Opinion
No. C8-96-262.
Filed August 13, 1996.
Appeal from the Department of Economic Security, File No. 8918UC95.
Lillian L. Johnson, (relator pro se).
Ruth Huntrods, (for respondent Sholom Home).
Kent E. Todd, (for respondent Commissioner of Economic Security).
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1994).
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Relator Lillian L. Johnson appeals the decision of the Commissioner's representative that she voluntarily quit her job without good cause attributable to her employer. We affirm.
DECISION
The narrow standard of review requires that findings be viewed in the light most favorable to the decision, and if there is evidence reasonably tending to sustain them, they will not be disturbed.
White v. Metropolitan Medical Ctr., 332 N.W.2d 25, 26 (Minn. 1983). This court reviews the decision of the Commissioner's representative, not that of the reemployment insurance judge. Tuff v. Knitcraft Corp., 526 N.W.2d 50, 51 (Minn. 1995).
Resolution of conflicting testimony lies with the Commissioner. This court will not question the credibility determinations made by the Commissioner's representative.
Nelson v. Bemidji Regional Interdistrict Council, 359 N.W.2d 38, 41 (Minn.App. 1984).
Johnson argues that the findings of the Commissioner's representative do not support the conclusion that she voluntarily quit her job without good cause attributable to her employer. She contends there is ample evidence in the record to show that the tender of her resignation was attributable to poor working conditions and the unreasonable demands made by her supervisor.
Johnson claims that, in an attempt by her employer to force her out of a job, she was (1) assigned the additional job duty of processing the incoming mail; (2) told by her employer that overtime would not be available to complete her job tasks; and (3) forced to work under hazardous conditions. She argues that it is obvious that her supervisor purposely tried to pressure her into accepting additional job duties, and therefore the decision of the Commissioner's representative cannot be sustained by the facts.
A person who voluntarily quits a job without good cause attributable to the employer is disqualified from receiving benefits for a certain period of time. Minn. Stat. § 268.09, subd. 1(a) (1994). The employer has the burden of proving whether an employee voluntarily quit. Marz v. Department of Employment Servs., 256 N.W.2d 287, 289 (Minn. 1977). Whether an employee had good cause to quit is a question of law that "is not binding on the court if it does not have reasonable support in the findings."
Zepp v. Arthur Treacher Fish Chips, Inc., 272 N.W.2d 262, 263 (Minn. 1978).
"Good cause" to quit has been defined as a reason that is "real, not imaginary, substantial not trifling, and reasonable, not whimsical; there must be some compulsion produced by extraneous and necessitous circumstances." Ferguson v. Department of Employment Servs., 311 Minn. 34, 44 n. 5, 247 N.W.2d 895, 900 n. 5 (1976). "Good cause" does not require employer negligence, fault, or wrongfulness. Hanson v. I.D.S.
Properties Management Co., 308 Minn. 422, 425 n. 1, 242 N.W.2d 833, 835 n. 1 (1976). A personality conflict or irreconcilable differences between an employee and a supervisor or coworker does not provide the employee with good cause to quit a job.
Trego v. Hennepin County Family Day Care Ass'n, 409 N.W.2d 23, 26 (Minn.App. 1987).
The Commissioner's representative concluded that Johnson had not quit her job with good cause attributable to her employer.
Although Johnson claimed that health problems would prevent her from completing her new job assignments, the representative found that she had not presented any evidence to support that proposition. The representative found that Johnson believed the additional responsibilities would take more time, but concluded that Johnson had not shown that she would go uncompensated for any additional hours worked. Concluding that Johnson did not quit for good cause attributable to her employer, the Commissioner's representative noted that Johnson could have attempted to complete all of her responsibilities as best she could in the time allotted and, if unable to complete all of the tasks, to then inform her supervisor.
On review of the record, we hold that the findings of the Commissioner's representative are supported by substantial evidence. We recognize that the assignment of handling the incoming mail may have constituted a substantial addition to Johnson's job duties. We agree, however, with the finding of the Commissioner's representative that had Johnson attempted to complete the added task and failed, a different result may have been reached. Under these circumstances, we believe that Johnson had a duty to attempt to comply with her employer's directive. We are not directed to any evidence to show that Johnson attempted to comply with her employer's request and was then criticized or disciplined by her employer for failing to complete the tasks assigned. We therefore cannot conclude that Johnson's voluntary resignation was for good cause attributable to her employer.