Opinion
1:23-CV-00199-RAL
10-20-2023
WILLIAM JONES, Plaintiff v. CHCA EDWARDS, DR. BAIRD, PA STROUP, PA JACOBSON, PABON, BLUMENSTEIN, DOUGHERTY, FOX, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES; Defendants
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER ECF NOS. 10,14
RICHARD A. LANZILLO, CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Now pending before the Court are two motions seeking temporary restraining orders filed by the Plaintiff, William Jones “Jones”). See ECF Nos. 10, 14. The motions have been referred to the Undersigned for a Report and Recommendation. For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that both motions be Denied.
Jones is a state prisoner currently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Albion. He first filed a motion for temporary restraining order on October 4, 2023, prior to the granting of his motion to proceed in forma pauperis. See ECF No. 10 (TRO motion); ECF No. 12 (order granting IFP). His Complaint was docketed on October 17, 2023, (ECF No. 13) and his second motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction (ECF No. 14) was docketed the same day. The Complaint raises claims of excessive force and deliberate indifference in connection with an incident that took place on April 29, 2023, against employees of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections. See ECF No. 13, generally. Jones' Complaint has not yet been served, however.
Motions for preliminary injunctive relief, including those for a TRO, are governed by Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and are judged against exacting legal standards.To obtain a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order, a movant “must satisfy the traditional four-factor test: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) he or she will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) granting relief will not result in even greater harm to the non-moving party; and (4) the public interest favors such relief.” Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139,147 (3d Cir. 2010). It is the movant's burden to show a likelihood of success on the merits. Campbell Soup Co. v. ConAgra Inc., 911 F.2d 86, 90 (3d Cir. 1992).
Pursuant to Rule 65(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a “court may issue a preliminary injunction only on notice to the adverse party.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(a)(1). In contrast, a “court may issue a temporary restraining order without written or oral notice to the adverse party or its attorney” if certain conditions are met. Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(b)(1).
Preliminary injunctive relief “is not granted as a matter of right.” Kershner v. Mazurkiewicz, 670 F.2d 440, 443 (3d Cir. 1982), see also Thomas v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 2014 WL 3955105, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 2014) (“An injunction is an ‘extraordinary remedy' that is never awarded as of right.”). Instead, the decision to grant or deny such relief is committed to the discretion of the district court. United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 210 (3d Cir. 1982).
Generally, preliminary injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy that places precise burdens on the moving party, and “[t]he preliminary injunction must be the only way of protecting the plaintiff from harm.” Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 801 (3d Cir. 1989). “It has been well stated that upon an application for a preliminary injunction to doubt is to deny.” Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Braddock, 90 F.2d 924, 927 (3d Cir. 1937). Further, where the requested preliminary injunctive relief “is directed not merely at preserving the status quo but... at providing mandatory relief, the burden on the moving party is particularly heavy.” Punnet v. Carter, 621 F.2d 578, 582 (3d Cir. 1980). Mandatory injunctions should be used sparingly. United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 212 (3d Cir. 1982).
For Jones to sustain his burden of proof that he is entitled to preliminary injunctive relief under Rule 65, he must demonstrate both a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm if the requested relief is not granted. Abu-Jamal v. Price, 154 F.3d 128,133 (3d Cir. 1998); Kershner, 670 F.2d at 443. “As these elements suggest, there must be ‘a relationship between the injury claimed in the party's motion and the conduct asserted in the complaint.' ” Ball v. Famiglio, 396 Fed.Appx. 836, 837 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Little v. Jones, 607 F.3d 1245, 1251 (10th Cir. 2010)) (quoting Devose v. Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th Cir. 1994)). “To establish a reasonable probability of success on the merits, the moving party must produce sufficient evidence to satisfy the essential elements of the underlying cause of action.” Sutton v. Cerullo, 2014 WL 3900235, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2014). To establish irreparable injury, “the moving party must establish that the harm is imminent and probable.” Stilp v. Contino, 629 F.Supp.2d 449,466 (M.D. Pa. 2009). “The mere risk of injury is not sufficient to meet this standard.” Id. And the burden of showing irreparable injury “is not an easy burden” to meet. Moore v. Mann, 2014 WL 3893903, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Aug 7, 2014). In assessing a motion for preliminary injunctive relief, the court must also consider the harm to the defendants and whether granting the preliminary injunction will be in the public interest. New Jersey Retail Merchants Assn v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 669 F.3d 374, 388 (3d Cir. 2012).
Importantly, in the prison context, a request for injunctive relief “must always be viewed with great caution because ‘judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing with the complex and intractable problems of prison administration.' ” Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Rogers v. Scurr, 676 F.2d 1211,1214 (8th Cir. 1982)). Where a plaintiff requests an injunction that would require the Court to interfere with the administration of a prison, “appropriate consideration must be given to principles of federalism in determining the availability and scope of equitable relief.” Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379 (1976). The federal courts are not overseers of the day-to-day management of prisons. Prison officials require broad discretionary authority as the “operation of a correctional institution is at best an extraordinarily difficult undertaking.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974). Accordingly, prison administrators should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that are needed to preserve internal order and to maintain institutional security. Beard v. Banks, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 2578 (2006); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979).
With the above considerations in mind, neither of Jones' motions demonstrates that a temporary restraining order is warranted in this case. His first motion is factually sparse and fails to assert any injury, let alone an irreparable one. Instead, Jones only asks the Court to order the Defendants to “be 500 feet from the Plaintiff, Mr. Jones,” and that all Defendants “not be employed were [sic] the Plaintiff is housed at.” ECF No. 10, ¶¶ 1-2. The lack of an allegation of irreparable harm is fatal to his motion for injunctive relief.
The second motion (ECF No. 14) is more specific. There, Jones reiterates the physical injuries he sustained during the alleged excessive force incident in April of 2023. See ECF No. 14, p. 1. Then, Jones relates that on June 14, 2023, he was approached by a non-defendant prison official and told to “stop filing grievances.” Id. He then states that he is being housed in a cell with no mattress, no blanket, or sheets, that I am sleeping on a metal bunk that causes a lot of distress and extreme pain and I have not been fed on breakfast, lunch, & dinner or received a shower or exercise,” Id. Jones then claims he was denied his “psych medication that I take for my mental health” on June 21, 2023. Id.
Jones' second motion is improper because he is attempting to raise new claims against new defendants based on conditions of his confinement in June of 2023, which he cannot do in a motion for injunctive relief. See, e.g, Naranjo v. Ivicic, 2022 WL 16951956, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 1, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 16950425 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 2022). Jones cannot amend or supplement his complaint by filing a motion for injunctive relief in which he raises new claims against new defendants. See id. Further, Jones cannot use a motion for injunctive relief to avoid the requirements of the Prison Litigation Reform Act. That is, if he wants to pursue claims based on allegations raised in his motion for TRO, he must first fully exhaust all available administrative remedies before filing a civil rights complaint related to prison conditions. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). And finally, Jones cannot use a motion for injunctive relief to make the Court the overseer of the day-to-day management of the prison system, including housing assignments. Id. See also Dickson v. McGrady, 2012 WL 1205643, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 11, 2012) (new claims against new defendants is not a proper basis for a motion for TRO).
Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that both of Jones' motions for injunctive relief (ECF No. 10 and ECF No. 14) be denied.
Notice Regarding Objections
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), Fed.R.Civ.P. 72((b)(2), and Local Rule 72(D)(2), the parties are permitted to file written objections in accordance with the schedule established in the docket entry reflecting the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Failure to timely file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011). Any party opposing objections may file their response to the objections within fourteen (14) days thereafter in accordance with Local Civil Rule 72(D)(2).