Opinion
3:20-cv-01270-MK
07-26-2021
JONATHAN D., [1] Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRAITON, Defendant.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
MUSTAFA T. KASUBHAI (He / Him) United States Magistrate Judge
Jonathan D. (“Plaintiff”) brings this appeal challenging the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration's (“Commissioner”) denial of his applications for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. The Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3), which incorporates the review provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). For the reasons explained below, the Commissioner's decision should be affirmed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The district court may set aside a denial of benefits only if the Commissioner's findings are “‘not supported by substantial evidence or [are] based on legal error.'” Bray v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006)). Substantial evidence is defined as “‘more than a mere scintilla [of evidence] but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'” Id. (quoting Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995)).
The district court “cannot affirm the Commissioner's decision ‘simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.'” Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1201 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999)). Instead, the district court must consider the entire record, weighing the evidence that both supports and detracts from the Commissioner's conclusions. Id. Where the record as a whole can support either a grant or a denial of Social Security benefits, the district court “‘may not substitute [its] judgment for the [Commissioner's].'” Bray, 554 F.3d at 1222 (quoting Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 2007)).
BACKGROUND
I. PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATIONS
Born in May 1976, Plaintiff was 40 years old on his alleged onset date of August 5, 2016. (Tr. 17.) Plaintiff protectively filed his applications for DIB and SSI on August 24, 2016, alleging disability due to bipolar disorder, anxiety disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), neurocognitive disorder, and obesity. (Tr. 17.)
The Commissioner denied Plaintiff's applications initially and upon reconsideration. Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) and appeared and testified before ALJ Linda Thomasson at two separate administrative hearings. (Tr. 19.) After the hearings, ALJ Thomasson issued a written decision dated March 24, 2020, denying Plaintiff's applications. (Tr. 13-29.) The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review, making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (Tr. 3-8.) Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of that decision.
II. THE SEQUENTIAL ANALYSIS
A claimant is considered disabled if he or she is unable to “engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which . . . has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). “Social Security Regulations set out a five-step sequential process for determining whether an applicant is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act.” Keyser v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 648 F.3d 721, 724 (9th Cir. 2011). Those five steps are: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in any substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the impairment meets or equals a listed impairment; (4) whether the claimant can return to any past relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant is capable of performing other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. Id. at 724-25. The claimant bears the burden of proof for the first four steps. Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2001). If the claimant fails to meet the burden at any of those steps, the claimant is not disabled. Id.; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-41 (1987).
The Commissioner bears the burden of proof at step five of the sequential analysis, where the Commissioner must show the claimant can perform other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy, “taking into consideration the claimant's residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience.” Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1100. If the Commissioner fails to meet this burden, the claimant is disabled. Bustamante, 262 F.3d at 954 (citations omitted).
III.THE ALJ'S DECISION
The ALJ applied the five-step sequential evaluation process to determine if Plaintiff is disabled. (Tr. 18.) At step one, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his alleged onset date of August 5, 2016. (Tr. 18.) At step two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffered from the severe impairments of bipolar disorder, anxiety disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), neurocognitive disorder, and obesity. (Tr. 19.)
At step three, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or equals a listed impairment. (Tr. 19.) The ALJ then concluded that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform medium work with the following limitations:
[Plaintiff] can frequently climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds, kneel, crouch, and crawl. He is limited to performing work with a reasoning level of 2. He also is limited to performing simple routine and repetitive tasks and making simple work related decisions. He can have no public contact and he can have occasional contact with supervisors.(Tr. 20.)
At step four, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had no past relevant work. At step five, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff could perform a significant number of jobs in the national economy, including salvage laborer, hand packager, and laundry worker. (Tr. 28.) The ALJ therefore concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled. (Tr. 29.)
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by (1) failing to incorporate Plaintiff's moderate limitations into the RFC; (2) improperly rejecting Plaintiff's subjective symptom testimony; and (3) improperly rejecting the lay witness testimony.
DISCUSSION
I. LIMITATIONS IN THE RFC
Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ failed to properly include in the RFC his moderate difficulties in understanding, remembering, and applying information; in interacting with others; and in concentrating, persisting, and maintaining pace. Plaintiff argues, specifically, that the evidence of record does not support the ALJ's conclusion that he can maintain concentration, persistence, or pace on even simple tasks, given his moderate difficulties, citing the unpublished opinion Brink v. Comm'r, 343 Fed.Appx. 211 (9th Cir. 2009). Noting that the ALJ in Brink accepted that the claimant had difficulty with concentration, persistence, and pace, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the ALJ's subsequent failure to include a limitation beyond “simple, repetitive work” in the claimant's RFC was error. Id. at 213.
Here, the ALJ limited Plaintiff to “simple, routine, repetitive tasks” in the RFC formulation, and did not include Plaintiff's moderate impairment in concentration, persistence, or pace in his RFC. (Tr. 20.) These findings, however, accord with the Ninth Circuit's holding in Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2008), where the Court found that an ALJ's decision to translate evidence of moderate limitation in pace and mental functioning into a concrete restriction to simple tasks was consistent with medical evidence showing the claimant was not significantly limited in her ability to maintain attention and concentration for extended periods. Id. at 1174. Similarly, the ALJ in this case determined that Plaintiff had moderate mental impairments and accordingly limited Plaintiff to performing only jobs that require a reasoning level of 2 or less, and work that involves only simple, routine and repetitive tasks. (Tr. 20.) Under SSA regulations, if a claimant is determined to have “moderate” limitations in a particular area, his “functioning in this area independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis is fair.” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App'x 1, 12.00F(2)(c).
The ALJ's RFC formulation is supported by the medical opinions of record, including the opinions of two psychologists who opined that Plaintiff was capable of maintaining concentration, persistence, and pace when carrying out simple instructions. (Tr. 90-91, 102-03.) Plaintiff does not contest the ALJ's acceptance of these opinions; only her interpretations of them. Further, Plaintiff's treating mental health provider assessed no limitations in understanding, remembering, and applying information, or persisting and maintaining adequate pace. (Tr. 591.) Examining psychologist Marc Stuckey, Psy.D., opined that Plaintiff suffered from only moderate limitations in understanding and remembering complex instructions, with no limitation in understanding and remembering simple instructions, and no difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace. (Tr. 598-99.) On this record, because the ALJ's assessment is consistent with the credited medical opinions, her assessment “adequately captures restrictions related to concentration, persistence, or pace … consistent with the restrictions identified in the medical testimony.” Stubbs-Danielson, 539 F.3d at 1174. The ALJ's RFC formulation is based on substantial evidence in the record and does not constitute harmful error.
II. SUBJECTIVE SYMPTOM TESTIMONY
Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ improperly rejected his subjective symptom testimony. The ALJ is required to provide specific, clear and convincing reasons for rejecting a claimant's testimony. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1017 (9th Cir. 2014). At the administrative hearing, Plaintiff testified that he cycled between either severe depression that caused him to sleep for days, or a manic state, which made him extremely paranoid. (Tr. 60, 65, 73.) Plaintiff also testified that he suffered from mood swings and difficulty completing tasks, and that he was completely disabled primarily due to his mental limitations.
The ALJ rejected Plaintiff's testimony to the extent that it conflicted with the RFC. First, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff's testimony regarding the severity of his symptoms and limitations was contradicted by the medical evidence of record. An ALJ may discount a claimant's statements if medical opinion evidence contradicts the claimant's subjective testimony. Carmickle v. Comm'r, 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008). Here, while Plaintiff complained of severe and debilitating mental symptoms, his mental status examinations were largely normal, with no evidence of severe depressive symptoms or significant symptoms of mania that Plaintiff alleged in his testimony. (Tr. 328, 344-45, 352-53, 360-61.) Further, Plaintiff's medical providers expressed a belief that Plaintiff was not disabled from a mental health perspective and had no limitations in understanding, remembering, and applying information, or persisting and maintaining adequate pace. (Tr. 331, 591.) As noted above, the reviewing psychologists opined that Plaintiff had no more than moderate mental limitations that did not prevent him from performing job tasks. (Tr. 90-91, 102-03.) Again, Plaintiff does not contest the ALJ's acceptance of the medical evidence; only her interpretation of it. Where rational, however, the ALJ's interpretation of the record must be affirmed. Because the ALJ presented and discussed clear and convincing reasons to reject Plaintiff's testimony regarding his extreme and debilitating mental limitations, the ALJ's reasoning should be affirmed. Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1161.
III. LAY WITNESS TESTIMONY
Plaintiff argues, finally, that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinions of lay witnesses Richard D., Tiffany D., and Carol D. (Tr. 284-76, 287-90, 291-93.) An ALJ may discount a lay witness's testimony if she provides germane reasons for doing so. Valentine v. Comm'r, Here, the ALJ found that the lay statements from Plaintiff's family members largely echoed Plaintiff's testimony regarding his symptoms and limitations. For example, Tiffany D. opined that Plaintiff has frequent mood swings and disrupted sleep. (Tr. 240.) Plaintiff's father, Richard D., testified that Plaintiff suffers from severe symptoms including mood swings and angry outbursts. (Tr. 284.) Plaintiff's mother, Carol D., testified that Plaintiff has difficulty completing tasks and functioning socially. (Tr. 292.) Because this testimony mirrors Plaintiff's subjective symptoms testimony, which ALJ provided legally sufficient reasons for rejecting, the ALJ also provided germane reasons for rejecting the lay statements. Valentine, The ALJ's reasoning is supported by substantial evidence and should therefore be affirmed.
RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons stated, the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence and should be AFFIRMED.
This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment or appealable order. The parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the court. Thereafter, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any factual determination of the Magistrate Judge will be considered as a waiver of a party's right to de novo consideration of the factual issues and will constitute a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to this recommendation.