Opinion
C/A: 0:24-1960-CMC-SVH
07-18-2024
Barbara Latrail Jones, Plaintiff, v. Barbara Jones, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Shiva V. Hodges United States Magistrate Judge
Barbara Latrail Jones (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed multiple documents the Clerk of Court construed as a complaint. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review such complaints for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district judge. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned denies Plaintiff's motion for an extension of time to comply with the proper form order [ECF No. 10] and recommends the district judge dismiss the action without prejudice.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
On April 16, 2024, Plaintiff, a self-identified “Sovereign Free Moor National,” filed 12 pages of documents directed to the court and 56 pages of attachments. [ECF Nos. 1, 1-1]. She references registration of Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) documents, including “UCC Financing Statement: Attachment Sheet, Security Agreement, Non-Negotiable Agreement for Suit, Hold Harmless and Identity Agreement, Common Law Copyright Notice, Commercial Notice of Trade Name, Power of Attorney and Public Notice, Verified Actual and Constructive Notice, The Right to Travel, Memorandum of Sovereignty Laws, Certificate of Birthright, UCC-1 Financial Statement, Certificate of Sovereign Status and Diplomatic Immunity.” [ECF No. 1 at 1 2]. She indicates:
That the Affiant Secured Party is the Sovereign Flesh and Blood Free Moorish American National female Barbara Latrail Jones and the Corporate Fiction/Debtor/Ens Legis is BARBARA LATRAIL JONES as appearing upon an UCC Filing is “artificial” and was created in contemplation of law (Commerce) AND THE TWO ARE NOT THE SAME FOR ONE IS REAL AND THE OTHER IS FICTION.Id. at 2. She asserts:
That the United States Corporate Government, State and County Jails, Correctional Corporations, Federal Bureau of Prisons, State Prisons, Private Prisons, CCA, Police Bureau Agencies, Sheriff Agencies, Surety Bond Agencies, U.S. Probation Offices, U.S.nDepartment of Homeland Security, FTA, Federal Transit Administration, or any Head of Department or Agency under the Jurisdiction of the Attorney General of the United States Government or any other Agencies or Corporations National and International Laws do not apply to the Sovereign Free Moor National Barbara Latrail Jones.”Id. at 3. She further claims:
That if this Affidavit is not Rebutted Point for Point by any man or woman, presenting the United kStates Government, or State Section any level in any matter at any time within 10 days to 30 days upon Registration and Recording, this Affidavit of Registration and Copyright Trade Name shall constitute and confirm that any man or woman or human being representing
any of the corporations or private agencies cannot show or provide a superior interest in the same property as identified upon the Security Agreement, held by Affiant, Sovereign Free Moor Barbara Latrail Jones.Id.
On May 24, 2024, the undersigned issued a proper form order advising Plaintiff that the court was unable to conduct initial review because the documents she filed “provide no proposed defendants, no basis for jurisdiction, and no facts showing she is entitled to relief.” [ECF No. 7 at 1]. Among other conditions, the order directed Plaintiff to “[c]omplete, sign, and return the enclosed standard complaint form,” which would “be docketed as an amended complaint in this case” by June 14, 2024. Id. Plaintiff filed additional unredacted documents on May 24, 2024, that were construed as related to the complaint. [ECF No. 9].
On June 14, 2024, Plaintiff filed a request for an extension of time to comply with the proper form order. [ECF No. 10]. She requested the court extend the deadline to August 31, 2024, because “the Defendant's voluntary response to Plaintiff's filings” was “due not later than August 24, 2024 and Defendant's [were] well within their legal rights and times to respond.” Id.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Plaintiff filed her complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss a case upon a finding that the action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted or is frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii). A finding of frivolity can be made where the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). In evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of N.Y., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990). Although the court must liberally construe a pro se complaint, the United States Supreme Court has made it clear a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements to state a claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face, and the reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
B. Analysis
1. Case Not Ripe
In her motion for an extension of time to comply with the court's proper form order, Plaintiff states “[t]here is no controversy at this time” and explains that “Defendant's voluntary response to [her] filings” is not due until August 24, 2024. [ECF No. 10].
The Fourth Circuit recently addressed ripeness in Whitaker v. Monroe Staffing Servs., LLC, 42 F.4th 200, 206-07 (4th Cir. 2022). The court explained:
The doctrine of ripeness arises from the case or controversy requirements of Article III. Scoggins v. Lee's Crossing Homeowners Ass'n, 718 F.3d 262, 269 (4th Cir. 2013); South
Carolina v. United States, 912 F.3d 720, 730 (4th Cir. 2019). A case is not ripe for judicial determination “if the plaintiff has not yet suffered injury and any future impact remains wholly speculative.” Doe v. Va. Dep't of State Police, 713 F.3d 745, 758 (4th Cir. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In contrast, a case is ripe for judicial decision when the “controversy is final and not dependent on future uncertainties.” Id. (citation omitted). Thus, when a claim is “presented in a clean-cut and concrete form, the issue is ripe for adjudication.” South Carolina, 912 F.3d at 730 (citation omitted). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing ripeness. Doe, 713 F.3d at 758.
Because ripeness is a Constitutional limitation on federal court jurisdiction, ripeness presents the threshold question whether a claim is justiciable. Scoggins, 718 F.3d at 269; South Carolina, 912 F.3d at 730. Both the district court and this Court are required to assure that such jurisdictional requirements are met. Va. Dep't of Corrs. v. Jordan, 921 F.3d 180, 187 (4th Cir. 2019).
Generally, a court must resolve jurisdictional issues before considering the merits of a claim, because “[w]ithout jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Envt, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998) (citation omitted); see also Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 563 F.3d 466, 475 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (courts must address ripeness before considering the merits).Id.
The Supreme Court has held that “[a] claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon ‘contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.'” Texas v. U.S., 523 U.S. 296 300 (1998) (citing Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580-81 (1985) (quoting 13A Charles A. Wright, Arthur v. Miller, & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3532, p. 112 (1984))).
Plaintiff has failed to allege that she suffered an injury. [ECF No. 1]. She states no controversy exists at this time, and a controversy may or may not arise in the future. See ECF Nos. 1 and 10. She has not sustained the burden to show the matter is ripe, as her case is not “presented in a clean-cut and concrete form.” South Carolina, 912 F.3d at 730. Therefore, the case is not ripe for adjudication.
Because Plaintiff's case is not ripe for adjudication, the undersigned denies her motion for an extension of time to respond to the proper form order and recommends the district judge dismiss the case without prejudice.
2. Failure to Meet Pleading Requirements
In addition or in the alternative, the undersigned recommends the court dismiss Plaintiff's complaint without prejudice for failure to meet the pleading requirements in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court. Fed.R.Civ.P. 3. Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a), [a] pleading that states a claim for relief must contain:
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support;
(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and
(3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.
“Every pleading must have a caption with the court's name, a title, a file number, and a Rule 7(a) designation.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(a). “The title of the complaint must name all the parties ....” Id. “A party must state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.” Fed. R. Civ. 10(b).
The documents construed as Plaintiff's complaint do not meet the requirements under Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) and 10(a) and (b). The documents have no caption, do not name a defendant, do not state claims in numbered paragraphs,have no short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, have no statement showing Plaintiff is entitled to relief, and have no demand for the relief sought. See ECF No. 1. They do not allow the undersigned to engage in meaningful initial review as it is unclear who Plaintiff is attempting to sue and why she is attempting to sue.
Plaintiff submitted an “Affidavit of Registration” that includes numbered paragraphs [ECF No. 1 at 2-3], but the remainder of the documents docketed as the complaint do not include numbered paragraphs.
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends the district judge dismiss the case without prejudice for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned denies Plaintiff's motion for an extension of time to comply with the proper form order [ECF No. 10] recommends the district judge dismiss the case without prejudice and without leave for amendment.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).