Opinion
No. 415 C.D. 2013 No. 416 C.D. 2013
02-07-2014
George E. Johnson Jr., Appellant v. Philadelphia Housing Authority
BEFORE: HONORABLE BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE BROBSON
Appellant George E. Johnson, Jr. (Johnson), pro se, appeals from two orders of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court). One of the orders, issued by the Honorable Sandra Mazer Moss, denied Johnson's motion for a preliminary injunction. The other order, issued by the Honorable Shelley Robins New, granted summary judgment in favor of the Philadelphia Housing Authority (PHA). Both matters arose in relation to a civil complaint (Complaint) Johnson filed against PHA. We affirm both orders of the trial court.
Johnson's pro se Complaint contains five counts, the averments of which, such as they are, we summarize as follows: (1) PHA acted with negligence in the performance of its duties; (2) PHA committed a tort in an effort to keep Johnson from accessing the courts based upon an order of the trial court that denied a discovery motion Johnson filed in the wrong division of the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas; (3) PHA committed an unspecified tort or fraud against Johnson that constitutes a violation of the equal protection clause of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; (4) PHA violated rules of court with regard to an unnamed proceeding; and (5) Johnson filed a grievance with PHA on July 14, 2010, and PHA has failed to respond to the grievance, which conduct, Johnson claims, violates his constitutional right to equal protection and due process.
PHA filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which the trial court denied without prejudice, and the trial court directed Johnson to file an amended complaint, setting forth the material facts upon which he based the claims in the Complaint. When Johnson failed to comply with the trial court's order directing him to file an amended complaint, PHA filed a second motion for judgment on the pleadings, which consisted of demurrers to the individual counts. Johnson responded to the motion by arguing again that the trial court erred in proceeding in light of PHA's allegedly late answer to the Complaint. The Honorable Marlene F. Lachman issued an order granting PHA's motion in part, dismissing Counts I through IV of the Complaint. Judge Lachman denied PHA's motion as to Count V, concerning PHA's alleged inaction on his grievance, concluding that Johnson had pleaded some facts relating to that Count. Thereafter, Judge Mazer Moss issued a pretrial order.
On the same date, the trial court also denied motions for default judgment and summary judgment Johnson had filed based upon an allegedly untimely-filed answer by PHA to Johnson's Complaint. The trial court concluded that PHA's answer following Johnson's motion for default was filed within the time limitations relating to requests for default judgments and denied his motions on those grounds. Johnson appealed these two orders as well as the trial court's order denying PHA's motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Superior Court dismissed the first two appeals and quashed the third. --------
Within one week of the issuance of the pretrial order, PHA filed a motion for summary judgment regarding Count V. The summary judgment motion set forth a historical framework describing PHA's responses to Johnson's grievance. The motion for summary judgment included a copy of a grievance-hearing request Johnson filed with PHA on May 17, 2010, in which Johnson claimed that PHA had promised to install a backyard fence but had not complied. Another exhibit indicated that PHA sent a notice to Johnson on June 10, 2010, scheduling a hearing for June 24, 2010. Exhibit E to the summary judgment motion is an order dated June 28, 2010, dismissing the grievance because Johnson did not appear at the hearing. PHA also attached Exhibit F, which is another grievance request form, dated June 14, 2010, in which Johnson attached a copy of the earlier grievance hearing request form that PHA had acted upon as described above. PHA thereafter conducted a hearing on August 26, 2010, at which time Johnson appeared in order to pursue his request for a fence. The August 27, 2010 order issued by Arbitrator Bethann R. Naples, Esq., indicated that PHA had altered its fence policy and was no longer installing fences at the location where Johnson resides. The Arbitrator denied Johnson's request. Johnson pursued an appeal of that decision to the Court of Common Pleas, which denied his appeal on June 13, 2011.
The day after PHA filed its summary judgment motion, Johnson filed a petition for preliminary injunction. Johnson based his request for relief on his general allegation that the earlier orders that had been issued were either the result of fraud or invalid or an abuse of discretion by the trial court. Johnson also claimed in his memorandum of law that he believed the process that had been applied in the trial court deliberately sought to discriminate against him as an in forma pauperis litigant. Johnson did not provide factual details in support of his claim, but referred specifically to his earlier claim that the trial court should not have permitted PHA's answer to be filed, based upon his belief that it was untimely. Thus, it is clear that Johnson's primary objection was with the trial court's orders, rather than with the actions of PHA.
As indicated above, Judge Mazer Moss denied Johnson's request for a preliminary injunction, concluding that Johnson failed to demonstrate all of the elements necessary for the grant of such relief. Judge Robins New granted summary judgment based upon the above-noted documents PHA attached to the summary judgment motion indicating that not only did PHA address the merits of Johnson's grievance, but also demonstrating that Johnson had pursued his appeal of the matter to the Court of Common Pleas. Judge Robins New concluded that, contrary to Johnson's claims, he had received due process in the grievance proceedings, PHA had not acted negligently, and Johnson suffered no harm as a result of negligence or improper conduct on the part of PHA.
In this appeal, Johnson recites various out-of-context legal precepts regarding the subject of fraud upon the court, which he offers in arguing that the trial court "ignored" Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure No. 206.6 and 206.7, relating to rules to show cause. Johnson asserts that the trial court violated his due process and/or equal protection rights by denying his preliminary injunction request without complying with these rules, i.e., issuing a rule to show cause upon PHA why the preliminary injunction should not be granted. We simply are unable to engage in appellate review of this issue as Johnson has failed to brief the issue adequately. Pa. R.A.P. 2119; Irey v. Dep't of Transp., 72 A.3d 762, 771 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (issue waived where appellant failed to develop legal argument or cite relevant legal authority in support of issue).
Additionally, Pa. R.C.P. No. 206.4 makes a trial court's issuance of a rule to show cause a discretionary matter. Thus, there was no impediment to the trial court deciding the motion without issuing a rule to show cause as requested by Johnson. The trial court's decision on the merits of Johnson's petition for a preliminary injunction reflects the nebulous nature of Johnson's pleading, which is lacking in the factual and legal specificity necessary for the trial court to address any legitimate merits in the matter. The petition was lacking in pertinent factual averments and consisted of broad legal complaints. Thus, it was not unreasonable or legally erroneous for the trial court to conclude that Johnson had failed to demonstrate the criteria necessary for the grant of a preliminary injunction.
Johnson also claims that some impropriety occurred because different judicial officers entered orders on the different motions in this case. Johnson again fails to provide adequate discussion and legal citation for the Court to address this issue, even if he properly raised it. Because the two orders involved distinct procedural petitions, we cannot conceive of any possible reason why this process could violate Johnson's constitutional rights. Because Johnson presents no legal argument to challenge the substantive rationale of Judge Robins New's decision on PHA's summary judgment motion, we conclude that Johnson has presented no basis upon which we may consider reversing the trial court's decision.
Accordingly, we will affirm the two orders Johnson has appealed: (1) the order denying his petition for preliminary injunction; and (2) the order granting PHA summary judgment.
/s/_________
P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 7th day of February, 2014, the orders of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (1) denying the petition for a preliminary injunction filed by Appellant George E. Johnson, Jr.; and (2) granting the motion for summary judgment filed by the Philadelphia Housing Authority are AFFIRMED.
/s/_________
P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge