Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc.

17 Citing cases

  1. In re Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases

    699 F. Supp. 233 (D. Haw. 1988)   Cited 7 times

    It is clear that under Hawaii law, "in a strict liability action, state-of-the-art evidence is not admissible for the purpose of establishing whether the seller knew or reasonably should have known of the dangerousness of his or her product." Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 68 Haw. ___, 740 P.2d 548, 549 (1987). The seller's knowledge of the dangers inherent in it's product, "although highly relevant to a negligence action, has absolutely no bearing on the elements of a strict products liability claim."

  2. In re Asbestos Cases

    829 F.2d 907 (9th Cir. 1987)   Cited 4 times

    This appeal raises a controlling question of Hawaii State tort law which we certified to the Supreme Court of Hawaii and which that court has now decided. See Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., ___ Haw. ___, 740 P.2d 548 (1987). Because the decision of the Supreme Court of Hawaii conflicts with the ruling of the district court in this case, we reverse and remand.

  3. Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.

    53 Cal.3d 987 (Cal. 1991)   Cited 267 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding that "knowledge, actual or constructive, is a requisite for strict liability for failure to warn."

    Not before us is the issue whether state-of-the-art evidence is admissible in design defect cases, whether tried on the "risk/benefit" or the "consumer expectation" theory.In re Asbestos Cases (9th Cir. 1987) 829 F.2d 907; Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. (1987) 69 Haw. 287 [ 740 P.2d 548]; In re Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases (D.Hawaii 1986) 665 F. Supp. 1454. Defendants asserted that when plaintiff struck his cause of action for punitive damages, he necessarily struck the allegations of failure to warn.

  4. KEALOHA v. E. I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND CO

    82 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 1996)   Cited 17 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Affirming under Hawaii law that bulk supplier of PTFE provided to knowledgeable intermediary for the manufacture of implants was entitled to summary judgment on claims brought by implant recipient

    Under Hawaii strict product liability law, a defendant is only liable if a plaintiff can show "that the seller is engaged in the business of selling the product, that the product contains a defect dangerous to the user or consumer, and that the defect is the cause of the injury." Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 740 P.2d 548, 549 (Haw. 1987) (on certified question from the Ninth Circuit) (citing Ontai v. Straub Clinic and Hosp., 659 P.2d 734, 739 (Haw. 1983)); see In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases, 960 F.2d 806, 815 (9th Cir. 1992). "A product is dangerously defective if it does not meet the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer or user as to its safety."

  5. In re Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases

    960 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1992)   Cited 124 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding that suppliers of insulation products containing asbestos to the Navy could not invoke defense where suppliers "simply failed to allege, let alone establish, that . . . they were acting in compliance with `reasonably precise specifications' imposed on them by the United States"

    We, therefore, hold that in a strict products liability action, state-of-the-art evidence is not admissible for the purpose of establishing whether the seller knew or reasonably should have known of the dangerousness of his or her product." Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 69 Haw. 287, 740 P.2d 548, 549 (1987) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). While the Hawaii Supreme Court interpreted the question we certified to it narrowly, and thus purported to decide only that evidence regarding a defendant's actual or constructive knowledge of the perils of its products is irrelevant in cases where a plaintiff challenges the inherent dangerousness of those products, 740 P.2d at 549 n. 2, we construed its ruling as applying to suits challenging the adequacy of a defendant's warnings as well.

  6. Mullaney v. Hilton Hotels Corp.

    634 F. Supp. 2d 1130 (D. Haw. 2009)   Cited 25 times
    Holding that Defendant's assertion of "any and all defenses under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c) as they may apply" was "not in keeping with notice requirements of federal court pleadings" and was "not sufficient to properly raise any specific affirmative defense"

    "[I]n a strict products liability action, the issue of whether the seller knew or reasonably should have known of the dangers inherent in his or her product is irrelevant to the issue of liability." Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 69 Haw. 287, 288, 740 P.2d 548, 549 (1987). "Although highly relevant to a negligence action, it has absolutely no bearing on the elements of a strict products liability claim."

  7. In re Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases

    854 F. Supp. 702 (D. Haw. 1994)   Cited 20 times
    Holding that wrongful death action brought within two years of date of death from asbestosis but more than two years after diagnosis accrued at time of death of decedent rather than at time of injury

    The statute of limitations commences to run on a products liability action on the earliest date that a plaintiff knows, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should know of the following elements: (1) that the defendant is engaged in the business of manufacturing or selling the product; (2) that the product contains a defect dangerous to the user or consumer; and (3) that the defect is the cause of his injury. Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 69 Haw. 287, 740 P.2d 548, 549 (1987). A product is dangerously defective if "it does not meet the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer or user as to its safety."

  8. Tabieros v. Clark Equipment Co.

    85 Haw. 336 (Haw. 1997)   Cited 152 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Recognizing that while "physical injury to the claimant, overt symptoms or manifestations of emotional distress, the actual witnessing of the tortious event, and/or supporting expert or medical testimony are not prerequisites to [a negligent infliction of emotional distress] claim, the presence or absence of these factors may nevertheless be relevant to establishing the existence of `serious' emotional distress as a response to a tortious event."

    Although highly relevant to a negligence action, it has absolutely no bearing on the elements of a strict products liability claim.Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 69 Haw. 287, 288-89, 740 P.2d 548, 549 (1987) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But cf. Maneely v. General Motors Corp., 108 F.3d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 1997) (summarizing California law as follows: "To establish a failure to warn claim, a plaintiff must prove that the manufacturer had a duty to warn of the dangers arising from a foreseeable use of the product and that the breach of that duty was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.

  9. Evans v. Gilead Scis., Inc.

    Case No. 20-cv-00123-DKW-KJM (D. Haw. Aug. 31, 2020)   Cited 6 times

    "[I]n a strict products liability action, the issue of whether the seller knew or reasonably should have known of the dangers inherent in his or her product . . . has absolutely no bearing on the elements of a strict products liability claim." Tabieros, 944 P.2d at 1298 n.11 (quoting Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 740 P.2d 548, 549 (Haw. 1987)). "When a product warning has been provided by a manufacturer, the adequacy of that warning is generally a question of fact for the jury."

  10. Burlington Insurance v. United Coatings Manufacturing

    518 F. Supp. 2d 1241 (D. Haw. 2007)   Cited 26 times
    Holding that unfair or deceptive acts or practices, specific performance, negligent misrepresentation, and negligence claims all stemmed from the defendant's contracts and warranties, rather than “any independent duty originating in tort,” and were therefore excluded from the CGL policy's coverage

    Instead, the plaintiff need only show that the seller is engaged in the business of selling the product, that the product contains a defect dangerous to the user or consumer, and that the defect is the cause of the injury. A product is dangerously defective if it does not meet the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer or user as to its safety." Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 69 Haw. 287, 288, 740 P.2d 548, 549 (1987) (internal citation omitted) (on certified question from the Ninth Circuit). Years later, the Hawaii Supreme Court limited the scope of the strict products liability doctrine by adopting the socalled "economic loss rule" which "applies to bar recovery of pure economic loss in actions based on products liability."