, as opposed to the mother, a primary right to have the child bear his surname, with the sole consideration going forward to be the child's best interest); Hamby v. Jacobson, 769 P.2d 273, 277 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("[M]ost recent court decisions have both rejected the notion that there is a preference for the paternal name and failed to adopt a preference for custodial parent choice, preferring to follow the rule that a name change request should be granted only if the court finds the name change is in the best interests of the child." (citing decisions from Arizona, California, Colorado, Illinois, Minnesota, Ohio, and Washington)); Hazel v. Wells, 918 S.W.2d 742, 744 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that "[t]he father has no greater right than the mother to have a child bear his surname" (quotation marks omitted)); Jones v. Roe, 604 N.E.2d 45, 47 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992) ("In resolving a dispute as to the surname of a child whose parents have not married, a court should not attribute greater weight to the father's interest in having the child bear the paternal surname than to the mother's interest in having the child bear her name."); Sec'y of the Commonwealth v. City Clerk, 366 N.E.2d 717, 723 (Mass. 1977) ("Important changes in popular and legal thinking suggest that ancient canards about the proper role of wom[e]n have no place in the law."); State ex rel. Connor H. v. Blake G., 856 N.W.2d 295, 300-01 (Neb. 2014) ("We conclude that in Nebraska, there is no preference for a surname-paternal or maternal-in name change cases; rather, the child's best interests is the sole consideration." (footnote omitted))

Post-Mark, the courts in Massachusetts, as elsewhere, have moved away from presumptions in favor of the paternal surname, in favor of “a principle of equality” that “the right of the father to have the child bear his name is no greater than that of the mother to have the child bear her name.” Jones v. Roe , 33 Mass.App.Ct. 660, 604 N.E.2d 45, 47 (1992) (citing cases and setting out several child-centered factors that should guide court's determination). “Gender-based distinctions ‘must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives' in order to withstand judicial scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.” SeeCaban v. Mohammed , 441 U.S. 380, 388, 99 S.Ct. 1760, 60 L.Ed.2d 297 (1979) (quoting Craig v. Boren , 429 U.S. 190, 197, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976) ); seeid . at 391–92, 394, 99 S.Ct. 1760 (holding that statutory provision that distinguished between unwed fathers and mothers, and gave only mothers right to veto adoption of child, bore no substantial relation to important state interest in providing adoptive parents to “illegitimate” child, and violated the Equal Protection Clause (citing Reed , 404 U.S. at 76, 92 S.Ct. 251 )). It is the view of the author of this opinion that factors which express a generalized preference for the father's wishes concerning

See G. L. c. 210, §§ 1 & 2. The factors are set forth in Jones v. Roe, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 660, 664 (1992). Here, the child was not yet one year old, had no awareness of her given surname, and was thriving in the care of her father.