It is clear that under Hawaii law, "in a strict liability action, state-of-the-art evidence is not admissible for the purpose of establishing whether the seller knew or reasonably should have known of the dangerousness of his or her product." Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 68 Haw. ___, 740 P.2d 548, 549 (1987). The seller's knowledge of the dangers inherent in it's product, "although highly relevant to a negligence action, has absolutely no bearing on the elements of a strict products liability claim."
This appeal raises a controlling question of Hawaii State tort law which we certified to the Supreme Court of Hawaii and which that court has now decided. See Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., ___ Haw. ___, 740 P.2d 548 (1987). Because the decision of the Supreme Court of Hawaii conflicts with the ruling of the district court in this case, we reverse and remand.
Not before us is the issue whether state-of-the-art evidence is admissible in design defect cases, whether tried on the "risk/benefit" or the "consumer expectation" theory.In re Asbestos Cases (9th Cir. 1987) 829 F.2d 907; Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. (1987) 69 Haw. 287 [ 740 P.2d 548]; In re Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases (D.Hawaii 1986) 665 F. Supp. 1454. Defendants asserted that when plaintiff struck his cause of action for punitive damages, he necessarily struck the allegations of failure to warn.
Under Hawaii strict product liability law, a defendant is only liable if a plaintiff can show "that the seller is engaged in the business of selling the product, that the product contains a defect dangerous to the user or consumer, and that the defect is the cause of the injury." Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 740 P.2d 548, 549 (Haw. 1987) (on certified question from the Ninth Circuit) (citing Ontai v. Straub Clinic and Hosp., 659 P.2d 734, 739 (Haw. 1983)); see In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases, 960 F.2d 806, 815 (9th Cir. 1992). "A product is dangerously defective if it does not meet the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer or user as to its safety."
We, therefore, hold that in a strict products liability action, state-of-the-art evidence is not admissible for the purpose of establishing whether the seller knew or reasonably should have known of the dangerousness of his or her product." Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 69 Haw. 287, 740 P.2d 548, 549 (1987) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). While the Hawaii Supreme Court interpreted the question we certified to it narrowly, and thus purported to decide only that evidence regarding a defendant's actual or constructive knowledge of the perils of its products is irrelevant in cases where a plaintiff challenges the inherent dangerousness of those products, 740 P.2d at 549 n. 2, we construed its ruling as applying to suits challenging the adequacy of a defendant's warnings as well.
"[I]n a strict products liability action, the issue of whether the seller knew or reasonably should have known of the dangers inherent in his or her product is irrelevant to the issue of liability." Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 69 Haw. 287, 288, 740 P.2d 548, 549 (1987). "Although highly relevant to a negligence action, it has absolutely no bearing on the elements of a strict products liability claim."
The statute of limitations commences to run on a products liability action on the earliest date that a plaintiff knows, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should know of the following elements: (1) that the defendant is engaged in the business of manufacturing or selling the product; (2) that the product contains a defect dangerous to the user or consumer; and (3) that the defect is the cause of his injury. Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 69 Haw. 287, 740 P.2d 548, 549 (1987). A product is dangerously defective if "it does not meet the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer or user as to its safety."
Although highly relevant to a negligence action, it has absolutely no bearing on the elements of a strict products liability claim.Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 69 Haw. 287, 288-89, 740 P.2d 548, 549 (1987) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But cf. Maneely v. General Motors Corp., 108 F.3d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 1997) (summarizing California law as follows: "To establish a failure to warn claim, a plaintiff must prove that the manufacturer had a duty to warn of the dangers arising from a foreseeable use of the product and that the breach of that duty was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.
"[I]n a strict products liability action, the issue of whether the seller knew or reasonably should have known of the dangers inherent in his or her product . . . has absolutely no bearing on the elements of a strict products liability claim." Tabieros, 944 P.2d at 1298 n.11 (quoting Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 740 P.2d 548, 549 (Haw. 1987)). "When a product warning has been provided by a manufacturer, the adequacy of that warning is generally a question of fact for the jury."
Instead, the plaintiff need only show that the seller is engaged in the business of selling the product, that the product contains a defect dangerous to the user or consumer, and that the defect is the cause of the injury. A product is dangerously defective if it does not meet the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer or user as to its safety." Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 69 Haw. 287, 288, 740 P.2d 548, 549 (1987) (internal citation omitted) (on certified question from the Ninth Circuit). Years later, the Hawaii Supreme Court limited the scope of the strict products liability doctrine by adopting the socalled "economic loss rule" which "applies to bar recovery of pure economic loss in actions based on products liability."