To this end, we have said that evidence is considered intrinsic to the charged offense when it is "(1) an uncharged offense arising from the same transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense; (2) necessary to complete the story of the crime; or (3) inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense." Johnson v. State , 312 Ga. 481, 491 (4), 863 S.E.2d 137 (2021) (punctuation omitted). Accord Williams , 302 Ga. at 485, 807 S.E.2d 350 (IV) (d), 807 S.E.2d 350 (citing United States v. Edouard , 485 F.3d 1324, 1344 (II) (C) (11th Cir. 2007) ).

[18–21] Appellant argues that the trial court nevertheless abused its discretion in admitting the robbery victim’s testimony because it should have been excluded under Rule 403. "[I]ntrinsic evidence must satisfy [Rule 403]," Johnson v. State, 312 Ga. 481, 491 (4), 863 S.E.2d 137 (2021), which provides in relevant part that "[r]elevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice," OCGA § 24-4-403. "[E]xclusion of evidence under Rule 403 is an extraordinary remedy which should be used only sparingly."

Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse his discretion in determining that the evidence of McCloud’s marijuana use — which, as noted above, the trial court limited to McCloud’s appearance and statements at the hospital — was intrinsic to the charges against him. See Johnson, v. State, 312 Ga. 481, 491-492 (4), 863 S.E.2d 137 (2021) (holding that evidence of the defendant’s involvement in uncharged shootings was intrinsic to the charged crime of criminal gang activity because the evidence was probative of the state’s theory that the defen- dant was involved in other shootings as part of his gang "work", and so it was reasonably necessary to complete the story of the charged crime); Smith, 307 Ga. at 271-272 (2) (c), 834 S.E.2d 1 (holding that evidence that the defendant and another person had been seen using and possibly selling drugs on the street corner where a shooting occurred was intrinsic to the charged crimes connected with that shooting because the evidence advanced the state’s theory that the shooting was the culmination of a series of drug-related robberies). See also Roberts, 315 Ga. at 236-237 (2) (b), 880 S.E.2d 501 (limited evidence of an uncharged crime may be admissible as intrinsic even if evidence of the crime as a whole is not intrinsic).

See White v. State, 319 Ga. 367, 380 (b) (i), 903 S.E.2d 891 (2024) (noting the trial court’s "implicit conclusion that the danger of unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence" pursuant to Rule 403). See also Johnson v. State, 312 Ga. 481, 494 (4), 863 S.E.2d 137 (2021) (concluding no error "in the trial court’s implicit conclusion that the probative value of the … evidence was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect"). See also Brewner v. State, 302 Ga. 6, 10, 804 S.E.2d 94 2017 (holding that while "[t]he trial court never did issue any express ruling on the 404 (b) motion," it "implicitly granted the motion by allowing [the evidence] at trial").

As relevant here, that means we not only look at the closing argument in which the allegedly offending statements were made, but also the jury instructions that preceded them. See Johnson v. State, 312 Ga. 481, 490-491 (3), 863 S.E.2d. 137 (2021) (considering the trial court’s preliminary instructions, as well as the final charge, to determine whether the jury was "adequately informed" of the applicable law). After the trial court swore the jury in, the trial court gave the jury preliminary instructions, which included the following: (1) "[t]he defendant is presumed innocent until he is proven guilty"; (2) "[t]he defendant enters upon the trial of the case with a presumption of innocence in his favor," which "remains with the defendant until it is overcome by the State with evidence that is sufficient to convince you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the crime or crimes charged"; (3) "[t]he burden of proof rests upon the State to prove every material allegation of the indictment and every essential element of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt"; (4) "[t]here is no burden of proof upon the defendant whatsoever, and the burden never shifts to the defendant to prove h

The trial court agreed with the prosecution that the prior injuries were admissible as intrinsic evidence - not falling under Rule 404 (b) - because they allowed the State to explain and rebut the testimony of Sconyers’s expert. See Johnson v. State, 312 Ga. 481, 491 (4), 863 S.E.2d 137 (2021) (Evidence is intrinsic when it is "necessary to complete the story of the crime." (citation and punctuation omitted)). The trial court also found that the evidence satisfied OCGA § 24-4-403 ("Rule 403").

We agree that, standing alone, this part of the verdict form — specifically, the unnecessary insertion of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard with respect to the presence of mitigating circumstances — is inartful and potentially confusing. But it is axiomatic that we do not assess jury charges in isolation; rather, we "consider them as a whole to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury improperly applied a challenged instruction." Johnson v. State , 312 Ga. 481, 490 (3), 863 S.E.2d 137 (2021). And in light of the charges as a whole, Locklear has not shown that the inartful nature of the verdict form likely affected the outcome of the proceedings.

See Jones , 302 Ga. at 897 (3), 810 S.E.2d 140 (assessing effect of arguably misleading instruction by reference to jury instructions in their totality). See also Johnson v. State , 312 Ga. 481, 490 (3), 863 S.E.2d 137 (2021) (noting that, in determining the impact of a challenged instruction, "we do not evaluate jury charges in isolation, but rather consider them as a whole") (citation and punctuation omitted). And as with other trial errors, in assessing harm "we review the record de novo, and we weigh the evidence as we would expect reasonable jurors to have done so."

As a result, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Wilson v. State, 315 Ga. 728, 740 (8) (a), 883 S.E.2d 802 (2023); see also Johnson v. State, 312 Ga. 481, 491 (4), 863 S.E.2d 137 (2021) ("[T]he exclusion of relevant evidence under Rule 403 is an extraordinary remedy that trial courts should grant only sparingly.") (citation and punctuation omitted).

We evaluate the sufficiency of evidence by determining whether a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Johnson v. State , 312 Ga. 481, 487 (2), 863 S.E.2d 137 (2021).