Opinion
No. 01-3818
January 2, 2003
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is the unopposed motion of defendant Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. for summary judgment. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS defendant's motion.
I. Background
This case arises out of plaintiff's fall off of a ladder on a snubbing unit, which is a hydraulic mechanical device, on a fixed drilling platform owned by Chevron on December 14, 2000. Plaintiff claims that his fall and injuries were caused by the presence of hydraulic oil on the ladder. Defendant Hydraulic Well Control, Limited ("HWC"), not Chevron, owned and controlled the snubbing unit and ladder. Chevron did not exercise any supervision over the installation of the snubbing unit or the placement of the ladder on the rig.
HWC was performing workover services on Chevron's drilling platform pursuant to a Master Service Order and Agreement. Under this agreement, HWC was an independent contractor and was required to maintain safe procedures and abide by Chevron's safety rules. The agreement did not contain any provision in which Chevron retained control over HWC. Chevron's company man, Michael Wilkerson, oversaw the well operations, reported on daily operations, and conducted some of HWC's safety meetings along with other supervisors. The night before plaintiff's accident, Wilkerson held a safety meeting in which he ordered the entire platform to be cleaned. Plaintiff claims that Wilkerson made this order specifically to clean a hydraulic oil leak, whereas Wilkerson does not recall being aware of any leak and instead claims he made this order almost daily as a general practice.
Plaintiff sued defendants for negligence. Defendant Chevron moves for summary judgment on the grounds that it did not own or control the ladder on the snubbing unit, and that it cannot be held vicariously liable for any negligence of its independent contractor, HWC. Plaintiff and intervenor, Alaska National Insurance Company, do not oppose this motion. The Court rules as follows.
II. Discussion
A. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues as to any material facts, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). A court must be satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party or, in other words, "that the evidence favoring the nonmoving party is insufficient to enable a reasonable jury to return a verdict in her favor." Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 178 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511 (1986)). The moving party bears the burden of establishing that there are no genuine issues of material fact.
If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by merely pointing out that the evidence in the record contains insufficient proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2554; see also Lavespere, 910 F.2d at 178. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who must, by submitting or referring to evidence, set out specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. The nonmovant may not rest upon the pleadings, but must identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue exists for trial. See id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2553-54; Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1996)
B. Negligence Claims
Because there is no dispute that HWC, not Chevron, owned and controlled the snubbing unit, the Court turns to the issue of operational control. A principal, such as Chevron, cannot be liable for injuries resulting from the negligent acts of an independent contractor such as HWC unless (1) the liability arises from ultrahazardous activities performed by the contractor on behalf of the principal, or (2) the principal retains operational control over the contractor's acts or expressly or impliedly authorizes those acts. See Coulter v. Texaco, Inc., 117 F.3d 909, 911-12 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing cases). HWC's drilling activities are not ultrahazardous. See id. at 912; Ainsworth v. Shell Offshore Co., 829 F.2d 548, 550 (5th Cir. 1987). Therefore, the only relevant issue is whether Chevron retained operational control over or authorized any of HWC's activities that allegedly resulted in plaintiff's injuries.
The operational control exception first requires determining whether the principal has contractually reserved a right to control. See Coulter, 117 F.3d at 912 (citing Graham v. Amoco Oil Co., 21 F.3d 643, 645-46 (5th Cir. 1994); Ainsworth, 829 F.2d at 549-51). Here, the agreement between HWC and Chevron provides that HWC is an independent contractor, that HWC shall provide all materials, equipment, and labor, and that HWC is required to maintain safe procedures and abide by Chevron's safety rules. (See Def.'s Ex. 5 arts. 2, 13.) Nowhere does the agreement reserve the right of Chevron to control HWC. Further, courts have held that a principal may reserve the right to monitor its contractor's performance, station a "company man" on the platform to observe the contractor's activities, make safety recommendations to the contractor, and report continuing unsafe work practices or conditions, all without triggering the operational control exception. See Coulter, 117 F.3d at 912 (citing Graham, 21 F.3d at 646; Ainsworth, 829 F.2d at 550). Thus, the presence of Chevron's company man, Michael Wilkerson, on the platform and his supervisory involvement in the cleanup of HWC's snubbing unit do not lead to a conclusion that Chevron had operational control of HWC's snubbing unit. "[A]bsent an express or implied order to the contractor to engage in an unsafe work practice leading to an injury," a principal like Chevron cannot be liable under the operational control exception. See Id. There is no evidence that Chevron expressly or impliedly ordered HWC to engage in any unsafe work practice. In light of these undisputed facts and well-settled jurisprudence, therefore, Chevron cannot be liable for any injuries resulting from HWC's activities.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendant's motion for summary judgment.