Opinion
Adam Quincy Jones, Petitioner, Pro se, Adelanto, CA.
For Calvin Johnson, Warden, Respondent: Assistant U.S. Attorney LA-CV, LEAD ATTORNEY, Office of U.S. Attorney, Civil Division, Los Angeles, CA; Diana L Pauli, LEAD ATTORNEY, Office of U.S. Attorney, Criminal Division - U.S. Courthouse, Los Angeles, CA.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
ARTHUR NAKAZATO, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Fernando M. Olguin, United States District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and General Order 05-07 of the United States District Court for the Central District of California. For the reasons reported below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the Court deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus by a person in federal custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (" Petition") and dismiss this action with prejudice.
1. BACKGROUND
Adam Quincy Jones (" Petitioner") is a federal prisoner incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution Victorville Medium II, in Victorville, California (inmate reg. no. 16133-040). He is currently serving an 156-month sentence pursuant to a guilty plea and conviction in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan of armed bank robbery and carrying or use of a firearm during a crime of violence. Petitioner is projected to be released from the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (" BOP") on February 6, 2023. (Pet. at 1-2; BOP records.
The Court takes judicial notice of Petitioner's inmate records with the BOP, which are available on the Internet at http://www.bop.gov. (Fed.R.Evid. 201.)
Petitioner filed the pending Petition on December 5, 2014, challenging the loss of 14 days of good conduct time (" GCT") sentence credits that resulted from a January 15, 2014 prison disciplinary hearing. The Discipline Hearing Officer (" DHO") who conducted the hearing concluded that Petitioner violated Prohibited Act Code 396 of the BOP's Inmate Discipline Program, use of the mail to further criminal activity, a " moderate severity level" prohibited act. See 28 C.F.R. § 541.3 (2011). As a result, Petitioner was disallowed 14 days of GCT credit, and he received a three-month loss of email privileges and visits. ( See DHO Report attached as Exhibit to Petition at 1-3.)
Pursuant to the Court's duty to examine and screen out frivolous habeas petitions, described more fully below, the Magistrate Judge has promptly examined the Petition and attached exhibits, and finds this action is subject to dismissal with prejudice.
2. DISCUSSION
Petitioner claims he was improperly subject to discipline for trying to contact his wife by mail, who is an inmate at another federal prison, because they have been authorized to correspond by mail. He also asserts that by blocking correspondence to and from his wife, prison officials have impeded his ability to properly pursue a motion to vacate or correct their sentences. (Pet. at 3; attached pages; Memorandum of Law at 1-7.) Petitioner's claims are rejected for the reasons discussed below.
2.1 Habeas Rules 1 and 4
Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 (" Habeas Rules"), requires a district court to dismiss a petition without ordering a responsive pleading where " it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief." Habeas Rule 4. Further, the Advisory Committee Notes to Habeas Rule 4 provide " it is the duty of the court to screen out frivolous applications and eliminate the burden that would be placed on the respondent by ordering an unnecessary answer, " particularly where the petition does not state facts " that point to a real possibility of constitutional error." Habeas Rule 4, Advisory Committee Notes (1976 Adoption).
Additionally, although the pending Petition was filed by a federal inmate under section 2241, Habeas Rule 1(b) permits this Court to " apply any or all of these rules" to any habeas petition, even if the petition is not filed pursuant to § 2254. See Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1269-70 (9th Cir. 1989) (affirming district court's dismissal of a § 2241 petition under Habeas Rules 1(b) and 4).
2.2 Legal Standard Governing Prison Disciplinary Proceedings
This Court may entertain a habeas petition challenging a federal sentence on the ground that its duration is " in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Tucker v. Carlson, 925 F.2d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1991). More specifically, judicial review is available where a BOP action " is contrary to established federal law, violates the United States Constitution, (footnote omitted) or exceeds its statutory authority . . . ." Reeb v. Thomas, 636 F.3d 1224, 1228 (9th Cir. 2011).
In the context of a prison disciplinary proceeding, a prisoner has a liberty interest in GCT credits, but that interest " must be accommodated in the distinctive setting of a prison, where disciplinary proceedings take place in a closed, tightly controlled environment peopled by those who have chosen to violate the criminal law and who have been lawfully incarcerated for doing so." Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 560, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (" [I]t is immediately apparent that one cannot automatically apply procedural rules designed for free citizens in an open society, or for parolees or probationers under only limited restraints, to the very different situation presented by a disciplinary proceeding in a . . . prison."). While " a prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitutional protections when he is imprisoned for crime, " the prisoner's rights under the Due Process Clause " are . . . subject to restrictions imposed by the nature of the regime to which [he has] been lawfully committed." Wolff, 418 U.S. at 555-56. Moreover, since prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, " the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply." Id. at 556.
In order to strike a " mutual accommodation between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution that are of general application, " the Supreme Court has articulated four requirements to satisfy due process when a prison disciplinary hearing may result in the loss of GCT credits: (1) advance written notice of the disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals, to call witnesses and present documentary evidence; (3) a written statement by the fact finder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action to ensure fair treatment; and (4) findings supported by " some evidence in the record." Hill, 472 U.S. at 454; Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556, 563-67.
2.3 Relevant Facts
The DHO Report provides the following facts. Petitioner was originally charged with violating Prohibited Act Code 296, a " high severity level" charge for using the mail to further criminal activity. See 28 C.F.R. § 541.3. Advance written notice of that charge was personally given to Petitioner by a staff member, in the form of a copy of his incident report, on January 6, 2014, the date of the incident, and nine days before the disciplinary hearing.
Petitioner was advised of his due process rights on January 8, 2014, seven days prior to his disciplinary hearing. During the hearing on January 15, 2014, Petitioner was advised that a staff representative was unable to appear and was provided the option of postponing the hearing. Petitioner elected instead to waive his right to a representative. Petitioner then declined to call any witnesses or present any documentary evidence, and admitted his guilt to the charge. Petitioner stated, " I was trying to contact my wife." (DHO Report at 1-2.)
In reaching a decision, the DHO made the following findings:
The inmate's due process rights were read and reviewed by the DHO to the inmate. The DHO confirmed the inmate received a copy of his incident report, and did not want to call any witnesses. The inmate decided to waive his right to a staff representative. The inmate had no documentary evidence to submit. The Notice of Rights Before the DHO form was amended, and the inmate signed this document. The DHO advised the inmate that the code was being amended to support the description of the incident. The inmate had no objection to the changing of the charge. The inmate understood his due process rights, and was ready to proceed with the DHO Hearing.
The DHO finds inmate JONES, Adam, Register Number 16133-040 committed the prohibited act of Use of Mail to Further Criminal Activity in violation of Code 396. The DHO relies upon the reporting officer's statement, which indicates[, " O]n January 6, 2014, at approximately 12:00 p.m., inmate JONES, Adam, Register Number 16133-040 came into R& D and dropped off " Legal Mail" . After inmate JONES left R& D I noticed it had the words " Legal Mail" typed on it. I researched the address and it was addressed to a house. 2605 Santa Barbara Dr., Grand Prairie, TX 75052. I then called the inmate back to R& D and questioned him about the address. He admitted that it wasn't legal mail. I opened the letter and it contained a letter to his mother and a letter to an inmate. I then gave the letter to SIS."
The DHO considered the inmate's statement at the DHO hearing in which, inmate JONES, Adam Register Number 16133-040, stated[, ] " I was trying to contact my wife."
The DHO considered the letter inmate JONES attempted to pass off as " Legal Mail" . Inmate JONES attempts to set up contact to his wife serving time at a federal prison camp via inmate JONES' mother because he does not have permission to correspond with his wife.
Based upon the greater weight of the evidence, the DHO is convinced inmate JONES, Adam, Register Number 16133-040, Use of Mail to Further Criminal Activity in violation of Code 396 [sic].
(DHO Report at 2.)
Finally, the DHO Report contains a section titled " Reason for Sanction or Action Taken, " and in that section the DHO stated:
Any action on the part of any inmate to abuse the mail system in the furtherance of criminal activity jeopardizes the security of the facility, and the safety of all others. The disallowance of good conduct time was imposed based on the inmate's sentence commitment and the severity of the offense. The loss of privilege sanctions [was] imposed to serve as punishment for the inmate's inappropriate behavior, and to affect the inmate's future behavior.
(DHO Report at 3.)
The written DHO Report was delivered to Petitioner via the institutional mail system on January 17, 2014. (DHO Report at 3.)
2.4 Petitioner's Disciplinary Hearing Satisfied Due Process
As shown above, Petitioner's disciplinary hearing satisfied all four requirements set forth in Hill and Wolff . The DHO Report affirmatively states Petitioner received advance written notice of the original disciplinary charge. He was also advised prior to the commencement of the hearing orally and in writing " that the code was being amended [to the less severe charge] to support the description of the incident, " and Petitioner had no objection, signed the relevant document, stated he understood his due process rights, and " was ready to proceed with the DHO Hearing." (DHO Report at 2.)
Moreover, the facts above establish Petitioner was provided an opportunity to call witnesses and present evidence, and the DHO Report provided a written statement by the DHO of the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action. Finally, the DHO's findings were unquestionably supported by " some evidence in the record, " specifically the reporting officer's statement that Petitioner falsely labeled as " legal mail" personal correspondence he was sending to his mother, which included a letter to be forwarded to his wife. Consequently, Petitioner's disciplinary hearing complied with the Due Process Clause because it met all four requirements for satisfying due process when GCT credits are at stake. Hill, 472 U.S. at 454; Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556, 563-67. As a result, Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief.
Moreover, Petitioner's contention that he was authorized to correspond with his wife, as well as the exhibits he attaches in support of that assertion, have no bearing on the Court's conclusion. Had Petitioner been found guilty of the original charge, Prohibited Act Code 296, his argument would be more persuasive, as that provision prohibits high severity abuses of the mail including " sending[] or receiving a letter or mail through unauthorized means" and " sending correspondence to a specific address with directions or intent to have the correspondence sent to an unauthorized person." See 28 C.F.R. § 541.3. But, the moderately-severe charge of mail abuse Petitioner was subsequently charged with and found guilty of, Prohibited Act Code 396, only requires that the inmate use the mail " to commit or further a Moderate category prohibited act." The moderate category includes less severe acts such as " [l]ying or providing a false statement to a staff member" (313) and " [c]ounterfeiting, forging, or unauthorized reproduction of any document, . . . ." (314). Id.
Here, the evidence established Petitioner falsely labeled a letter as " legal mail" when it was personal mail intended for his mother and wife, and when he was caught he admitted it was not legal mail. (DHO Report at 2.) Whether or not Petitioner was authorized to correspond with his wife, he was properly found guilty under Prohibited Act Code 396. Particularly in light of the fact this Court's inquiry into the evidence supporting the DHO's decision does not extend beyond " some evidence in the record, " the DHO's findings satisfied due process. See Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56 (" Ascertaining whether [the " some evidence" ] standard is satisfied does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.").
The foregoing establishes Petitioner's disciplinary hearing complied with the Due Process Clause, Hill, 472 U.S. at 454; Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556, 563-67, and Petitioner has not shown that any aspect of his disciplinary proceedings violated a constitutional or other federal right. Further, in light of the fact that the above conclusion " plainly appears from the [P]etition and [the] attached exhibits, " the Court must dismiss the Petition without ordering a responsive pleading. Habeas Rule 4; Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 656, 125 S.Ct. 2562, 162 L.Ed.2d 582 (2005).
Lastly, to the extent Petitioner claims that, by disallowing correspondence with his wife, prison officials are blocking his access to the courts or are in any way impeding his ability to pursue a legal action, Petitioner fails to raise a cognizable claim for federal habeas relief. See Crawford v. Bell, 599 F.2d 890, 891 (9th Cir. 1979) (" [T]he writ of habeas corpus is limited to attacks upon the legality or duration of confinement.").
3. RECOMMENDATION
In accordance with the foregoing, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an order: (1) accepting the findings and conclusions of this Report and Recommendation; and (2) directing that judgment be entered dismissing this action with prejudice.