Opinion
Case No. 2:19-cv-385-RMG-MGB
04-30-2019
Elijah Gaylon Jones, Plaintiff, v. T. Ervin, Mental Health Counselor; Marie Livingston, Mental Health Care Manager; Matthew Rotan, Corporal; John Crane, Sergeant; Raymond Goins, S.H.U. Sergeant, Mark Fleming, Sergeant; Delhm Campagna, Lieutenant; R. Hollister, Deputy Director; J. Vandermosten, Director; and Greenville County, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This is a civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee, is representing himself and is proceeding in forma pauperis. This matter is before the Court on initial screening. Under Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.), the assigned United States Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the complaint and to submit a recommendation to the United States District Judge. For the following reasons, the undersigned recommends that the complaint be summarily dismissed, in part.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is an inmate at the Greenville County Detention Center. The central claim in his complaint involves defendant Ervin, a mental health counselor at the jail. Plaintiff alleges that, shortly after he filed a grievance against Ervin, Ervin unconstitutionally retaliated by having Plaintiff transferred to solitary confinement for over a week. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 4.) Plaintiff also alleges defendant Livingston, Ervin's supervisor, participated in this retaliatory conduct. (Id.)
Plaintiff's claims against most of the other defendants involve how they allegedly responded to his reports of Ervin and Livingston's retaliation. First, he is suing defendants Rotan, Crane, Goins, Fleming, and Campagna, officers working in the jail. Plaintiff alleges each officer was deliberately indifferent to his constitutional rights because he told them about the retaliation, but they ignored him and failed to investigate it. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 4-5.)
Plaintiff next makes claims against defendants Vandermosten and Hollister, who are the jail's director and deputy director, respectively. Plaintiff alleges they ignored his retaliation claim and failed to train jail staff to properly handle retaliation claims. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 5-6.)
Finally, Plaintiff alleges defendant Greenville County was deliberately indifferent by housing him at a jail where administrators and officers have a custom of ignoring retaliation claims and are inadequately trained on responding to such claims. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 6.)
On March 4, the undersigned notified Plaintiff that portions of the complaint were subject to summary dismissal for failing to state a claim on which the Court could grant relief. (Dkt. No. 6 at 1-3.) The undersigned gave Plaintiff three weeks to cure the defects in his pleading by filing an amended complaint. (Id. at 3.) The undersigned warned Plaintiff that, if he did not file an amended complaint, she would recommend that the Court summarily dismiss the defective portions of the complaint. (Id.) Plaintiff did not any amended pleading.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints seeking redress from governmental entities, officers, or employees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Court must dismiss any prisoner complaints, or portions of complaints, that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. § 1915A(b). Those same criteria are grounds for dismissing a case filed by someone proceeding in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
As to failure to state a claim, a complaint filed in federal court "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When a court analyzes a complaint for facial plausibility, it must accept the factual allegations as true. Id. The court need not, however, accept as true the complaint's legal conclusions. Id. When "it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations," Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), the complaint fails to state a claim.
Because Plaintiff is pro se, the undersigned has screened the complaint liberally and considered whether it includes any potential grounds for relief. See, e.g., Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). That does not mean, however, the Court can ignore a clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim. Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1088 (1986).
DISCUSSION
Having carefully reviewed the complaint and its attachments, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has stated facially plausible claims against Ervin and Livingston. However, the undersigned Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against defendants Rotan, Crane, Goins, Fleming, Campagna, or Greenville County. Thus, the claims against those defendants should be dismissed. In addition, portions of Plaintiff's claims against the other defendants are subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a claim.
Plaintiff's retaliation claims against Ervin and Livingston are facially plausible retaliation claims. See Booker v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 855 F.3d 533, 540 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 755 (2018), and cert. denied sub nom. S.C. Dep't of Corr. v. Booker, 138 S. Ct. 755 (2018).
However, Plaintiff has not stated any valid claims against Rotan, Crane, Goins, Fleming, or Campagna. Plaintiff alleges each officer was deliberately indifferent to his constitutional rights because he told them about the retaliation, but they ignored him and failed to investigate it. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 4-5.) Plaintiff's allegations fail to state a § 1983 claim against those defendants. See Mays v. Smith, No. 5:18-CT-3186-FL, 2019 WL 958401, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 27, 2019) (allegations that prison guards failed to report retaliatory conduct did not state a violation of prisoner's constitutional rights); Roberts v. Lewis, No. 2:17-cv-177-RMG-MGB, 2017 WL 1148594, at *6 (D.S.C. Mar. 3, 2017) (allegations that defendants failed to investigate grievances did not state a § 1983 claim), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 1134717 (D.S.C. Mar. 24, 2017). Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff may be asserting those defendants are liable as bystanders, that claim fails because the complaint does not allege facts showing that those defendants knew Ervin or Livingston were violating Plaintiff's rights or that those defendants could have prevented the harm. See Randall v. Prince George's Cty., 302 F.3d 188, 204 (4th Cir. 2002) ("An officer may be liable under § 1983, on a theory of bystander liability, if he: (1) knows that a fellow officer is violating an individual's constitutional rights; (2) has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm; and (3) chooses not to act.").
Plaintiff also fails to state a claim against the County. Plaintiff alleges the County was deliberately indifferent by housing him at a jail where officers have a custom of ignoring retaliation claims and are inadequately trained on responding to such claims. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 6.) A county can be liable under § 1983 only if the execution of its policy or custom caused a violation of the plaintiff's federal rights. Penley v. McDowell Cty. Bd. of Educ., 876 F.3d 646, 653 (4th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). In South Carolina, sheriffs—not counties—are responsible for the operation of county jails. See S.C. Code Ann. § 24-5-10 ("The sheriff shall have custody of the jail in his county and, if he appoint a jailer to keep it, the sheriff shall be liable for such jailer and the sheriff or jailer shall receive and safely keep in prison any person delivered or committed to either of them, according to law."). And sheriffs are state officials, not arms of counties. Cobb v. South Carolina, No. 2:13-cv-2370-RMG, 2014 WL 4220423, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 25, 2014). Consequently, counties generally are not liable under § 1983 for incidents occurring in jails. See id. Because Plaintiff's claims all arise out of incidents at the Greenville County Detention Center, and Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing how the County exercised any control over the Center, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Greenville County.
Next, Plaintiff alleges Vandermosten and Hollister ignored his retaliation claim and failed to train jail officers to properly handle retaliation claims. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 5-6.) Construed liberally, the allegations about Vandermosten and Hollister ignoring his claims appear to be valid claims of bystander and/or supervisory liability, and therefore they pass screening. See Mays, 2019 WL 958401, at *3 (finding prisoner's allegations that prison warden and administrator ignored officers' retaliatory acts could be claims for supervisory or bystander liability and thus withstood § 1915A screening). However, Plaintiff's claim that Vandermosten and Hollister failed to properly train officers about inmate retaliation is subject to dismissal. A plaintiff seeking to hold a supervisor liable under § 1983 for failure to train must plead and prove (1) the subordinates actually violated the plaintiff's constitutional or statutory rights; (2) the supervisor failed to train properly the subordinates thus illustrating a "deliberate indifference" to the rights of the persons with whom the subordinates come into contact; and (3) this failure to train actually caused the subordinates to violate the plaintiff's rights. McBeth v. City of Union, No. 7:15-cv-1473-BHH, 2018 WL 4594987, at *17 (D.S.C. Sept. 25, 2018) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The complaint fails to allege facts establishing the first element because, as discussed above, the subordinate officers did not violate Plaintiff's rights by ignoring his reports of retaliation.
Finally, Plaintiff indicates he is suing Defendants in both their individual and official capacities, and Plaintiff's prayer for relief includes a demand for damages. (Dkt No. 1 at 2-3, 5; Dkt. 1-1 at 2-3). The Eleventh Amendment bars damages claims against state actors in their official capacities. See Will v. Mich. Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989). Thus, the portions of Plaintiff's complaint seeking damages from any defendant in his or her official capacity is subject to summary dismissal.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the undersigned recommends that the Court dismiss (1) Plaintiff's claims against Rotan, Crane, Goins, Fleming, Campagna, and Greenville County; (2) Plaintiff's failure-to-train claims against Vandermosten and Hollister; and (3) the portions of the complaint requesting money damages against any defendant in his or her official capacity.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
/s/_________
MARY GORDON BAKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE April 30, 2019 Charleston,
South Carolina
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the Important Notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).